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Preface 
This PhD dissertation concerns the potential and challenges of conducting 
innovation in public-private partnerships with the objective of sustainability 
transformation of waste management systems. The dissertation is based on a 
comparative, embedded case study of the role of public-private partnerships in 
municipal waste management in two countries, England and Denmark. The thesis 
includes two parts: PART I: Introductions and Conclusions and PART II: 
Research Articles. Part I introduces the themes, theories, empirical field and 
methods of the PhD and draws a general conclusion. Part II consists of the 
following three independent, but interlinked research articles: 
- Article 1: The Potential for Conducting Innovation in Public-Private Partnerships 
(submitted to International Public Management Review) 
- Article 2: The Prominent, but Contested Role of Public-Private Partnerships in 
Sustainability Transformations of Waste Management Systems – Comparing 
English and Danish experiences (to be submitted to Environment and Planning A) 
- Article 3: Network, Hierarchy and Market: Managing Mixed Governing 
Strategies for Innovation in Public-Private Partnerships (to be submitted to Public 
Administration). 
The dissertation was conducted between September 2011 and March 2015, where 
I was employed at the Department of Business and Politics (DBP), Copenhagen 
Business School. The PhD was financed by Copenhagen Municipality, Aarhus 
Municipality and Vestforbrænding to whom I am immensely grateful for this 
opportunity. This dissertation has been born with ‘blood, sweat and tears’ but also 
tremendous joy and excitement. I could not have done it without the support of my 
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two supervisors, Professor Carsten Greve and Associate Professor Sine Nørholm 
Just from the Department of Business and Politics at CBS. I would also 
specifically like to thank the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research 
(MIoIR), where I spent three interesting months between March and May 2013, 
and especially to my host, Dr. Sally Gee, for many good questions and 
conversations. Also thanks to the EU-SPRI for granting financial support to this 
research stay.  
 
Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the good people at Liverpool 
University, and especially Dr. Mike Rowe, for hosting the Public Management 
and Public Administration Postgraduate Conference in 2013 and 2014, which 
provided me with two wonderful opportunities to discuss my work in a crowd of 
English researchers. On the same note, I would also like to express my gratitude to 
Professor Jacob Torfing and Professor Eva Sørensen from Roskilde University 
and Associate Professor Karl Löfgren from Victoria University of Wellington as 
well as their group of PhDs for interesting PhD courses and valuable comments to 
some of the early drafts towards this PhD. Furthermore much appreciation goes to 
the two discussants from my second work-in-progress seminar in September 2014, 
Associate Professor Holger Højlund, Department of Management, Politics and 
Philosophy, CBS, and Associate Professor María José Zapata Campos, 
Department of Organization, CBS, for excellent comments towards the finish line.  
 
Lastly, a warm thanks to all of my good colleagues at DBP – you have truly been 
an inspiration to me. Special thanks goes to Christiane Stelling for taking this PPP 
journey along with me, Sofie Blinkenberg-Federspiel for immense moral support 
especially in the last hard-working months and Lasse Folke Henriksen for sharing 
his office with me. On a personal note, I would like to thank my family and 
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friends for bearing with me through this intense period and especially Andreas, for 
coming into my life at the most insane time and staying put.  
 
Thank you. 
 
Sofie Dam 
Copenhagen, March 2015 
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English Abstract 
This PhD concerns the potentials and challenges for conducting innovation in 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) towards the objective of transforming 
municipal waste management towards more sustainable systems. In recent years, 
local authorities have been met with intensified demands from the EU and national 
governments to change existing waste management systems from solutions based 
on disposal and recovery towards more recycling and prevention and at the same 
time deliver more efficient waste management services through the inclusion of 
private businesses. These two demands may to some degree be mutually 
supportive, but may also lead to challenges in the prioritization and development 
of new solutions.  
 
Alongside changes in waste management systems from simple, local ‘collect-and-
throw-away’ systems towards more sustainable, complex socio-technical 
networks, where various types of waste are collected, transported and treated in 
separated streams between a net of public and private actors, private actors have 
gained more influence in the management of municipal waste. Private businesses 
participate as waste collectors, technology developers, managers of treatment 
plants and end-receivers of municipal waste and are also co-producers of this 
waste through the design and production of goods consumed in households. 
Thereby public and private actors have become gradually more interdependent and 
increasingly need to work together to develop more sustainable waste 
management solutions. Concurrently, however, the movement towards 
privatization of waste management services also creates increasing competition 
between public and private actors in waste management, which may lead to the 
opposite effect and result in tensions between these groups. This dilemma frames 
the role of public-private partnerships in municipal waste management. 
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The dissertation is based on an embedded, comparative and explorative case study 
of public-private partnerships, innovation and sustainability transformation in 
municipal waste management in two countries, England and Denmark. The data 
collection includes 43 in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with experts 
and public and private managers with concrete experiences of public-private 
partnerships, and also includes experiences from non-partnership arrangements 
(in-house, traditional contracting out). The interviews are supplemented and 
triangulated by various written material such as regulations, policy strategies, 
contracts, websites, reports, etc. Interviewed respondents and partnerships were 
identified in a qualitative, bottom-up process through networking, ‘snowballing’ 
and observation from several events and fora in the waste management sector.  
 
The dissertation shows that public-private partnerships play a prominent, but also 
continuously contested role in sustainability transformations of English and 
Danish waste management systems. There is a unique potential for conducting 
innovation in PPPs through a mix of hierarchical, market-based and networked 
governing strategies, which in the right balance may lead to both organizational 
and service innovations in municipal waste management. A broad palette of 
partnerships from more networked to more tightly organized types may contribute 
to a gradual sustainability transformation through the development of innovative 
solutions in ’patchworked’ experimentation between actors with different 
positions in the waste system, for example focusing on policy development, 
testing of new technologies and implementation of market mature solutions.  
 
However, the dissertation also points towards a number of challenges for public-
private partnerships. Especially contractual partnerships may entail a tension 
between hierarchy, competition and collaboration, where hierarchical public 
organizations may tend to over-regulate partnerships and thereby deprive 
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themselves from private input, where after inflexible, long-term contracts may 
lock-in the public organization to an insufficient solution, if the organization of the 
partnership and especially the economic incentives does not adequately support 
gradual improvements, flexibility and collaboration. Ultimately, the key is that 
both organizations show a willingness to collaborate, build trusting relationships 
and jointly develop solutions.  
 
EU regulation has been criticized for providing a sub-optimal framework for 
public-private cooperation, but the new public procurement directive now points 
towards more innovative partnerships in the future. It will be interesting to observe 
how this opportunity will be used in waste management, where this need is 
particularly outspoken. Whereas this dissertation has mainly focused on the 
ongoing sustainability transformation from disposal and recovery towards 
recycling, future waste policies will increasingly focus on the prevention of waste, 
which will pose new challenges to the understanding and organization of waste 
and bring forward new actors and forms of cooperation.  
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Dansk resume 
Denne ph.d. fokuserer på potentialer og udfordringer i forhold til at skabe 
innovation i offentligt-private partnerskaber med det formål at bevæge sig mod en 
bæredygtig omstilling af den kommunale affaldshåndtering. Der har i de senere år 
været et øget pres på kommunerne fra EU og nationale regeringer for dels at gøre 
affaldshåndteringen mere bæredygtig ved fx at flytte affald fra deponi og 
forbrænding mod mere genanvendelse og forebyggelse, dels at gøre 
affaldshåndteringen mere effektiv gennem en øget inddragelse af private 
virksomheder. De to krav spiller til en vis grad sammen, men kan også skabe 
udfordringer i prioriteringen og udviklingen af nye løsninger.  
 
I takt med at affaldssystemerne ændres fra simple ’indsaml-og-smid-væk’ 
systemer til mere bæredygtige komplekse, socio-tekniske netværk, hvor 
forskellige typer af affald indsamles, transporteres og behandles i separate 
strømme mellem et net af offentlige og private aktører, har private aktører fået en 
større rolle i affaldshåndteringen. Private virksomheder deltager som indsamlere, 
teknologileverandører, behandlere og modtagere af kommunalt affald og i høj grad 
også som med-producenter af affaldet gennem design og produktion af varer og 
emballage, der ender i husholdningsaffaldet. Dermed skabes en øget afhængighed 
mellem offentlige og private aktører, der i stigende grad må samarbejde om at 
skabe mere bæredygtige affaldsløsninger. Samtidig skaber bevægelsen mod 
privatisering af affaldshåndteringen dog også en stigende grad af konkurrence om 
affaldet mellem offentlige og private, der kan have den modsatrettede effekt og 
give spændinger mellem aktørerne. Dette dilemma sætter rammen for offentligt-
private partnerskabers rolle i affaldssektoren.  
 
Afhandlingen er baseret på et indlejret, komparativt og eksplorativt case studie af 
offentligt-private partnerskaber, innovation og bæredygtig omstilling i den 
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kommunale affaldshåndtering i to lande, England og Danmark. Dataindsamlingen 
inkluderer 43 dybdegående, semi-strukturerede kvalitative interviews med 
eksperter samt kommunale og private aktører med erfaringer fra offentligt-private 
partnerskaber og inkluderer også interviews med aktører fra alternative 
organiseringsformer (in-house og traditionelle kontrakter). Interviewene er 
suppleret og trianguleret med tekstmateriale fra lovtekster, politiske strategier, 
kontrakter, hjemmesider, rapporter, etc. Interviewpersoner og partnerskaber er 
identificeret gennem en kvalitativ, bottom-up tilgang via netværk, 
’sneboldsmetoden’ og deltagelse i forskellige arrangementer og fora i 
affaldssektoren. 
 
Afhandlingen viser, at offentligt-private partnerskaber spiller en væsentlig, men 
også omdiskuteret rolle i den bæredygtige omstilling af kommunal 
affaldshåndtering i England og Danmark. Der er et særligt potentiale i 
partnerskaber for at skabe innovation gennem et mix af hierarkiske, 
markedsbaserede og netværksbaserede strategier og styringsformer, der i et 
afbalanceret samspil kan lede til innovation i både organiseringen af 
affaldshåndtering og i de konkrete services. En bred pallette af partnerskaber fra 
mere netværksbaserede til mere tæt organiserede former kan bidrage til en gradvis 
bæredygtig omstilling ved at udvikle innovative løsninger gennem et kludetæppe 
af eksperimenter i samspil mellem aktører fra forskellige positioner i 
affaldssystemet, fx med fokus på policy-udvikling, test af nye teknologier og 
implementering af markedsmodne løsninger.  
 
Afhandlingen peger dog også på en række udfordringer for offentligt-private 
partnerskaber. Især de kontraktbaserede partnerskaber indeholder en spænding 
mellem hierarki, konkurrence og samarbejde, hvor hierarkisk styrede offentlige 
organisationer kan have en tendens til at overregulere partnerskaber og dermed 
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udelukke sig fra muligheden for private input, hvorefter lange, ufleksible 
kontrakter kan fastholde den offentlige organisation i en utilstrækkelig løsning, 
hvis organiseringen af partnerskabet og især de økonomiske incitamenter ikke i 
tilstrækkelig grad understøtter løbende forbedringer, fleksibilitet og samarbejde. I 
sidste ende er hovedsagen, at begge organisationer viser en vilje til at samarbejde, 
opbygge tillid og skabe løsninger i fællesskab.  
 
EU-lovgivningen kritiseres for ikke at skabe de optimale rammer for offentligt-
privat samarbejde, men nu peger en ny udbudslov mod mere innovative 
partnerskaber i fremtiden, og det bliver interessant at se, hvordan denne mulighed 
håndteres i affaldssektoren, hvor dette behov er meget udtalt. Mens denne 
afhandling især har fokuseret på den igangværende omstilling fra deponi og 
forbrænding mod genanvendelse, vil fremtidige affaldspolitikker i stigende grad 
fokusere på affaldsforebyggelse, der stiller nye udfordringer til forståelsen og 
organiseringen af affaldshåndtering og bringer nye aktører og samarbejder på 
banen.   
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PART I: INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2011, this project’s main supervisor, Professor Carsten Greve, was contacted by 
three of the most prominent actors in the Danish waste management sector. 
Copenhagen Municipality, Aarhus Municipality and the publicly owned company 
Vestforbrænding I/S were interested in a political scientist’s view on the changing 
conditions for delivering waste management services, which they experienced in 
their daily work. These local waste managers experienced a number of dramatic 
changes in the regulation and organization of municipal waste management, such 
as higher demands for environmental sustainable solutions, internationalization of 
waste regulations and markets, a growing pressure for externalization of waste 
management services to private providers and an increased focus on citizen 
service, innovative design and new technologies. As they experienced challenges 
in meeting these new demands within the current regulatory framework and 
traditional contracting out practices in waste management, they posed the 
question, if and how their role as municipal managers was changing? In line with 
this, they were considering new forms of contracting out and cooperation with 
private sector actors, such as public-private partnerships.   
 
These initial discussions led to the launching of this PhD project in September 
2011 as a co-financed project between CBS and these three organizations. As 
such, the PhD has taken its starting point in empirically experienced challenges in 
a field that has been - and continuously is - undergoing substantial transformation 
in Denmark, but also in a broader European context. Thus the PhD project began 
with a strong focus on the regulatory changes and the specific challenges of 
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contracting out waste collection services. As the project evolved, it became clear 
that these discussions were embedded in a more far-reaching societal challenge.  
 
The issue of waste management addresses the fundamental construction of our 
society. Today’s capitalist society evolves around the production and consumption 
of goods. A key consequence of this is the production of waste. We produce 
goods, we use them and we throw them away. We also discard of the packaging 
wrapped around our goods, or the leftover food we did not manage to consume 
after all. Already in the 1960-70’ies, some people began to question this practice. 
In 1972, the Club of Rome published the now famous ‘Limits to Growth’ report 
(Meadows et al 1972), where the authors addressed the issue of scarce world 
resources in a first attempt to investigate the interdependencies between five 
global problems: ‘accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, 
widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources, and a 
deteriorating environment’ (p. 21). Their message was that the continuation of 
current growth trends and resource depletion were leading towards an ultimate 
limit of growth. However, according to the Club of Rome, this trend could be 
turned around, if the world’s nations developed more sustainable practices of 
resource use and material recycling: 
 
“It depends on how the major resource-consuming societies handle some 
important decisions ahead. They might continue to increase resource consumption 
according to the present pattern. They might learn to reclaim and recycle discarded 
materials. They might develop new designs to increase the durability of products 
made from scarce resources. They might encourage social and economic patterns 
that would satisfy the needs of a person while minimizing, rather than maximizing, 
the irreplaceable substances he possesses.”  
(Meadows et al 1972, p.67-68) 
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The report was later criticised for its ‘doom day’ message - after all, the world has 
not collapsed yet. Essentially, though, we are still facing the same problems that 
the authors of this report presented more than 40 years ago. The report made an 
important contribution to our understanding of the crucial interdependencies 
between systems. Waste generation is closely interlinked with industrial 
production of goods, population rates and consumption patterns. The easiest way 
to reduce waste continues to be to reduce economic activity, although this is rarely 
seen as a favourable solution (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tada 2012). Generating and 
storing waste products may lead to production of GFC gasses contributing to 
climate change or pollution of the environment, but produced waste may also be 
used to deliver energy and heat to citizens and release materials for new 
production processes. As such, waste management is a crucial part of the 
challenge of sustainable development.  
 
Waste production and management increasingly take place through local and 
global networks of various public, private and civil society actors. As with many 
other complex, global issues, there is not one actor, who controls waste. 
Accordingly, there will be no one actor, who can solve the challenge of waste 
either. In these complex situations of interdependency, where knowledge and 
resources are spread between various actors that are dependent on each other to 
achieve their goals, public-private partnerships are often mentioned as a useful 
form of governing (see for instance Osborne 2000, Teisman and Klijn 2002, 
Kooiman 2003, Bulkeley and Newel 2010). As Teisman and Klijn (2002) directly 
state: “Partnerships are seen as the best way, in the end, to govern the complex 
relations and interactions in a modern network society” (p.198). Partnerships 
might connect global organizations to global firms, public organizations to other 
public organizations, private producers to private sub-producers, civil society 
actors to local decision-makers or involve a broad range of actors from various 
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spheres. This PhD dissertation focuses on the role of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) between local public authorities and private sector actors in municipal solid 
waste management. 
 
As such, it is not within the limits of this PhD to deliver a prescription for a global 
sustainability transformation of waste management. However, the structural 
conditions for waste management and the aim of sustainability are important parts 
of the context for the investigated PPPs as these conditions shape the practices and 
challenges of municipal waste managers. In recent years, sustainability of waste 
management practices have risen on the political agenda, where seeing ‘waste as a 
resource’ has become a new narrative. As such, sustainability continues to be a 
global guiding principle that frames concrete political targets and local practices of 
waste management. In this PhD, I will investigate the role of PPPs as policy 
instruments for conducting innovation towards the objective of moving towards 
more sustainable waste management systems. The hope is that an in-depth 
understanding of current practices and challenges may deliver important input and 
a solid starting point to discuss the next steps towards sustainable waste 
management.  
 
As such, the perspective of the PhD has broadened over time. From an initial 
focus on waste collection, the PhD now also includes waste treatment, as these 
two segments of municipal waste services are hard to separate in the development 
of sustainable solutions. For example, it might not be very useful to implement 
separate collections of glass and plastic waste, if there is no treatment facility to 
prepare them for recycling. Likewise, there is no need for an expensive treatment 
facility, if your waste is not sorted to fit the chosen technology. Furthermore, as I 
asked the question of where and how innovative solution entered into these waste 
management systems, I was also led to various networked forms of PPPs including 
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a broader range of actors,  which more directly aimed at developing new solutions 
in the forms of new policies and/or technologies. These have also been included in 
the thesis.  
  
The purpose of the dissertation is twofold; the author wishes both to contribute to 
current research on public-private partnerships as policy instruments for 
innovation of sustainable solutions in a broader context of public management 
reforms and to develop knowledge that might be useful for practitioners in the 
field of waste management. Theoretically, the PhD especially focuses on the 
development of a theoretical framework for understanding the possibilities and 
challenges of conducting innovation in PPPs, including the potential role of PPPs 
in sustainability transformations of waste management systems. More generally 
speaking, waste management is used as a case to investigate the potential and 
challenges for conducting innovations in institutionalised cooperation between 
public and private actors towards complex societal challenges. Empirically, the 
PhD specifically aims to investigate the role of PPPs in municipal waste 
management.  The ambition is to present a thick, context based description of the 
considerations, experiences and developments of PPPs in this policy field. As 
such, this PhD also intends to open the field of waste management as a subject of 
public administration and public management in which it has been largely absent 
(Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008b, Campos and Hall 2013). 
 
For these aims, the analytical strategy has been a comparative case study of PPP 
practices in Denmark and England; both to provide a clearer picture of the Danish 
case through comparison and to draw on experiences from PPPs in the English 
waste sector, where PPPs have played a much greater role than in the Danish 
counterpart. Denmark and England are both highly industrialized countries with a 
large waste generation, but they have handled the challenge of waste differently. 
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Denmark started to develop more sustainable systems of waste management 
across the country in the 1960s, and the first incineration plant with energy and 
heat production was built at Frederiksberg already in 1903 (Kleis and Dalager 
2003). England used garbage to fill holes in the ground from the extraction 
industry until EU regulation pressured them to act in the 1990s (Davoudi and 
Evans 2005). Since then, England has used PPPs to take a huge step forward 
towards more sustainable waste systems, which in this short time-span has brought 
them close to the Danish level of recycling. In comparison, contractual PPPs have 
played a much smaller role in Denmark, which might be curious compared to the 
general collaborative structure in the Danish governing tradition. However, 
partnerships are now ‘the talk of the town’ in the Danish waste community and a 
few PPPs have emerged.  
 
As such, these two cases pinpoint the question of the role of PPPs in innovation of 
waste management systems towards more sustainable solutions. The English case 
might suggest that PPPs could indeed be an efficient policy tool to provide more 
sustainable waste systems. However, the Danish case suggests that it was possible 
to reach the same level much earlier without PPPs, although curiously, the Danes 
are now considering PPPs for the next steps forward. It might just be a question of 
managerial ‘fashion’. After all, the PFI-style PPP was invented in the UK, whereas 
it has never had a great breakthrough in Denmark. However, there might also be 
legitimate and rational reasons why Danish waste managers have not fully 
embraced PPPs. Perhaps there is a dark side to the apparent English success story?  
 
PPPs have had a rather turbulent life in England, where they have been both 
broadly celebrated and fiercely critiqued. Furthermore, in both cases there seem to 
be only a few PPPs in collection of waste, where in-house solutions or traditional 
contracting out continue to dominate. Why is that, when theory clearly argue for 
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the advantages of partnerships? Are public authorities wasting opportunities? 
These two cases provoke a number of questions to the apparently complex 
interrelationships between PPPs, innovation and sustainability in waste 
management, which I will attempt to answer in this PhD.   
  
On the background of these questions and considerations, this introductory chapter 
will outline the main themes and concepts in the PhD. The chapter will begin by 
introducing municipal waste management as a changing empirical field. This will 
be followed by introductions to three main concepts in the thesis: public-private 
partnerships, innovation and sustainability. Lastly, the chapter will present the 
research questions and the analytical design, which will frame the dissertation and 
connect the three articles.  
Municipal waste management  
The changes in waste management experienced by public waste managers today 
takes place in a historical context of alterations in the way waste has been 
perceived and organized. Waste has always been a part of society, but the nature 
of waste has changed along with new patterns of production and consumption. 
With Industrialisation the amounts and content of waste changed and brought milk 
cartons, plastic and paper diapers into the daily life’s of citizens, where they made 
redundant old practices of repairing and reusing (Kleis and Dalager 2003). Today, 
a renewed political and industrial focus on seeing ‘waste as a resource’ seems to 
have brought back this former awareness of the value of waste (Corvellec and 
Hultman 2012).  
 
The legal definition of waste in the EU Waste Framework Directive describes 
waste as: ‘any substance or object which the holder discards or intends to discard’ 
(EC 2008, Article 3, 1). As such, waste is understood as something that is 
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‘unwanted’, a leftover from production and consumption no longer of value to the 
owner (White et al 1995). From the moment products are discarded as waste, they 
lose their ‘use and exchange value’, and thus their identity as what they were 
before (Minervini 2013). The definition of waste is dynamic and may include an 
almost endless list of waste types that are discarded. This dissertation focuses on 
‘municipal solid waste’ (MSW), which is waste produced by households or similar 
waste types produced by small businesses and public institutions that are collected 
through a municipal collection scheme (EUROSTAT 2011). Municipal waste 
usually includes waste types such as glass, paper, card, metal, plastics, organic and 
‘residual waste’ (mixed ‘non-recyclable’ waste). Accordingly, municipal waste 
management is the collection, treatment and disposal of municipal solid waste.  
 
Municipal solid waste is considered more challenging and expensive to manage 
than waste from other sources (Davoudi 2009). The mix of various types of waste 
complicates the task of collecting and sorting and increase the cost of waste 
management systems compared to more homogenous waste types (Hoornweg and 
Bhada-Tada 2012, p.14). A main task for local authorities is to find the optimal 
system of bring or kerbside collections for various streams of waste and arrange 
for them to be transported to different destination points for treatment. Although 
municipal waste tends to be a smaller part of the total waste production (in 
England for example, municipal waste counted for 10,7 % of total waste produced 
in 2006/7 (Davoudi 2009), the management of this waste is a critical issue for 
local authorities to secure the functioning and well-being of local communities. 
Waste management is a public service that affects all citizens on a weekly or 
perhaps even daily basis, and although waste management is often overlooked, 
people tend to notice, when these systems break down and waste is suddenly 
piling up in the streets (Corvellec and Hultman 2013). A scare example is the city 
of Naples, where pictures of piles of waste were wired around the world in the 
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1990s and the mafia as recent as last year orchestrated illegal toxic bonfires of 
industrial waste.  
 
Waste is a social construct. What is waste today may not be waste tomorrow, and 
what is waste in London may not be the same as waste in Milan (Davies 2007, 
MacKillop 2009). Accordingly, there is no global recipe for waste management 
and it has traditionally been considered a subject for local authorities. However, 
municipal waste management has gradually developed into complex, multi-level 
governed systems, where the EU and national regulations and targets direct the 
work of local authorities, who are increasingly dependent on private and civil 
society actors to achieve their goals (Uyarra and Gee 2012). As a consequence of a 
growing marketization and upgrading of waste management techniques, private 
sector actors are gradually taking a more central role in municipal waste 
management as service providers, developers of new technologies and receivers of 
recycled products.  
 
In line with this development, there has been an increasing attention towards 
public-private partnerships in the delivery of waste management services. 
However, we continue to know little on the organisation, processes and results of 
these PPPs (Slater 2007). This PhD will explore how waste management PPPs 
work in practice to investigate the potential, limitations and challenges for these 
policy instruments in the management of waste. The next section will outline the 
understanding of PPPs in the dissertation. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships  
PPPs may broadly be understood as ‘cooperative institutional arrangements 
between public and private sector actors’ (Greve and Hodge 2005).  Whereas 
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PPPs are more often narrowly defined as long-term infrastructure contracts 
between public authorities and private companies, this PhD aims to take a broader 
approach to capture the variety of PPP types in municipal waste management 
services. The PhD focuses on partnerships between one or more public authorities 
or public companies delegated the responsibility for waste management services 
and private sector companies working with them for this purpose. I do not 
particularly focus on partnerships with the community sector, although these play 
a relatively large role in the English context (Sharp and Luckin 2006). Neither do I 
focus on partnerships that are purely public-public or private-private, or 
partnerships initiated by central governments or other facilitating organizations 
with local authorities being absent. Whereas the main focus has been on 
contractual PPPs (PFIs, partnering contracts, joint ventures, etc.), I do, however, 
also include partnerships of a more networked character, where local authorities 
participate in cooperations between a broader range of actors.  The scope of PPPs 
investigated changes between the articles in the PhD, which I will return to in 
Chapter 2. 
 
In line with Greve and Hodge (2005), the PhD focuses on PPPs ‘because the 
concept promises a new way of managing and governing organizations that 
delivers service to citizens’ ( p.2). PPPs may be seen as a ‘qualitative jump ahead 
in the effort to combine the strong sides of both the public sector and the private 
sector’ (ibid.). In contrast to pure privatization, PPPs should not involve a 
complete shift of responsibility for public service delivery to the private sector. 
Rather, the aim is to establish collaborative relations, where public and private 
sector actors share ideas, resources, risks and costs to jointly develop and deliver 
public services and thereby improve outcomes (Rosenau 2000, Klijn and Teisman 
2005). However, this might not be without challenges, and as we will return to in 
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Chapter 2, PPPs have also been subject of harsh critiques, and it has been 
questioned if PPPs in practice deliver on these promises.  
 
PPPs may to some degree be studied isolated as organizational forms and policy 
instruments in ‘whatever’ field. However, PPPs do not exist in a vacuum. They are 
initiated and organized in a current and historical context, and, as Osborne and 
Murray (2000) recommend, it is important to be aware of the impact of these 
external factors upon the success of PPPs. This PhD dissertation investigates PPPs 
in the empirical field of waste management, which brings specific advantages and 
challenges to PPPs. In both national cases, England and Denmark, waste 
management policies demand a change in current practices. As such, a main 
challenge for public waste managers is the pressure towards innovation of current 
practices and development of more sustainable waste management systems.  The 
question is, if PPPs may be relevant instruments for this purpose. The next section 
will outline the understanding of innovation in this context. 
Innovation  
Innovation may be understood as a creative process of developing new ideas to 
change existing practices in a specific setting and also involves the 
implementation and potentially diffusion of these ideas (Mulgan and Albury 2003, 
Walker 2006, Van de Ven et al 2008). There are various types and scopes of 
innovation, ranging from smaller, incremental service changes to more radical, 
break-through innovations in a sector, or even comprehensive system innovations 
involving new technologies, organizations and relationships between 
organizations fuelled by new mind-sets and policies (Mulgan and Albury 2003, 
Moore 2005).  
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Innovation has traditionally been connected to the private sector, where the 
disciplining effect of competition in a process of ‘creative destruction’ was said to 
induce companies to innovate in order to survive (Shumpeter 1943). In contrast, 
the public sector’s role has mainly been perceived as one of supporting private 
sector innovation (Sørensen 2012). However, an increasing body of research has 
begun to explore innovation in the public sector, which perhaps is not quite as 
rigid, rule-bound and bureaucratic as its reputation (Hartley 2005, Moore 2005, 
Osborne and Brown 2011).  At least, public innovation scholars have identified a 
number of innovations in public programs and services (Borins 1998, Albury 
2005).  
 
In the 1980s, New Public Management effectively placed innovation on the public 
sector agenda, and the pressure from the global financial and economic crisis has 
in many welfare states brought the issue back on top of the political agenda 
(Sørensen 2012). Today’s public sector is met by complex societal challenges 
such as climate change, poverty or social inequality in an increasingly fragmented 
and diverse society, where growing citizen expectations to individualized 
solutions and restrained public budgets place governments in a cross-pressure 
situation. These developments have led to an emphasis on innovation of public 
services to deliver ‘more for less’ (Kooiman 1993, Albury 2005, Sørensen and 
Torfing 2011, Bekkers et al 2011). There is a growing acknowledgment in the 
public sector that finding these new solutions demands coordination and 
cooperation across public sector organizations as well as with a range of actors 
from the private sector or civil society, for instance through public-private 
partnerships (Mandell and Steelman 2003, Bommert 2010, Sørensen and Torfing 
2011).  
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However, despite this general agreement, a theoretical base to support the 
connection between PPPs and innovation seems to be lacking (Leiringer 2006). 
Innovative results from PPPs are less studied and show mixed results (see for 
instance Ball et al 2000, Hurst and Reeves 2004, Bovaird 2006, Leiringer 2006, 
Esteve et al 2012). Accordingly, this thesis aims to develop a theoretically based 
framework to understand the various results of innovation from PPPs. 
Furthermore, an increasing body of PPP research has emphasized the importance 
of the management of PPPs from the establishment of the PPP to the phase after 
signing of the contract (Osborne and Murray 2000, Fischbacher and Beaumont 
2003, Noble and Jones 2006, Ysa 2007, Weihe 2010, Steijn et al 2011). Hence, the 
PhD aims to investigate the role of management in the PPP process for conducting 
innovation. The following section will outline the understanding of sustainable 
waste management applied in the dissertation.  
Towards sustainable waste management 
Sustainable development was defined in the Brundtland Report ‘Our common 
future’ as ‘development that meets the needs of the present, without comprising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987). This 
development outlines trajectories of change, which combines environmental 
objectives with economic wealth and social cohesion. There has been a lot of 
enthusiasm about ‘win-win’ solutions, for instance concerning export 
opportunities for ‘green’ technology, but as Kemp, Loorbach and Rotmans (2007) 
points to, it is important to acknowledge the potential trade-offs between these 
three goals in any type of development process. In practice, each new 
technological development brings new social issues to the table, which need to be 
dealt with politically and organizationally (p.79). In a specific local context, the 
potential of a new ‘green’ solution will be weighed against economic costs and 
social acceptance. As such ‘sustainable development’ is not a static concept, but a 
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dynamic transformation process, in which new solutions are developed, tested, 
discussed and negotiated (ibid.).  
 
Broadly speaking, sustainable waste management concerns the prevention of 
generation and management of waste from harming the environment and human 
health, refraining from excessive resource use and the development of closed-loop 
systems for material recycling (EC 2008). In line with other authors (Bulkeley et 
al 2005, Corvellec and Hultman 2012), the thesis will take the European Waste 
Hierarchy as a generally accepted guideline for the transformation towards 
sustainable waste management. The hierarchy ranks waste management methods 
according to environmental impact from prevention of waste, preparing for re-use, 
recycling, and recovery with disposal (landfilling) as the least favoured option (EC 
2008, Article 4). As such, sustainability transformation would involve moving up 
the waste hierarchy. However, the hierarchy does not include for example the 
environmental effects of waste transport, which link up to the challenge of climate 
change and has been a focus point of development in many local authorities.  
 
The return to a stronger sustainability concept, where waste is seen as a resource, 
has brought a new attention to the top layers in the waste hierarchy; waste 
prevention and recycling. This narrative has been strengthened both at the 
European level, where the most recent waste strategy from the Commission, 
‘Towards a circular economy: A zero waste programme for Europe’, addresses 
waste in the context of a broader transformation of production and consumption 
patterns1 (EC 2014a), at the national level, where for example the Danish 
government applies increasing pressure on municipalities to increase recycling in 
favour of incineration in the strategy ‘Denmark without waste’ (Danish 
                                                          
1 This strategy has, however, recently been re-drawn by the new Commission and a replacement is expected next 
year. 
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Government 2013), and at the local level, where for example the publicly owned 
company Renosyd has implemented a new ‘resource’ bin for mixed recyclables in 
Skanderborg and Odder municipalities in Denmark (www.renosyd.dk).  
 
The development is supported by new concepts such as a ‘circular economy’, 
developed by the international organization Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2012), 
which gather actors to change the ‘take-make-dispose’ and buy-consume’ patterns 
of modern society and strive to provide concrete examples of the possibilities of 
reducing material use and circulating materials. Industry actors seem to 
increasingly catch on to this as they begin to develop for example ‘industrial 
symbiosis’, where literally one companies waste becomes another company’s 
treasure. The same development seems to spread bottom-up from civil society, 
where new initiatives to loan, exchange, share or give away instead of buying new 
products are emerging. As such, this renewed sustainability agenda opens a 
‘window of opportunity’ for a change in current practices. 
 
This PhD dissertation investigates the role of PPPs in waste management within 
this period of transformation, where innovation and sustainability is brought to the 
forefront. A changing contextual environment raises some challenges for research, 
and it might have been easier to study and conclude upon a transformation process 
that had already taken place, such as the study of the socio-technical transition 
from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (1860-1930) (Geels 2005). During this 
three years period, new policies have been launched, new partnerships have begun 
and new research papers on these subjects have emerged. As far as possible, the 
PhD has attempted to capture these changes. Furthermore, most of the PPPs 
studied have not yet been completed, and it may still be difficult to see their role 
and contributions in a larger perspective.  
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On the other hand, studying PPPs in waste management in the midst of a 
transformation process gives a unique first hand insight into the potential role of 
PPPs during processes of change. Furthermore, it provides the possibility for 
research to contribute to these societal developments by creating knowledge to 
inform the choices of actors and increase their awareness of their own (potential) 
contribution to sustainability processes. A municipal waste manager once asked 
me, ‘So, all right, I get the whole waste as resources agenda, but who should do it, 
and what is the municipalities role in this transformation? What can we do?’ 
Hopefully, this PhD dissertation will provide a few pointers for eager and 
ambitious municipal waste managers engaging in this challenge.   
Research questions 
On this background, the PhD dissertation poses the following main research 
question:  
What are the potentials and challenges in public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
for conducting innovation towards the objective of sustainability 
transformation of municipal waste management systems? 
 
Accordingly, the research question links the potential for innovating in PPPs with 
the political objective and demand of transforming waste management in a more 
sustainable direction, which conditions the successful use of PPPs in this empirical 
field. In order to provide an answer to this question, the PhD will investigate three 
research sub-questions that address various dimensions of the main research 
question: 
 
1) What is the potential for conducting innovation in PPPs? 
In the context of the increased demand for innovation in the public sector in 
general, and in the particular case of waste management, the general idea of PPPs 
as a good policy instrument to gather actors and resources across publican a 
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private spheres to develop innovative solution to pressing problems and the 
underdevelopment of a theoretical basis to support this, the first sub-question 
addresses the potential for innovation in PPPs. As such, this sub-question opens 
and explores the two main concepts of PPPs and innovation and their 
interrelatedness. The question will be answered through a review of existing ideas 
and empirical investigations of innovation in PPPs. 
 
2) How may PPPs contribute to sustainability transformations? What is the 
role of PPPs in English and Danish sustainability transformations of waste 
management systems?  
From this starting point, the second sub-question focuses on the objective of 
sustainability change and addresses the theoretical question of how PPPs may 
contribute to processes of sustainability transformation, supported by an empirical 
question of the role of PPPs in waste management in two specific cases, England 
and Denmark. Asking about ‘the role’ of these PPPs implies an interest in the 
general use of various types of PPPs in waste management, if and how identified 
PPPs are used as policy instruments for sustainability transformation and to what 
extent they contribute towards this aim. The question will be answered through a 
comparative analysis of the role of PPPs in sustainability transformations of waste 
management in England and Denmark. 
 
3) How is innovation conducted in PPP processes, and in what way may 
public managers support this? 
Based on the theoretical review and conceptual model developed from the first 
research question and the empirical mapping of PPPs and contextual knowledge of 
change processes in waste systems from the second question, the third sub-
question goes on to inquire into the detailed processes of innovation in PPPs and 
further addresses the importance of public manager’s managerial effort for 
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successful innovation in PPP processes. As such, the question may reveal both 
potentials and challenges of PPP innovation. The question will be answered on the 
basis of selected empirical cases of PPPs in municipal waste management. 
 
These research questions will be answered in the introductory paper on the basis 
of the analyses in the three articles of the PhD. As the next section will explain, 
the papers each mainly contribute to a specific sub-question, but may supplement 
the answers of the other questions as well. As such, all articles feed into a 
collective answer to the main research question.  
Analytical design 
The analytical design of the PhD is built around a comparative, embedded case 
study of PPPs in municipal waste management in England and Denmark (Yin 
2009). This approach enables some degree of generalization across cases, without 
jeopardizing the possibility for a context-based understanding. In contrast to 
‘holistic’ case studies, the embedded design allows the dissertation to examine 
specific phenomena in operational detail by ‘zooming in’ on specific sub-units 
(PPP projects) within a more global approach to the case (PPPs in Denmark and 
England) embedded in a context (changes in waste management). It has been a 
purpose of this PhD dissertation to provide both a broader picture of the use of 
PPPs in two national cases and a more operationally focused study of the 
dynamics in specific PPP projects, where four innovative PPPs have been selected 
for more in-depth analysis. Embedded case designs are said to risk getting stuck at 
the sub-unit level and never returning to the main unit of the case (ibid., pp.46ff), 
but the reciprocal design of this study, where the focus is shifted deliberately 
between thorough investigations at each level, should prevent this to happen. 
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The comparison of multiple cases might provide a more robust ground for 
generalizations compared to a single case study (Yin 2009). The cases have been 
selected for analytical purposes on the basis of a ‘replication’ design, where 
similar investigations are carried out in a limited number of cases (Peters 1998, 
Yin 2009). In the choice of the quantity of cases there will always be a trade-off 
between richness in context and detail versus generalization through experiences 
from several cases. With the selection of an embedded case study with two cases 
(England and Denmark) and four sub-units (specific PPPs), the projects attempt to 
strike a balance between investigating and developing theoretical propositions 
across a number of cases, while still being able to describe the dynamics in the 
cases with rich context and detail. The choice of the case study, case selection etc. 
will be further explained in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 1 provides a model of the embedded, comparative case study design. The 
model also illustrates the levels of analysis and focus points in the four articles. As 
the model shows, the articles correlate to various levels in the case study design. 
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Figure 1: The analytical design of the PhD dissertation based on a 
comparative, embedded case study 
 
 
Source: see Yin 2009, p. 46 
  
Article 1, ‘The Potential for Conducting Innovation in Public-Private 
Partnerships,’ establishes the theoretical framework for investigating innovation 
in PPPs at the sub-unit level. As such, the article mainly addresses the first 
research sub-question. The article requests a more precise understanding and 
investigation of the various meanings attached to the ambiguous concepts of PPPs 
and innovation and provides a review of ideas and empirical investigations of 
innovation in PPPs from existing literature. On this background, the article 
develops a first outline of a conceptual framework for investigating innovation 
processes in various types of PPPs across sectors such as waste management, 
construction and health care, which is then used to investigate drivers and 
challenges for innovation in three PPP types: infrastructure PPPs, services PPPs 
and innovation PPPs. The article suggests that the application of a broad 
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understanding of innovation may shed light on the value of various types and 
scopes of PPP innovation. 
 
Article 2, ‘The Prominent, but Contested Role of Public-Private Partnerships 
in Sustainability Transformations of Waste Management Systems. 
Comparing English and Danish experiences,’ is situated at the main case level. 
This article mainly addresses the second sub-question and focuses on the concepts 
of PPPs and sustainability. The article investigates PPPs as policy instruments for 
sustainability transformation with municipal waste management as a case, thus 
placing PPPs in a theoretical framework of sustainability transformations in socio-
technical regimes. The article identifies and categorises PPPs in waste 
management in two national contexts, England and Denmark, compares the role 
and use of PPPs in sustainability transformation processes across these cases, and 
discusses if PPPs should be considered suitable policy instruments in 
sustainability transformation processes. The role of PPPs is illustrated by 
examples from specific PPP projects (sub-unit level). As such, the article includes 
both an independent theoretical contribution by linking sustainability 
transformation literature to PPP literature illustrated by two empirical cases and an 
empirical contribution by identifying and categorizing the use of PPPs in English 
and Danish waste management.  
 
Article 3, ‘Network, Hierarchy and Market: Managing Mixed Strategies for 
Innovation in Public-Private Partnerships’, draw on, expand and test the 
conceptual framework developed  in the first article. This article moves down to 
the sub-unit level in the embedded case study and addresses mainly the third sub-
question. On the basis of the theoretical framework developed in article 3, this 
article investigates the management of innovation in PPPs over time in the whole 
process of the PPPs from pre-contract phase, over the contract design to the post-
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contract phase. The article investigates four selected innovative and collaborative 
PPPs from England and Denmark, one service PPP and one infrastructure PPP 
from each country. The article provides an empirically tested, theoretically based 
model for investigating innovation in various PPP types and discusses 
implications for both theory and practice. 
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Chapter 2: Public-Private Partnerships 
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed introduction to central concepts and theories of 
PPPs with an emphasis on approaches, suggestions or conclusions, which has 
served as inspiration to the analytical approach applied in the PhD dissertation. 
The chapter has also been used as a possibility to provide a little more theoretical 
background and discussion than possible in the more restricted format of research 
articles.  
PPPs in a historical and dynamic perspective 
From the mid-20th century focus on ‘nationalization’ to the 1980s focus on 
‘privatization’, public-private partnerships (PPPs) seems to have taken over the 
21th century with its messianic middle ground slogan of collaboration between 
public and private organizations (Wettenhall 2005). PPPs are increasingly used all 
over the world to deliver public infrastructure and services and develop new 
policies and solutions to public sector challenges (Osborne 2000, Rosenau 2000, 
Grimsey and Lewis 2005, Hodge et al 2010). Judging the amount of empirical 
investigations of PPPs in for example the US (Rosenau 2000, Johnston and 
Romcek 2005), Australia (Hodge 2004, Noble and Jones 2006, Johnston and 
Gudergan 2007), Canada (Murray 2000), the UK (Falconer and McLaughlin 2000, 
Bovaird 2006, Reeves 2008), Denmark (Greve 2003, Andersen 2012), Sweden 
(Almqvist and Högberg 2005), the Netherlands (Klijn and Teisman 2003, Steijn et 
al 2011), Spain (Esteve et al 2012), France (Sadran 2004), as well as in cross-
national comparisons (Hammerschmid and Ysa 2010, Petersen 2011, Stelling 
2014), there is definitely an empirical phenomena to study. 
 
The emergence of PPPs is often connected to the New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms in the 1980s, but the phenomenon of public-private cooperation is not 
altogether new. As Wettenhall (2005) recalls, various forms of public-private 
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mixing might be traced all the way back to the beginning of civilization. In the 
Old Persian Empire, contracting and partnership between government and smaller 
businesses evolved as government began to use private companies to collect taxes 
for the construction of roads, bridges and canals. In France, concession contracts 
for water supply, where public authorities lease out the operation, maintenance 
and collection of revenue for publicly owned facilities, may be traced back to the 
mid-1800s (Wettenhall 2005). In more recent history, the idea to the UK PFI 
contract, which was launched in 1992, was actually adopted from urban 
regeneration partnerships widespread in the 1970s’s USA, where local authorities 
joined forces with businesses to accelerate urban development (Falconer and 
McLaughlin 2000, Weihe 2008). 
 
Especially the UK Labour government has embraced the partnership agenda as a 
central strategy in their ‘third way’ policy. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
was introduced in the UK in 1992 by the Conservative government to attract 
private finance for public infrastructure. The PFI model fitted the Conservative’s 
ideological believes of the private sectors primacy over the public sector and may 
be seen as an expansion of the private sectors role in society in continuation of the 
introduction of Compulsive Competitive Tendering (CCT) of public services in 
the 1980s (Falconer and McLaughlin 2000). From being in strong opposition 
towards the PFI, Labour turned around in the beginning of the 1990s to embrace 
the PFI and suggested improvements of the scheme. When coming into office in 
1997, Labour effectively re-branded PFIs as a ‘public-private partnerships’ within 
a broader partnership umbrella and took efforts to export the idea to create new 
markets for British companies (Hellowell 2010). As such, the Labour government 
adopted PPPs as a new approach to the role of government in society (Hodge and 
Greve 2013). 
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In contrast, the Scandinavian countries have been more reluctant towards PPPs, at 
least in the UK PFI-style model. As Greve and Mörth suggest, this might be linked 
to the Scandinavian corporatist tradition, where close cooperation between public 
and private actors is deeply rooted in society, but tends to be rather informal and 
hierarchically based compared to the formal, contract-based relationships in PFIs 
(Greve and Mörth 2010). In Denmark, PPPs were mentioned for the first time in a 
Finance Ministry report from 1999 under the social-democratic led government, 
and it was expected that the new Liberal-Conservative government elected in 2001 
would increase focus on PPPs. Nevertheless, the scepticism towards PPPs 
continued (Greve and Mörth 2010). A recent report from 2012 showed renewed 
interest in PPP projects listing 14 existing Danish PPP projects and 15 projected 
projects (KFST 2012).  
 
In Denmark, however, more loosely coupled, network-based partnerships 
including a broader range of public and private actors are increasingly used for the 
development of new solutions or policies, for example in Danish environmental 
politics. Besides networks directly initiated by the government (Danish 
Government 2013), several network organizations such as Gate 21 
(www.gate21.dk), Copenhagen Cleantech Cluster (www.cphcleantech.com) or the 
Danish GTS institutes (www.gts-net.dk) systematically work on gathering actors 
to produce and share knowledge. In a Danish government publication from 2010, 
a variation of this approach was formalized as ‘innovation partnerships’ and added 
to existing descriptions of public-private cooperation forms in Denmark 
(Udbudsportalen/LGDK 2010). A recent report shows that Danish municipalities 
have increasingly embraced this possibility. The report identified 249 finished and 
ongoing OPI projects in central welfare areas such as health care, elder care and 
day care – considerably more than the number of infrastructure PPPs (Petersen 
and Brogaard 2014a).  
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Accordingly, whereas governments and researchers have mainly focused on PPPs 
in the form of the PFI style long-term infrastructure contracts (Weihe 2008) there 
might be a tendency to overlook the variety of PPP types. As the Danish and 
English examples suggest, public-private cooperation might serve different 
purposes and seems to continuously change as well as the political, legal, and 
cultural context in which they are situated. As old forms such as the PFI are 
discussed, evaluated and questioned, new ‘emerging’ organizational forms of 
PPPs such as the ‘innovation partnership’ arrives (Greve and Hodge 2013). These 
dynamics makes it continuously interesting - but also potentially challenging - to 
grasp and study PPPs. 
 
The definition of PPPs in this thesis 
As the introductory chapter stated, the starting point for investigations of PPPs in 
the PhD has been a broad definition of PPPs as ‘cooperative institutional 
arrangements between public and private sector actors’ (Greve and Hodge 2005). 
This definition opens for a broad investigation of what is empirically understood 
as a PPP arrangement in municipal waste management, as it provides a number of 
possibilities for PPP arrangements with various degrees of closeness and trust in 
relationships. ‘Cooperative institutionalized arrangements’ may involve more or 
less organizational and financial tight relationships between the partners (Hodge 
and Greve 2007). PPPs can be backed by a contract, but may also be based on a 
more loose commitment. For example, joint venture companies for design, build, 
finance and operation of public infrastructure are generally financial and 
organizational tight, whereas the organization of purely contract-based PPPs 
integrate the two organizations less financially. In contrast, partnerships for the 
purpose of policy development tend to have a more networked structure with less 
organisational and financial integration (ibid.).  
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Compared to one-time exchange relationships, PPPs involve relatively long-term 
commitments and as such, they necessarily include some degree of discretion 
between the partners. PPPs involve binding your organization to another 
organization in an uncertain future, where external or internal changes might 
affect the needs of the organizations involved over time (Andersen 2012). 
Accordingly, PPPs are always more than the wording of a contract or collaborative 
agreement (Bovaird 2004). 
 
The definition identifies participants as ‘public and private sector actors’.  This 
PhD thesis focuses on partnerships between municipalities, also called local 
authorities, responsible for waste management services (or publicly owned 
companies to whom this responsibility might have been delegated), and private 
companies taking part in the development and delivery of these services. These 
local actors need not necessarily be the initiators of PPPs (as in contract based 
arrangements), but might also be partnership participants included by for instance 
government or other facilitating organisations.  
 
With a public authority as one partner, PPPs will always have a policy function in 
a broad sense of the word, in this case to contribute to the provision of waste 
management services to citizens (Rosenau 2000). This PhD focuses on public-
private cooperation in waste collection or treatment or potentially cooperation 
related to the development of new policies, technologies, products or processes 
that direct or feed into these services. However, this PhD does not include PPPs 
for technology development and import to third world countries (see for example 
Ferroni and Castle 2011, Campos et al 2011) or cooperations that only involves 
public financial support to private technology development (see for example 
Drejer and Jørgensen 2005).  
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The ambiguity of the PPP concept and various categorizations 
The most general agreement in PPP literature seems to be that the concept of PPPs 
is nebulous and ill-defined (Weihe 2008). PPP researchers have debated the 
definition of PPPs, the historical origins of PPPs and even if PPP could at all be 
characterized as a distinctive form of governance (Hodge et al 2010). Whereas 
some have referred to PPPs as a new policy instrument ‘blurring the borders’ 
between public and private (Rosenau 2000), others have described PPPs as a more 
‘easy to swallow’ rhetoric for privatization of public services (see Linder 1999). 
The ambiguity of the concept and its representation in multiple and changing 
forms means that a conceptual demarcation and identification of PPPs in the 
studied field continue to be a necessary starting point for analysis, although it has 
not been a main purpose in itself for this PhD. 
 
In attempts of clearing up the confusion of the PPP variety, researchers have 
worked on various categorizations of PPP types. PPPs have for instance been 
categorised according to contractual arrangements (BOT, BOOT, DBFO, etc.) 
(Savas 2000), purpose (service, infrastructure, policy, etc.) (Bovaird 2004, 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2010), ‘research approaches’ (urban regeneration, 
policy, infrastructure, development) (Weihe 2008), analytical level of study 
(project, organizational form, policy, governance tool, etc.) (Hodge 2010, Hodge 
and Greve 2013), ideological commitments (neo-liberal vs. neo-conservative) 
(Linder 1999), or more recently, according to ‘dimensions’ of the public-private 
relationship (co-responsibility vs. relational governance) (Stelling 2014). These 
categorizations show that various types of PPPs might employ different rationales, 
suit different purposes and take a variety of forms. In line with Bovaird (2004) and 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011), this PhD has applied a categorization based 
on purpose, which is close to many empirical categorizations and thereby easy 
operational in empirical analyses.  
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The variety of PPPs has led some researchers to warn against the tendency to 
‘draw general conclusions about PPP without specifying what is actually meant 
by PPP’ (Weihe 2008). As Van der Wel (2004) states, it is ‘striking to see how 
few authors (or for that matter governments and international agencies) seem to 
be aware of the existences of other interpretations of the term PPP than the one 
they happen to use themselves’ (p.21, referenced in Weihe 2008). This is hard to 
argue against since complete confusion arising from a random mix of suggestions 
and conclusions seems inevitable. On the other hand, studying each PPP type its 
own might lead to ‘water-tight compartments’, where researchers are not aware of 
potential possibilities of mutual learning (ibid.). To break down some of these 
boundaries in the expectation that fruitful learning might take place across the 
‘watertight compartments’ of PPP research and practice, this dissertation aims to 
capture and compare different types of PPPs (ie. Infrastructure, service, etc.). 
 
The three articles in the PhD thesis deliberately provide different categorizations 
of PPP types serving the various purposes of the articles (see Table 1). In the first 
article, three PPP types related to service delivery and described in existing 
literature and empirical reports are selected as potentially relevant in waste 
management services, infrastructure partnerships, service partnerships and 
innovation partnerships. Infrastructure partnerships typically involve the joint 
procurement of a combination of tasks such as design, construction, finance, 
operation and maintenance of a building or processing facility in a long-term 
contract of 20-35 years. In this period, the private consortium typically owns or 
co-owns the facility, which is paid for in instalments by the public authority and 
may be bought by the authority after an agreed period of time (Yescombe 2007). 
Service partnerships involve the contracting out of a public service in a contract 
based on ‘partnership principles’ such as trust, openness, common values and 
flexibility (Udbudsportalen/LGDK 2010). Innovation partnerships involve “a 
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setting in which public and private players work together to develop innovative 
solutions targeted the public sector” (Evald et al 2014, p. 34). The ‘players’ are 
considered cooperation partners and as such expected to ‘develop innovative 
solutions together through a continuous transfer of ideas and knowledge between 
the players involved’ (ibid.). These PPP types are used to discuss the potential and 
challenges of conducting innovation in PPPs as it appears in existing empirical 
investigations.  
 
Table 1: PPP typologies in the articles 
Article 1 Article 2 Article 3 
 Policy Partnerships  
Infrastructure Partnerships Service Delivery Partnerships 
(including infrastructure and 
service partnerships) 
Infrastructure Partnerships 
(including an innovation 
partnership) 
Innovation Partnerships 
Service Partnerships Service Partnerships 
 Technology Partnerships  
 
The second article applies a more explorative approach to investigate the potential 
variation of partnership types used in waste management. This strategy aligns with 
the ‘policy approach’ in Rosenau (2000), where public-private constellations 
within a specific policy area are described and analysed (Weihe 2008). The second 
article identifies, categorizes and compares PPP types in waste management in 
England and Denmark. The article identifies three PPP types that to some degree 
correspond with the PPP types in the first article, but also adds two ‘new’ types; 
policy partnerships, service delivery partnerships (including infrastructure and 
service PPPs), and technology partnerships. The three identified PPP types 
correspond with the three levels in the multi-level perspective on sustainability 
transformation; landscape, regime and niches (see Article 2). Whereas policy 
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partnerships gather actors and resources to identify solutions towards 
implementation and development of waste policy and regulation, technology 
partnerships are more directly focused on technology development and testing. 
These two PPP types could also be characterized as’ innovation partnerships’ in a 
broader sense as these may come in many different shapes (see DECA 2009, 
Brogaard and Petersen 2014b), but with the coming specific procedure for 
‘innovation partnerships’ in the new procurement directive this could lead to 
conceptual confusion.  
 
On the background of the empirical categorization in the second article, the third 
article in the dissertation selects two comparable PPP types, infrastructure PPPs 
and service PPPs, to provide more detailed case studies. These PPP types are 
based on a contract and may involve monitoring and enforcement of contract 
specifications, but have been selected as examples of innovative contract-based 
PPPs displaying ‘genuine’ partnership features. As such, they pinpoint the 
interesting tension between competition and collaboration in PPPs. These three 
categorizations of PPPs thus supplement each other in the investigation of the role 
of PPPs in waste management and the potential and challenges for innovation and 
sustainability transformation. In the next section, we will discuss the ambiguity of 
PPPs and hereunder the meaning of ‘genuine partnership’.  
 
The debate on ‘genuine’ partnerships 
As the previous section showed, a central debate on the PPP concept has 
concerned the question of how to define and demarcate PPPs in relation to other 
forms of public-private cooperation, such as traditional contracting out. ‘Real life’ 
PPPs, especially the infrastructure version, has been accused of not being 
‘genuine’ partnerships - in the sense of being equal, long-term relationships built 
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on mutual trust and commitment (Klijn and Teisman 2000, Wettenhall 2005). 
According to Klijn and Teisman (2005), contracting out is characterized by 
principal-agent relationships, where the agent carries out work for the principal 
and is assumed to have conflicting interests.  Especially when information is 
limited and close monitoring is difficult the main task for the principal is to 
provide incentives for the agent to follow the principal’s interests (Walls 1995, 
p.36-38). According to Klijn and Teisman a public tender process might involve 
some cooperation in the negotiation phase, but after signing of the contract the 
relationship is characterized by ‘regulation’ by contract (principal-agent), rather 
than cooperation. In contrast, genuine partnerships are characterized by principal-
principal relationships, where the partners jointly decide on the aims and co-
produce solutions with the objective of achieving effective solutions for both 
partners (Klijn and Teisman 2005).  
 
This demarcation line between partnerships and contracts, or collaboration and 
‘regulation’, has also been drawn in collaboration theory, where Donahue and 
Zeckhauser (2011) emphasize that collaborative governance:  
“leverages private expertise, energy, and money by strategically sharing control – over 
the precise goals to be pursued and the means for pursuing them – between government 
and private players. That discretion simultaneously motivates private collaborators to 
enter the public arena and empowers them to play their roles as well. Done well, 
collaboration creates synergies between governments and participants, allowing them 
together to produce more than the sum of what their separate efforts would yield” (p. 4). 
 
In contrast, 
“[a] municipal government contracting with a private waste management 
company represents the other end of the spectrum. Discretion rests entirely with 
the government. The company’s charge - to pick up garbage and dump it on the 
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landfill - is explicit, complete, and geared to the government’s priorities.” (p. 10-
11) 
 
However, this sharp dichotomy might bring only a limited understanding of 
contractual relationships between public and private actors in general and in waste 
management. As Klijn and Teisman (2000) also suggest, there is a growing 
number of situations, where public authorities do not have a clear picture of the 
policy, product or service they would like to procure, which is a prerequisite for a 
clear contract. For more complex procurement of infrastructure and services, 
especially in long-term contracts, it will not be possible for the public authority to 
describe specifications in detail, leaving a potential contract incomplete 
(Williamsen 1975). In these situations, there is a need for continuous dialogue and 
flexibility and hence more collaborative relationships (Klijn and Teisman 2000).   
 
This situation where competitive contracting and collaboration becomes blurred 
has been captured with the concept of ‘relational contracting’ from law theory 
(Macneil 1975, 1980), which has also been used to analyse PPPs (Johnston and 
Romzek 2005, Reeves 2008). In contrast to the ideal type of the ‘discrete’ contract 
from transactions in neoclassical microeconomics that involves a sharp, one-time 
exchange with no relationship between the parties other than this transaction, the 
term ‘relational contracting’ describe a contractual relationship based on personal 
relations, which tends to involve several people and have a longer life span. These 
contracts involve ‘future cooperation not only in performing what is planned but 
in future planning’ (Macneil 1980, p.21). As specific exchanges in the future may 
not be planned in detail, planning rather involves specification of the substance of 
exchange and of structures and processes of future exchange.  To work 
successfully, these contracts require solidarity and trust between the parties, as 
they are based on some degree of faith in the other party to continuously deliver 
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according to the agreement. According to Macneil, all contracts are to some 
degree relational, as contracts do not exist outside of society. However, the more 
complex a service agreement might be the more need there will be for extra-
contractual relations (ibid.). 
 
In line with this thinking, Andersen (2012) describes PPP contracts as ‘second 
order’ contracts or a ‘promise of future promises’. He suggests that partnership 
contracts do not simply demand specified services, but rather the development of 
new solutions in a framework that allow expectations to the exchange to change 
over time in line with a turbulent and changing environment. Rather than 
specifying the demands of the product or service as in a ‘discrete’ contract, these 
contracts provide expectations to the form and process of cooperation, where 
parties are expected to act as ‘partners’ (pp. 205ff).  As such, these ideas relate 
very obviously to the purpose of service partnerships, but perhaps less obviously 
to infrastructure partnerships.  
 
Literature investigating empirical examples of public-private relationships in PPPs 
shows various degrees of genuine partnership relationships. Andersen (2012) 
provides three illustrative examples from a Danish context of partnership contracts 
based on flexibility, mutual trust, continuing dialogue and shared responsibility, 
where initiators explicitly positioned these in contrast to traditional outsourcing. In 
a UK context, Bovaird (2006) provides an example of a PFI contract on revenue 
and benefits services in a London borough, where a key selection criterion was 
willingness to work in partnership with the borough and the relationship was 
supported by economic incentives for both partners to continuously deliver cost 
savings.   
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In contrast, Teisman and Klijn (2002) describes an example from the Netherlands, 
the Mainport Rotterdam Project, where public authorities supported by 
environmental organizations chose more traditional procurement procedures over 
a partnership model to maintain control over revenues and environmental 
standards. Similarly, Reeves (2008) concludes in an analysis of the first 
infrastructure PPP in Ireland for the provision of five public schools that the 
government agency procuring the contract actually preferred a more transactional 
approach. However, Reeves also shows that the transactional features in this case 
did not prevent cooperation and trust to develop between the agency and the 
private partner, although the involved schools wished for a more relational 
contracting.  
 
Accordingly, although contract-based PPPs may not be purely collaborative, they 
might display collaborative features. What especially Reeves analysis suggests, 
and what have been the starting point for this PhD thesis, is that contract based 
PPPs might involve a mix of governing strategies with elements of 
collaboration/partnership, competition/market and regulation/hierarchy. The 
degree of collaboration reflects more or less deliberative governing strategies of 
the public authorities procuring these solutions and thereby having the initiative 
power to design the procurement process and contract. This design choice might 
be related to the type and degree of complexity of the task and expectations to 
contextual changes in the contract period. As chapter 1 indicated,  waste 
management services are facing increasing complexity, which potentially moves 
this service from being a prime example of ‘transactional’ contracting to be a 
potential subject for ‘relational contracting’.  
 
The debate on genuine partnership is an important cornerstone in our purpose of 
investigating innovation in partnerships. If our expectations to the benefits of PPPs 
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are bound to the idea of them being collaborative and they are not, obviously our 
expectations might be disappointed. As such the ambiguity of the PPP concept 
creates and analytical dilemma: Do we investigate empirically labelled PPPs as 
policy instruments for innovation or do we investigate the concept of ‘partnership’ 
- the genuine partnership - as an instrument for innovation? As the previous 
section showed, the first and second article in this PhD investigates empirically 
labelled PPPs and from there discuss the degree of genuine partnership, whereas 
the third article has selected partnerships that display genuine partnership features. 
We will return to the subject of PPPs and innovation after a short review of 
promises, critiques and evaluations of PPPs.  
PPP promises, critiques and evaluations  
Why should public and private actors engage in partnerships? The idea of 
partnership is widely celebrated as a plus-sum word signalling win-win solutions. 
A basic idea is that the involved organisation will achieve gains that exceed the 
benefits form working alone (Rosenau 2000). By pooling resources and sharing 
skills, expertise and knowledge, the organisation may develop better and more 
innovative solutions to complex societal challenges (McQuaid 2000, Klijn and 
Teisman 2005). PPPs might even be considered necessary to coordinate action in 
an increasingly diverse and networked society, where actors with relevant 
knowledge and resources are dispersed (ibid.). From a public authority’s view, 
including private partners may bring increased efficiency, market knowledge, 
reduced risk, new ideas or an innovative approach, or enable the realization of 
projects that would not have been possible without private investment (Hodge and 
Greve 2013). PPPs may enable these benefits from a competitive private sector, 
without relinquishing the control of the public sector (Grimsey and Lewis 2005). 
From a private point of view, private actors might see a financial benefit from the 
possibility of expanding their business into new markets, reducing uncertainty and 
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risk in facility investments or to get public funding for development projects that 
might be too risky or expensive to undertake alone (Ham and Koppenjan 2001).  
 
However, PPPs have also been criticised from various perspectives. From a 
‘traditional public administration’ perspective, PPPs have been accused of diluting 
responsibility from the public to the private sector. From a New Public 
Management (NPM) perspective the often long-term commitment of PPPs has 
been said to potentially disturb competition (Bovaird 2004).  From a ‘governance’ 
perspective, as described in the section of PPP ambiguity, PPPs has been accused 
of being a ‘rhetorical scam’ for traditional hierarchical relationships rather than 
actual joint decision-making (Kljin and Teisman 2002). And finally from a ‘policy 
analyst’ perspective PPPs has been described as a political trade-off between 
direct control, flexibility and clear accountability of public services for the 
potential of increased economic efficiency and service standards (Flinders 2005). 
These critiques show that there might be trade-offs involved between various 
objectives, when PPPs are used as policy instruments.  
 
The evaluation of PPPs has been a central discussion in PPP research (Grimsey 
and Lewis 2005, Hodge and Greve 2009, Hodge 2010, Jeffares et al 2013). As 
Hodge and Greve (2007) suggest that a good starting point for evaluation might be 
the specific objectives for the PPP set by the organisations initiating the 
partnership (p.548). In general, these objectives seem to vary and have changed 
over time. In the USA, urban regeneration partnerships were often initiated by 
coalitions of private companies, who believed an urban crisis needed extraordinary 
action, and decided to mobilize city authorities, universities and non-profit groups 
to revitalize the city and provide better business environments (Davis 1986). In 
contrast, the main objective of PFIs have been to provide public infrastructure 
while getting around restrictions of public sector debt levels, reduce pressure on 
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public sector budgets and provide better value for money (Vfm) for tax payers 
(Hodge and Greve 2013). As such, these are rather different objectives and 
different outcomes may be expected as well.  
 
Evidence to support PPP promises is highly mixed and has concentrated mainly on 
infrastructure PPPs. In Hodge and Greve’s (2007) assessment of the argument and 
evaluations of these PPP types, they showed firstly, that infrastructure PPPs do not 
actually reduce pressure on public budgets, but rather move costs into the future, 
and secondly, that many evaluations of Value for Money (VfM) are 
methodologically questionable and ‘the most optimistic reading of the evidence so 
far is that it is mixed’ (p.38). Pollitt (2005) argues that a higher percentage of PFIs 
are now delivered on-time and on-budget, with successful risk transfer and 
‘considerable design innovation’, whereas Shaoul (2005) presents a range of failed 
PFI projects and general difficulties of getting access to relevant data to evaluate 
PFIs.  
 
It seems that the popularity of the ‘partnership’ concept have overcome any harsh 
critique (Hodge and Greve 2013). The European market for infrastructure PPPs 
alone peaked in 2007 with approx. EUR 30 billion (EPEC 2011), and despite 
financial challenges during the financial and economic crisis PPP investments 
have continued to a level of around EUR 24 billion in 2010 (Connoly and Wall 
2013). However, as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the enthusiasm for 
infrastructure PPPs continues to vary across national contexts. PPPs remain ‘as 
much political as they are managerial entities’ (Jefares et al 2013, p.171).  The 
various promises, evaluation and critiques of PPPs may reflect the ambiguity and 
various meanings applied to the concept (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). Klijn 
(2010) suggests that the secret behind the popularity of PPPs might lie exactly in 
this ambiguity. The various financial and organizational forms attached to PPPs 
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may exactly allow decision-makers, public and private managers to apply their 
preferred meaning to the concept. As such, PPPs provide a possibility to connect 
various actors despite disagreements (Klijn 2010). Whereas the political nature of 
PPPs is often understated in favour of more technical evaluations, the second 
research article in the dissertation takes the political nature of PPPs into account, 
describing the ‘prominent, but contested role of PPPs’ in waste management. The 
next section will focus more explicitly on innovation as an objective of PPPs. 
PPPs and Innovation 
As the previous section has shown, innovation may not always be the main 
objective of PPPs. However, it is an objective that is often implicitly embedded in 
the idea of PPPs and which is likely to become more prominent in the future. PPPs 
have been linked both to more innovative outcomes, for instance as design 
innovation in construction projects, and more generally to encourage ‘a more 
innovative public sector’ (Hodge and Greve 2013, p.7). PPPs has also been said to 
be an innovation in themselves, a ‘governance’ innovation, that changes not only 
the outcome or organisation of service delivery, but the whole process of 
governing services – decision power structures, responsibilities and resources 
(More and Hartley 2008, Ysa et al 2013).  
 
There has been an increased focus on innovation in the public sector, which 
compared to the private sector has been perceived as bureaucratic, rule-bound, 
compromise-seeking, short-term oriented and risk averse, which combined with a 
lack of competition, would not provide an optimal environment for innovation 
(Bekkers et al 2011). During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of public 
management reforms significantly altered the public sector and increased the focus 
on how various organisations – public, private, civil society – might contribute to 
solve some of the pressing societal challenges. In the recognition of the limitations 
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of top down government in dealing with these challenges, researchers have 
emphasised the need for increased interaction between public and private actors, 
for example through public-private partnerships (Osborne and Gabler 1993, 
Rhodes 1996, Mandell and Steelman 2003, Bommert 2010, Sørensen 2010, 
Sørensen and Torfing 2011).  
 
The idea of PPPs can be connected to two strategies for innovation, which in 
practice are often mixed. Firstly, PPPs can be connected to the classic New Public 
Management (NPM) idea of private sector primacy over public sector 
organisations. Private sector organizations are imagined to be more economically 
efficient, more innovative, better at adapting to rapid change and faster to adopt 
best practices and abandon unsuccessful or obsolete activities. By delegating more 
responsibility to the private sector rather than keeping services delivery and 
operation in-house, so-called ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’, the public sector 
should be getting more value for money (Osborne and Gabler 1992). As Bekkers, 
Edelenbos and Steijn (2011) phrase it: ‘From an NPM perspective, public 
innovations should be focused on creating a business-like public sector’ (p.11). As 
such PPPs might be applied as policy instruments to make the public sector more 
efficient and innovative in line with business logics.  
 
The alternative innovation strategy is that PPPs may connect actors and 
organizations from various policy perspectives and ‘produce greater dynamism 
through the sharing of ideas, expertise and practice’ (McQuaid 2009). This idea 
may be linked to the ‘shift from government to governance’ in public 
administration, which emphasises the contribution to the governing of society 
from a wide range of public, private and civil society actors (Rhodes 1996, 
Bekkers et al 2011). The before-mentioned argument of ‘synergy’ belongs in this 
context, where pooling and combining resources, specific expertise and 
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knowledge from various actors are said to increase the quality and efficiency of 
solutions and deliver added value (ibid.). Inclusion of various stakeholders in the 
innovation process is also said to smooth the implementation process, as actors 
themselves have been involved in the development of the solutions that are to be 
implemented. In this light, partnerships may bring a more ‘transformational’ 
approach to service delivery that do not only focus on efficiency and cost savings, 
but also on improving service quality for users (Entwistle and Martin 2005).  
 
One of the key arguments in this thesis is the importance achieving clarity over 
which PPP argument is in play in specific PPP types and empirical examples, as 
these can be connected to various governing strategies and ideas about how 
innovation is developed. As we will return to in chapter 3, both in the English and 
the Danish context, partnerships have been linked to ideas of ‘modernization’ and 
the development of ‘new solutions’ (Falconer and McLaughlin 2000, Danish 
Government 2011). However, despite theoretical and empirical expectations of 
linkages between PPPs and innovative outcomes, the connection remains diffuse. 
As the first article in this dissertation shows, research-based empirical 
investigations has been scarce, scattered between various empirical and research 
fields and shown mixed results. As the PPP literature rarely engages with literature 
on public sector innovation (an exception being Esteve et al 2012 and Ysa et al 
2013), the first article will dig into this body of literature in order to provide a 
more detailed understanding of innovation processes and outcomes in PPPs.  
The processual and managerial turn in PPP research 
This last section of the chapter on PPPs will describe a ‘processual and managerial 
turn’ in PPP research, which has inspired the analytical approach in especially the 
third research article. Whereas much PPP research has focused on describing the 
various organizational and financial forms of PPP (such as BOT, BTO, DBFO), an 
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increasing amount of research papers have pointed towards the importance of 
investigating the processes surrounding PPPs, before or/and after the signing of a 
contract, and especially how these PPP processes are managed (Osborne and 
Murray 2000, Fischbacher and Beaumont 2003, Noble and Jones 2006, Ysa 2007, 
Weihe 2008; 2010, Skelcher 2010, Steijn et al 2011, Gestel et al 2014).  
 
On the basis of an examination of various PPP types in France, Sadran (2004) 
points towards the importance of managerial effort in designing and achieving 
good results from PPPs. The paper concludes that although PPPs offer a 
favourable framework to suit contemporary needs in public policy, “[g]ood 
governance, then, is not created by partnership itself: it is the manner in which 
agents concerned seize it and appropriate it” (ibid., p.248). In line with this, 
Hodge, Greve and Boardman (2010) concludes that PPPs do not always lead to 
synergistic benefits, but may also lead to failures, and that PPPs demand at least as 
much management as traditional hierarchical or market-based governing 
mechanisms. Referring to Kettl (1993), they state that ‘the strength of governing 
activities will not diminish when private sector organizations become involved in 
public infrastructure development. The government activities themselves will just 
be of a different kind’ (p.595-96).  
 
In contrast to the stated relevance of managerial efforts, several authors have 
pointed to the lack of empirical investigations of micro-level cooperation and 
management of PPP processes (Fischbacher and Beaumont 2003, Noble and Jones 
2006, Ysa 2007, Skelcher 2010, Weihe 2010).  According to Noble and Jones 
(2006), PPP research has been confined to provide explanations of PPP popularity, 
discussing PPP outcomes and establishing criteria for PPP success, whereas the 
micro-management of PPP processes has been overlooked. In line with this, 
Fischbacher and Beaumont (203) states that: ‘One surprising aspect of this [PPP] 
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literature is the neglect of key processual aspects of PFI and PPP projects - a 
criticism which can be made both of academic and policy documents’ (p.171). 
Weihe (2008) suggests that ‘future research could appropriately address the 
character of cooperation beyond the characteristics of the formal contract. At 
what point is cooperation ‘close’ and ‘trust-based’ or ‘genuinely collaborative’?’ 
(p.439).  
 
A number of empirical investigations have begun this explorative journey 
(Lowndes and Skelcher 1998, Osborne and Murray 2000, Klijn and Teisman 
2003, Fischbacher and Beaumont 2003, Teicher et al 2006, Noble and Jones 2006, 
Reeves 2008, Gestel et al 2014). A starting point for some has been a mapping of 
the PPP process. For example, Osborne and Murray (2000) analysed the 
‘collaborative process’ in the establishment of a PPP between four voluntary and 
non-profit organizations (VNPOs), the provincial government and an independent 
funding organisation in Columbia, Canada, through four stages: 1, the pre-contact 
phase, 2, the negotiating phase, 3, the implementation phase, and 4, the evaluation 
phase. The authors highlighted the importance of the pre-contract phase, where the 
preliminary establishment of trust and respect between the VNPOs laid the ground 
for collaboration and provided negotiation leverage to these relatively smaller 
organizations. Similarly, in a case study of infrastructure PPPs in Ireland, Reeves 
(2008) describes the PPP process  in two phases; ex-ante, in terms of the 
contractual setting and procurement process, and ex-post, in terms of the conduct 
of partners after the construction phase.  
 
A few studies have focused on ‘governance’ of PPPs as a means to secure 
democratic accountability of PPP projects (Skelcher 2010, Hodge 2004). 
According to Hodge (2004), PPP contracts ‘need not only be optimal in the 
technical sense, but also accompanied by a priority for democratic debate, 
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transparency and clarity’ (p.47). Although democratic accountability has not been 
a key focus in this dissertation, this issue touches a main concern in the design and 
management of PPPs for innovation.  As Skelcher (2010) points to, appropriate 
governance mechanisms may both be way for public authorities to protect public 
interests despite delegation of authority to private businesses, and work as a 
constraint on public authorities by ‘enabling the private actors to realize the 
innovative potential that PPPs are intended to promote, by virtue of not being part 
of the state bureaucracy’ (p.293). As such, governance structures should enable 
some degree of co-decision and/or ‘self-governing’ by the private actors involved, 
but without jeopardizing public interests and clear accountability. This is not an 
easy balance to strike. 
 
An interesting finding in micro-studies of PPP processes is the repeated tendency 
and desire of public organizations to ‘fall back’ on hierarchical governing 
mechanisms (Teisman and Klijn 2002, Ysa 2007, Reeves 2008).  This might be 
criticized, as governments potentially lose out on the collaborative potential for 
synergistic effects (Teisman and Klijn 2002). Some studies show that PPPs might 
change between various forms of governing over time. Ysa (2007) suggests that 
PPPs may move between three ideal types, ‘symbolic’ PPPs (hierarchical), 
‘instrumental’ PPPs (market-based) and ‘organic’ PPPs (network-based), over 
time, whereas Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) showed different ‘modes of 
governing’ in various phases of urban regeneration PPPs. As these studies show, 
PPPs may not be only hierarchical or collaborative, but can involve several 
governing mechanisms. However, both studies describe PPPs as moving between 
phases, ‘modes of governing’ or ‘ideal types’, which might lead us to overlook the 
potential complexity of PPP management. As described in the former section on 
ambiguity, Reeves (2008) points towards a greater complexity where hierarchical 
and collaborative elements may co-exist at a given point in time. As such, ‘falling 
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back’ to establish some degree of hierarchy in PPP relationships may not 
completely erode the possibility for synergistic effects or market-based efficiency. 
 
Inspired by this turn towards processual and managerial aspects of PPPs, the third 
article in the dissertation investigates the processes of innovation in four contract-
based PPPs from the pre-contract phase to the post-contract phase. In between 
these two phases, the paper highlights the contract design, which provides an 
institutional framework for cooperation in the post-contract phase. As Johnston 
and Gudergan (2007) emphasise, the contract remains the main governing 
mechanism (in contract-based PPPs), although it’s ‘incompleteness’ makes the 
PPP dependent on ‘actor behaviour’ and social relationships (p. 573).  
 
To some degree this approach challenges the message from Steijn, Klijn and 
Edelenbos (2011), which suggest that organizational form does not matter to PPP 
outcome, only the intensity of managerial effort. However, this might be a 
question of definitions. It intuitively makes sense that PPP success is not 
dependent on the degree of organizational tightness. Steijn, Klijn and Edelenbos 
compare organizations in projects groups, project organizations and autonomous 
legal entities, which would probably be used in quite different contexts and for 
different purposes. However, this thesis suggests that in their admirable effort of 
highlighting the importance of managerial effort, the authors risk neglecting the 
likewise importance of specific contract design and partnership organization. 
Consequently, the thesis aims to bring together ‘governing through contracts’ and 
‘governing as more than contracts’. As such, the PhD points towards a managerial 
model for PPPs encompassing both institutional design and process facilitation 
embedded in a specific context and history.  
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Conclusion: Investigating PPPs 
With its messianic middle ground slogan of collaboration between public and 
private organizations, PPPs seems to have taken over the 21 century. However, 
cooperation between public and private actors is not a new phenomenon, but has 
roots back to early civilisation. Whereas the current interest in PPPs have mostly 
directed attention to the PFI-style long-term infrastructure contract, new forms of 
partnering continue to evolve and challenge the researcher trying to grasp and 
describe this policy instrument.  
 
The ambiguity of the PPP concept makes a conceptual clarification and 
demarcation a necessary starting point for analysis. In this dissertation, PPPs are 
understood broadly as ‘cooperative institutional arrangements between public and 
private sector actors’ (Hodge and Greve 2005). The PhD investigate PPPs 
between municipalities, also called local authorities, responsible for municipal 
waste management services (or public companies to whom this task might have 
been delegated), and private companies taking part in the development and 
delivery of these services. These PPPs can be more or less formalized and closely 
knitted and may be based on a contract, joint venture arrangement or a 
collaborative agreement. As relatively long-term commitments, PPPs will always 
involve some degree of discretion and thus be more than the wording of a contract 
or agreement.  
 
Five main points developed from PPP literature will frame the analytical approach 
in the dissertation: 
1) PPPs are situated in a historical, cultural and political context and seems to 
be changing over time and taking new forms; 
2) PPPs have different objectives, which might provide good starting points for 
evaluation. PPP evaluations show mixed results and might be interpreted 
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differently according to political attitudes towards the inclusion of private 
sector actors in service delivery;  
3) Although innovation might not always be a main objective for PPPs, it is 
embedded in the idea of PPPs and likely to become a more prominent 
argument in the future. In contrast, there is less knowledge on the 
connection between PPPs and innovation. Two strategies for innovation is 
often mixed: achieving efficiency from private sector competitiveness and 
combining resources, knowledge and ideas from various actors to develop 
better solutions; 
4) PPPs can be more or less based on ‘genuine partnership’ relationships and 
may be managed through a mix of hierarchical, market-based or networked 
forms of coordination; 
5) The management of the PPP over the whole process from the pre-contract 
phase, over the contract-design to the management of the contract in the 
post-contract phase is important for PPP success.  
 
Consequently, the first article will review current ideas and empirical evaluation 
of innovation in PPPs with a focus on three PPP types used in service delivery: 
Infrastructure PPPs, service PPPs and innovation PPPs. The second article will 
explore the various types of PPPs in waste management and investigate their role 
in the historical, cultural and political context of the two national cases. The third 
article will investigate four selected innovative, contract-based PPPs that display 
genuine partnership features, and follow the managerial efforts of the involved 
public managers throughout the PPP process.  
 
As such, the PhD aims to contribute to PPP research by a) further develop a 
research-based understanding of innovation in PPPs, b) stress the importance of a 
processual and managerial perspective on PPPs as well as a solid contract design, 
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c) show that PPPs might not be either contract-based or collaborative, but 
potentially involve a variety of governing mechanisms, and d) emphasise the 
neglected influence of the historical, cultural and political context on the role of 
PPPs in a specific field.    
63 
 
Chapter 3: Public-Private Partnerships in England and Denmark 
As a number of international case studies and comparative studies show, the 
prevalence and organizational form of PPPs varies nationally (see for instance 
Hodge et al 2010). England and Denmark has had a different PPP history, which 
only partly seem to be converging. In this short chapter, we will take a closer look 
at our two cases to investigate the PPP history of Denmark and England, including 
the various official classifications of PPPs, and a turn in both countries towards 
seeing PPPs as an approach to societal innovation. As such, this chapter provides 
an extended background description of the two cases from a PPP perspective and 
rather elaborated descriptions of some of the PPP types investigated in the articles. 
For both cases, these classifications may not be representative for the whole range 
of PPPs, but they do provide a starting point for empirical classifications. This 
chapter only aims to provide an overview of the most important developments, 
whereas more elaborate descriptions of the PPP history for England may be found 
in Falconer and McLaughling (2000), Hellowell (2010)  and Connoly and Wall 
(2013), and for Denmark in Greve (2003), Greve and Mörth (2010) and Petersen 
(2013). 
 
England 
The PPP history of England 
As the birthplace of the long-term infrastructure contract, England has used this 
type of PPP broadly to deliver public infrastructure with private financing in times 
of pressured public budgets. The idea to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
contract was developed, when a former environment secretary in Labour visited 
the USA in 1978 and became inspired by American urban regeneration 
partnerships. When the Labour government fell in 1979, the idea was taken 
forward by the Conservatives, who embraced PFIs as a new instrument to include 
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private sector organizations in the delivery of public infrastructure and services 
(Falconer and McLaughlin 2000). The Conservative John Major government 
launched the PFI model in the autumn budget statement in 1992. The main 
purpose of the programme was to substitute orthodox capital expenditure and 
thereby release money in the short term and ‘hide’ capital expenditure from 
calculations of the UK’s national debt. After initial hostility, Labour decided to 
embrace PFIs and came forward with a critique of the Conservative’s ‘hands-off’ 
approach to PFI implementation, which led the Conservatives to launch a more 
interventionist programme in 1995 which became a breakthrough for the PFI 
model. Whereas only three deals had been signed before this programme, 24 
projects were signed between April 1995 and Labours election in May 1997 
(Hellowell 2010).   
 
With the Labour party re-entering into power in 1997, the PPP agenda shifted. 
Labour rebranded PFIs as ‘PPP’ and as a part of the party’s ‘Modernization’ 
agenda applied a more pragmatic approach to the inclusion of private actors. 
Rather than forcing private inclusion in public services, this decision should be 
taken locally on the basis of a new ‘Best Value’ regime. In principle, the important 
matter was not who was delivering public services, but that quality was high for 
users and projects provided ‘value-for-money’ (Connoly and Wall 2013). As such, 
the focus on PFI and private inclusion in service delivery continued, but the 
rhetoric shifted from being one of downscaling the state in favour of the private 
sector to being one of’ joint working’ and ‘partnership’, with public, private and 
‘third’ sector organizations sharing responsibility for societal developments 
(Falconer and McLaughling 2000).  
 
PFIs have been criticised for not actually bringing value for money and for 
shifting the wrong risks to the private sector or not shifting risks at all, but 
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although the global economic and financial crisis in 2007/8 led to a slowdown in 
PPP projects due to challenges of achieving private loans, the PFI model is far 
from dead (Connoly and Wall 2013). By 2009, public authorities and private 
consortia in the UK had signed 641 PFI contracts with a nominal value to the 
public sector of £63,8 billion (Hellowell 2010). In 2012, the incoming 
Conservative led coalition government launched a new PFI programme, the PF2, 
where the increasingly complicated question of finance was addressed along with 
other issues to improve the design and management of PFIs (HM Treasury 2012). 
The UK government continues to have the world’s most advanced and supportive 
PPP/PFI policies and several PPP-support units offering guidelines, financing 
programs and project approval systems for local authorities (Greve and Hodge 
2013b, Verhoest et al 2015). 
 
Partnerships as an approach to innovation in England 
From the Conservative government’s focus on a streamlining and skimming the 
public administration through resource constraint and compulsive competitive 
tendering (CCT), the Labour government changed direction towards community 
leadership, ‘best value’ and new political structures with a strong focus on 
innovation in local governments and services (Newman et al 2001). The 
overarching ‘Modernizing Government’ agenda from March 1999 explicitly 
linked partnership to efforts of societal innovation:  
“Distinctions between services delivered by the public and private sector are breaking 
down in many areas, opening the way to new ideas, partnerships and opportunities for 
devising and delivering what the public wants. […] We build on the many strengths in 
the public sector to equip it with a culture of improvement, innovation and collaborative 
purpose. […] Some parts of the public service are as efficient, dynamic and effective as 
anything in the private sector. But others are not. There are numerous reasons for this, 
and […] to help counter some of these difficulties, the Government is working in 
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partnership – partnership with the new, devolved ways of government, and partnership 
with local authorities, other organisations and other countries.”   
(CM 1999, p.9-11, referenced from Falconer and McLaughlin 2000)  
 
As such, the government continued the Conservative’s focus on learning from the 
‘innovative’ private sector, but rather to assist and strengthen than to minimize the 
public sector. According to Falconer and McLaughlin, the Labour government 
displayed ‘a highly pragmatic view, acknowledging the need for a flexible system 
of public sector funding and service provision which makes the best use of what 
the private, public and voluntary sectors have to offer, through the establishment 
of various partnership arrangements’ (Falconer and McLaughlin 2000, p. 124). 
As such, focus has been on including ‘stakeholders’ as well as actors with relevant 
knowledge or competences in relation to specific service tasks.  
 
Besides the continuation and improvement of the PFI programme, the PPP 
umbrella also included ‘policy’ partnerships to develop specific policies and ‘area-
based’ partnerships competing for funds for local ‘regeneration’ projects, both 
including a broader range of public, private and/or voluntary actors, and 
‘community’ or ‘user’ partnerships between public bodies and service users to 
develop or provide specific services (Jeffares et al 2013). As such, the Labour 
government embraced PPPs as a general approach to societal innovation, 
incorporating a whole range of PPP types. The overview in the next section 
focuses on partnerships for service delivery in a broad understanding. 
 
Official PPP types in England 
The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) has published 
an oversight of ‘service delivery partnerships’, which collects descriptions and 
recommendations from other authorities such as the Office of the Deputy Prime 
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Minister (ODPM), Partnership UK and 4PS (DCLG 2006). The oversight 
describes three main forms of public-private partnerships for local authorities: 1) 
Joint venture companies, 2) Public-private partnering contracts, and 3) PFI and 
capital investments strategic partnerships (ibid., Jeffares et al 2013).  
 
Joint venture companies are newly established companies co-owned by one or 
more public and private organizations. The aim of a joint venture is to enable 
public and private actors to pool assets and resources and work together towards 
complimentary objectives and optimization of operations. This structure has its 
own legal identity and may own and deal assets, employ people, enter into 
contracts, etc. Joint ventures are flexible vehicles that may enable development, 
investments in assets and service delivery, where authorities may keep the desired 
level of control through decision processes, as shareholder or through provisions 
in the legal documents. Usually, the public authority will have a minority share of 
the company and a contract with the company to provide services, but the 
company may also be shared 50-50 or be authority controlled. The contract needs 
to be procured through public procurement mechanisms, but the company need 
not necessarily. Joint ventures may also be contract-based, rather than being 
established as companies. (DCLG 2006, p.41ff) 
 
Public-private partnering contracts are contracts between a local authority and a 
partner that envisage a more collaborative relationship than traditional outsourcing 
contracts. These contracts may be used either for strategic/management advice, be 
largely operational or something in between. Partnering contracts usually include: 
1) a less adversarial approach to disputes, 2) the possibility of redefining 
operations and costs as circumstances may change over time, 3) a collaborative 
approach to contract reading emphasising the ‘spirit of intention’, 4) sharing of 
gains and risks, and 5) an open book approach to accounting. Services in a 
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partnering contract may be developed either initially as a ‘big bang’ or 
incrementally in the contract period, but the changes need to be advertised in the 
procurement material. DCLG suggests that the contract should be performance 
based with the payment made dependent on the achievements towards 
performance targets.  As such, a partnering contract may be a less complex way of 
achieving joint working compared to a joint venture.  The contract may also 
include a joint venture intermediary between authority and contractor (ibid., p. 
101ff). 
 
In the DCLG guide, PFIs are categorized as outsourcing arrangements, and more 
specifically ‘capital outsourcing’. These arrangements usually involve the 
outsourcing of design, build, finance and operations to a private sector provider 
for a contract period of about 25-30 years. As such, a public authority, either alone 
or through ‘joint commissioning’ with other public authorities, procures 
investments in assets and services related to these. The aim of PFIs is to achieve 
access to private expertise and funding and transfer considerable risk to the private 
partner in this process. The private partner will often be a special purpose vehicle 
set up as a consortium of investors/ service providers, which then sub-contracts the 
actual construction/refurbishment and service delivery to other companies. In 
some cases, the authority may also choose to be a part of the special purpose 
vehicle to be closer involved in service delivery (ibid., p.142ff).  
 
In general, payments are not started before the commencement of service delivery, 
where after they are dependent on the performance of assets and services. The 
assets are usually financed through a mixture of debt finance (loans) and equity 
finance (company investments) (ibid.), and if sufficient risks are transferred to the 
private vehicle, government regulation dictates that the investment will not score 
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against an authorities capital spending limits. Public authority funding of the 
project is usually supported by central government funds.  
 
Capital Investment Strategic Partnerships are more complex variations of capital 
outsourcing with the aim to deliver a stream of investments and services in 
specific local areas, for example via a national strategic joint venture that enters 
into ‘sub’-joint ventures with local stakeholders and a private company (p.163ff). 
Table 2 provides an overview of the three PPP types. 
 
Table 2: PPP types in England 
 Structure Aim Contract length 
Joint venture 
company 
An established 
company co-owned 
by the public 
authority and private 
company. May also be 
contract-based. 
To enable joint 
working and pooling 
of assets and 
resources to pursuit 
complimentary 
objectives 
Long term 
commitment that may 
entail serial contracts 
with the authority 
Public-private 
partnering contract 
A ‘collaborative’ 
contract between 
public authority and 
private company for 
strategic development 
or service delivery  
To enable joint 
working and 
flexibility for service 
improvements based 
on a more 
collaborative and less 
adversarial approach 
to contracting 
Medium to long term 
(7-12 years or longer) 
PFI/ Capital 
Investment Strategic 
Partnership 
A contract between 
one or more public 
authorities with a 
private provider for 
the design, build, 
To achieve finance, 
expertise and risk 
sharing from private 
sector actors 
Long term 
(25-30 years) 
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finance and operations 
of assets and delivery 
of services related to 
these 
Source: DCLG 2006, Jeffares et al 2013 
 
In relation to the discussions in the former chapter, it is interesting that PFIs here 
are defined as ‘outsourcing’ rather than partnering contracts. The guide directly 
states as a disadvantage that PFIs are ‘rather inflexible to secure the best value 
duty of continuing improvements’ and are ‘used merely as a funding mechanism 
rather than a partnering arrangement’ (ibid., p.155). The PF2 addressed these 
challenges to some degree. The government aimed at improving flexibility and 
partnership in PF2’s by for example removing ‘soft services’ (cleaning, catering 
etc.) from future contracts and making other services voluntary to a fixed price. 
They also introduced more appropriate risk sharing, ‘open book’ accounting and 
sharing of surplus lifecycle funding (HM treasury 2012). Some of these challenges 
and new ideas are also evident in a number of the waste management PPPs 
investigated and may provide reason to discuss if PFIs may (in some cases) 
involve ‘genuine’ partnership. 
Denmark 
The PPP history of Denmark 
In Denmark, the PPP term has been linked closely to the British PFI contract. In 
Danish PPP vocabulary, the PPP term is specifically reserved for this type of 
partnership, whereas other PPP types are referred to as for instance ‘service 
partnership’, ‘partnering’ or ‘innovation partnership’ (Udbudsportalen/LGDK 
2010). In the 1990s, the Danish Social Democrat government began to show 
interest in the UK PFI model, and PPPs were mentioned for the first time in a 
Finance Ministry report from 1999. It was expected that the new Liberal-
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Conservative government elected in 2001 would increase focus on PPPs, but this 
far from happened. The new government continued the NPM-inspired 
modernization agenda and focused on contracting out and consumer choice, but 
remained sceptical towards PPPs (Greve and Mörth 2010). When eventually a PPP 
report was launched in 2004, it only suggested a bundle of spread initiatives and 
proposals and suggested seven pilot projects to be ‘tested for PPP relevance’. By 
2011, only one of these projects, the Danish National Archive, had been signed 
(Petersen 2011).  
 
Some of this scepticism was grounded in local experiences with public-private 
cooperation in the 1990s. A regional hospital in the area of Frederiksborg tried for 
some time to establish a PPP for a hospital, but did not get enough bidders. Farum 
municipality, who was known to be a frontrunner ‘contracting out’- municipality, 
began to experience with sale-and-lease back arrangements, but an attempt by the 
city council to involve private companies in the construction of a new indoor arena 
and the rebuild of the local football stadium ended in a tremendous failure. A case 
of mismanagement eventually led to the imprisonment of the former Mayor of 
Farum. As such, especially the Farum case was not exactly an inspiration for 
further experimentation with new organizational forms to include private actors. 
Even though private sector organizations have pushed for PPPs and the national 
pension fund ATP for example offered to co-finance a renovation of the Danish 
rail tracks through PPP, the liberal government remained reluctant and doubted the 
financial benefits of PPPs (Greve and Mörth 2010).  
 
The government delegated the day-to day responsibility for PPPs to a smaller 
government agency, the National Agency for Enterprise and Construction, which 
focused on providing tools and guidelines for PPP projects and established a PPP 
network for public and private organizations engaged in the area. Amogst other 
72 
 
things this resulted in the development of a Danish PPP contract model and a 
Danish version of a ‘Public Sector Comparator’ (PSC) (Greve and Mörth 2010). 
By 2012, 14 Danish PPP projects and 15 projected projects were identified in a 
government evaluation report which also reported positive evaluations from 
participants (KFST 2012). In 2014, the ‘Productivity Commission’ emphasized the 
innovative potential of PPPs and suggested that Danish competences should be 
gathered in a central PPP unit as in the UK. The report also stressed that Danish 
authorities should focus more on total project costs, rather than being caught in the 
short-term argument of cheaper public loans, which has dominated the Danish 
PPP debate so far (Produktivitetskommissionen 2014). It remains to be seen, 
whether this will move the Danish PPP agenda.  
 
The relative absence of PPPs in a Danish context might be considered curious, as 
cooperative arrangements with the private sector have deep roots in the Danish 
corporatist tradition and consensus-orientated society. As Greve and Mörth (2010) 
suggest, an answer might be that the Danish tradition for cooperation is based on 
hierarchy and informal relations, whereas the PFI-style PPPs are formal, contract-
based arrangements between equal partners. Whereas PFI-style PPPs are closely 
linked to the idea of NPM and the primacy of the private sector, the corporatist 
tradition is based on a strong state and participatory democracy. As such, although 
both are cooperative arrangements, the approaches to cooperation might clash 
(Greve and Mörth 2010). Furthermore, as Petersen (2011) concludes, “Denmark’s 
strong public finances and well-built infrastructure made private finance through 
the PPP model largely redundant” (p.25). As such, another reason why PFI-style 
infrastructure partnerships have not gained too much prominence in Denmark 
might be that there has been no ‘burning platform’ under the Danish tradition for 
publicly financed infrastructure. This is also reflected in waste management, 
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where the majority of incinerators have been financed through public interest 
companies.  
 
Partnerships as an approach to innovation in Denmark 
In line with the Labour government, the incoming Social Democratic led coalition 
government entering into power in 2011 has signalled a broader and perhaps more 
collaborative approach to contracting out, for example by replacing the council for 
‘outsourcing’ with a council for ‘public-private cooperation’ in 2013 (rops.dk 
2013). The Government programme from 2011, explicitly emphasises a 
partnership approach to societal reform. The title of the programme, ‘A United 
Denmark’ in itself strongly signals collaboration. The programme displays a broad 
partnership concept linking partnership to objectives of ‘modernization’, 
development of ‘new solutions’, the combination of economic growth with ‘a 
green transformation’: 
“We need to modernize Denmark. This demands comprehensive and new-thinking 
reforms created in partnerships breaking down traditional boundaries. Each and every 
one of us can contribute.” 
 
“The Danish society shall be good and efficient.  A society, which uses human and 
natural resources in a sustainable and cost-efficient manner. The government’s growth 
initiatives and economic policy shall go hand in hand with a long-term comprehensive 
green transformation of Denmark. There is a need for new solutions. And they shall be 
developed through dialogue, partnerships and broad cooperation.” 
(Danish Government 2011, p. 7-8) 
 
The programme also launched a pragmatic approach to the inclusion of private 
sector actors, and emphasised the opportunities in cooperation and mutual 
learning:  
“It is time to see pragmatically on the boundaries between public and private. The public 
sector and private companies should cooperate and learn from each other. This is simply 
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most efficient, and it may provide new opportunities for growth and new jobs. 
Partnership between public and private may open new possibilities to commercialize 
developed solutions.” (Danish Government 2011, p. 7-8, 24) 
 
The programme only briefly mentions infrastructure partnerships promising (only) 
an analysis of economic benefits of infrastructure PPPs (p.14). Instead, the 
programme suggest several broader partnerships, such as a partnership on public 
schools where involved actors (pupils, parents, teachers, school leaders etc.) 
would obligate each other on ambitious demands and specific targets areas’ (ibid., 
p.17). This would be ‘(a) partnership, where ideological trademark issues give 
way for mutual respect, and where the schools’ stakeholders are working 
together’ (ibid.). As such, although this approach does not delegate much attention 
to contract-based PPPs, it does link broader approach of partnership working to 
societal innovation. 
 
Official PPP types in Denmark 
A guide from the government organization ‘Udbudsportalen’ lists four PPP types: 
1) Partnering and service partnerships, 2) Public-private company, 3) OPP/‘OPP’ 
light (PPP/PPP light), 4) Public-private innovation (OPI). This categorization 
relates to the different phases in a public project (Udbudsportalen/LGDK 
2010).Table 3 provides a model to show how various PPP types are related to 
various phases, from the development to design, construction, maintenance, 
operation and finance. 
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Table 3: PPP types in Denmark, related to various phases  
Development Design Construction Maintenance Operation Finance 
 Traditional outsourcing Traditional outsourcing  
Partnering Service Partnership 
Public-private partnership light (OPP light) 
Public-private partnership (OPP) 
Public-private 
innovation 
  Public-private company 
Source: Udbudsportalen/LGDK (2010), p.4 
 
Partnering expresses a more flexible and collaborative type of public-private 
cooperation in design and construction. The partnering agreement is a supplement 
to a traditional outsourcing contract, which outline a number of joint principles for 
the cooperation and as such relates to the form of cooperation, rather than 
describing the specific tasks. The aim of this cooperation is to develop a 
constructive relationship between the municipality, advisors and the entrepreneur, 
where they jointly may find the best solutions for this specific project (ibid., 
p.10f). 
 
Service partnerships are similar contract types focusing on operation and service 
tasks. The aim of these partnerships is to include the private partner in delivery, 
development and improvement of efficiency in public services. As such, the 
partnership may include a range of similar or connected tasks to provide the 
possibility of prioritization and integration of service tasks. The partnership 
agreement builds on an open specification of tasks to enable joint development of 
objectives and methods, an economic model that incentivize gradual 
improvements in the contract period and principles of mutual trust, common 
values and the wish to learn together. The length of these contract types is 
typically 4-6 years (ibid., p.10). 
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Public-private companies are regulated by law no. 548 of 8 June 2006, which 
enables public authorities to establish a mixed company with one or more private 
companies to marketize and sell public know-how and at the same time deliver 
public services. As such, it is a demand that the developed products and services 
build on knowledge that is developed within the public sector, and the task may 
not have been contracted out before.  The aim of these partnerships is to achieve 
synergies from the combination of public and private knowledge and resources 
and potentially develop new markets for these products. The public authority may 
outsource the company and operations jointly or establish the company and then 
bid on the operation along with other bidders (ibid., p.13). The public authority 
may not have the majority of influence in the company, and if turnover to the 
private sector exceeds 50% in a three year period, the public authority is obliged to 
privatize the company (L548 2006).The length of the contract may be around 5-8 
years or longer dependent on the development perspectives in the project 
(Udbudsportalen/KL, p.13). 
 
‘Public-private partnerships’, or ‘OPP’, is the joint outsourcing of design, 
construction, maintenance, operation and finance of a public construction project. 
In line with the English PFI, the aim is to improve the total economy of the project 
by delegating risk to the private contractor, including finance and ownership of the 
facility. The private company is paid through a serial of payments over the length 
of the contract, where after the facility will usually be taken over by the public 
authority. Functional or output specifications along with an economic incentive 
model should increase the possibility of innovative and more efficient solutions 
from the private contractor. In Denmark, OPP projects are covered by a rule of 
obligatory depositing of a sum that equals the private investment, which lessen the 
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economic advantage of private funding, but it is possible to apply for exemption. 
The length of the contract is typically around 30 years (ibid., p.18-19).  
 
‘Public-private partnership light’, or ‘OPP light’, is basically a public-private 
partnership with public finance.    
 
Public-private innovation, or ‘OPI’, is a relatively new form of public-private 
cooperation, where focus is on the development and innovation of public services. 
The idea is to achieve mutual gains for the public and private actors involved, 
where the public authority get access to new technology and knowledge, whereas 
private companies get new information of user needs, which might be used to 
develop new products either within the project or in the future.  As such, these 
partnerships are based on the idea of synergies from the combination of specific 
knowledge and competences from public and private actors. Rather than 
delivering a specific facility or service to a public authority, the private actor 
participates on equal footing to develop solutions to jointly formulated challenges. 
OPI projects are not necessarily based on formal contract, and when they are, 
these are generally very openly formulated as it is not possible to describe the end 
result. According to this guide, these co-operations tend to be more long term 
(ibid. p.21-22). However, for example the example of an innovation partnership in 
this project was less than a year, so this is obviously not always the case. Table 4 
summarizes the various PPP types described in Denmark. 
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Table 4: PPP types in Denmark 
PPP types Structure Aim Contract length 
Partnering (a) and 
Service Partnerships 
(b) 
A flexible and 
collaborative contract 
between a public 
authority and private 
company for either a) 
design and 
construction or b) 
operation and service. 
The contract is 
usually supplemented 
by a ‘partnership 
agreement’. 
To a) develop a 
constructive 
relationship between 
the municipality, 
advisors and 
entrepreneur to jointly 
develop the best 
solutions, or b) 
include the private 
partner in delivery, 
development and 
improvement of 
efficiency in public 
services 
Middle length  
(4-6 years) 
Public-Private 
Company 
A mixed company 
between one or more 
public authorities and 
private companies 
To achieve synergies 
from the combination 
of public and private 
knowledge and 
resources and 
potentially develop 
new markets based on 
public know-how 
Middle to Long term 
(5-8 years or longer) 
OPP/ OPP light A contract between a 
public authority and a 
private company for 
the design, 
construction, 
operation and finance 
of a construction 
project. OPP light 
To improve the total 
economy of the 
project by delegating 
risk to the private 
contractor and 
achieve more 
innovative and 
efficient solutions 
Long term 
(30 years) 
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does not include 
private finance. 
through private sector 
input 
Public-Private 
Innovation 
A contract or 
‘agreement’ between 
a public and a private 
company to jointly 
develop an innovative 
solution to a public 
challenge 
To achieve mutual 
gains, where the 
public authority get 
access new 
technology and 
knowledge, and the 
private company get 
information on user 
needs and potential 
new markets 
Varies, not 
necessarily a formal 
contract 
Source: Udbudsportalen/LGDK (2010) 
 
The classification of these different partnership types may provide an overview of 
some of the most used forms of formal public-private cooperation and the 
structure according to the task of the partnerships is very straightforward logical. 
However, it may also lead to some confusion on the PPP vocabulary. Especially 
the attachment of the ‘OPP’ (PPP) label to construction projects is rather 
unpractical, as public-private partnerships are actually an umbrella concept that is 
able to include all these different types of cooperation. As such, the PPP term is 
reserved for the PPP type that is perhaps most questionable a genuine PPP. In line 
with the English categorization of PFI, It is also striking that this type of 
partnership is only described as an economic cooperation to improve total costs 
and risk sharing, where compared to for example ‘service partnerships’ the 
relationship between public and private partners is not mentioned at all.  
 
Furthermore, the categorization may be criticised for focusing narrowly on 
economically based cooperation, especially recalling the current government’s 
own broader approach to partnership. As Højlund (2014) explains, the Danish 
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categorization is based on the degree of economic involvement, range and 
temporal commitment in a classic economic line of thought, where partnership is 
based on interests. Højlund suggests that PPPs may also be based on values, which 
may be a more solid commitment ground for flexible and innovative partnerships, 
where objectives, organisation and governing may evolve over time. This is 
mirrored in waste management, where the approach in the government strategy 
overwhelmingly relies on broader stakeholder partnerships to develop specific 
new solutions. In these partnerships, not only interests, but also values may play a 
role to push new solutions forward. 
 
Comparing the English and Danish approach to PPPs, the Danish approach 
may include more ‘partnership types, but seems a little narrow and inflexible 
compared to the more rich variations of partnership working in England. In 
England, for example, a strategic partnership for development may frame a range 
of smaller local partnerships on infrastructure investment and services. The joint 
venture company in an English context also seem to be much less restricted than 
the Danish L548 companies, which extent the possibilities for English authorities 
to enter into this most integrated form of cooperation compared to the possibilities 
for this in Denmark. The partnership types do however suggest some degree of 
convergence; Danish service partnerships might be compared to English 
partnering contracts, PFI to OPP and Joint ventures to L548 companies. The 
English categorization does not include an innovation partnership, but innovation 
is an explicit part of especially partnering contracts and capital investment 
strategic partnerships.  
 
This last-mentioned difference may be quite interesting as it might express a 
difference between Danish and English local authorities in the way public services 
are developed either through specific innovation projects or as a part of service 
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delivery. The Danish model of innovation partnerships have recently been 
formalized in the new EU procedure for ‘innovation partnerships’ in the revised 
EU public procurement directive (EC 2014b). Danish municipalities seem to have 
been frontrunners in adopting this practice in line with the increased focus on 
innovating public services. The absence of such innovation partnerships in the 
English classification may be related to the lack of resources for such projects in 
this context, where local authorities are met by continuous economic cut-downs 
requiring them to strip down services to the most basic level.  
Conclusions: The PPP context in England and Denmark 
This chapter has provided an overview of the context of PPP policy and practice in 
the two cases, England and Denmark. As the previous chapter suggested, this 
historical, cultural and political context might be important to understand the role 
of PPPs in waste management. The historic development of PPP policies and 
practices has been remarkably different in the two cases, but has to some degree 
been converging resulting in broadly comparable PPP types.  
 
England invented the PFI-style PPP, which was implemented by the Conservative 
government in 1992 and continued under the Labour government from 1997 and 
onwards. Labour changed the strong NPM focus on down-scaling the state in 
favour of the private sector, towards a more pragmatic view on private inclusion 
as an option for ‘Best Value’.  With their Modernization agenda, Labour 
emphasised a broad umbrella of PPPs as an approach to new possibilities of 
improvement and innovation in public services.  
 
In contrast, PFI-style PPPs was first considered by the social democrat 
government in Denmark inspired by the UK experiences, followed by a number of 
liberal-conservative governments displaying a rather reluctant attitude towards 
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PPPs. The Danish scepticism may be explained by the differences between the 
Danish and UK approaches to public-private cooperation. The Danish tradition 
involves a more hierarchical, state-based and informal approach to cooperation 
compared to the formal, contract-based relationships in UK PFIs, and further, 
Danish municipalities have had enough resources to continue the practice of 
authority funding of infrastructure. However, also in Denmark, PPPs have been 
connected to efforts of innovating society, only based on a broader and more 
networked approach to PPPs.   
 
In England three main types of PPPs are identified: 1) Joint venture companies, 2) 
Public-private partnering contracts and 3) PFIs/Strategic Capital Investment 
Partnerships with some variation in the organization of the various types. These 
PPP types are broadly reflected in the Danish government guide displaying four 
PPP types: 1) Partnering and service partnership, 2) Public-private company, 3) 
OPP/OPP light (PPP), 4) Public-private innovation (OPI). Although the 
descriptions of the English PPP types seems more flexible and show more 
variation in organizational form, these PPP types are broadly comparable with the 
exception of the Danish OPI partnership.  
 
Accordingly, in article 2, the role of PPPs in waste management will be analysed 
within these historic, cultural and political contexts. Obviously, these varied 
historic backgrounds suggest that PFI style PPPs would play a bigger role in the 
UK case, whereas Danish waste authorities might have adopted the general Danish 
scepticism towards these, but on the other hand might emphasise more networked 
types of PPPs and OPI. The PPP types identified here have been used as a starting 
point for the categorization of waste management PPPs in the articles. In the first 
research article, infrastructure partnerships, service partnerships and innovation 
partnerships corresponds to the English PFI and ‘partnering contracts’ and Danish 
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OPP/Public-Private Company, service partnership and innovation partnerships. In 
the second article, service delivery partnerships correspond to the 
PFI/OPP/Public-Private Company whereas policy and technology partnerships do 
not correspond directly to these categorizations (although these may to some 
degree be compared to ‘innovation partnerships’ as they often focus directly on 
conducting innovation). In the third article, a UK partnering contract and a Danish 
service partnership contract have been selected as examples of service PPPs, 
whereas an English PFI contract and a Danish public-private company (including 
an innovation partnership) have been selected as examples of infrastructure PPPs.  
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Chapter 4: The Public Management of Waste 
This chapter introduces the empirical field of waste management. The first section 
discusses the various meanings of waste and how these frame the management of 
waste, illustrated by examples of developments in England and Denmark. 
Thereby, this section also serves as an introduction to waste management in these 
two contexts. The second section outlines the consequences of these changes for 
municipal waste managers, who are met by new managerial challenges in the 
governing of complex, socio-technical waste systems. The third section discusses 
how these challenges may lead to an emphasis on PPPs as policy instruments for 
innovation and sustainability transformation, where the following section will 
describe empirical investigation of waste management PPPs in existing literature. 
The last section wraps up the chapter by proposing waste management as a most 
relevant subject of public administration and public management research, where 
this empirical field has been largely absent. 
 
A number of articles have shown the fast changing English waste management 
policies and practices from landfilling to towards energy recovery and recycling 
(Adams et al 2000, Davoudi 2000, Burnley 2001, Davoudi and Evans 2005, 
Weaver 2005, Bulkeley et al 2005), and a few investigations of waste management 
in England have also mentioned PPPs (Entwistle 1999, Bulkeley et al 2007, Slater 
et al 2007, Uyarra and Gee 2012). In contrast, there is hardly any research-based 
investigations of the organisation and transformation of Danish waste management 
systems (although see Grønnegård Christensen 2001, Busck 2007, Federspiel 
2011) and as such there might be a specific need for describing these processes in 
Denmark.  
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What is waste? 
“Waste is no longer a disturbing by-product of consumption that waste producers 
pay to have removed. It has become an object of both desire and avoidance, open 
for political determination and everyday attention.” (Corvellec and Hultman 2013, 
p.143) 
 
As chapter 1 showed, waste may be defined legally as: ‘any substance or object 
which the holder discards or intends to discard’ (EC 2008, Article 3, 1). As the 
citation above points to, however, the meaning applied to the concept of waste has 
changed over time, which has also brought new attention to the management of 
waste. In the following we will look at four different meanings of waste: 1) waste 
as a problem, 2) waste as a market, 3) waste as a resource, and 4) waste as non-
waste. These four approaches to waste co-exist in a layered reality of meaning, 
which frames waste management today and provide new challenges for municipal 
waste managers. 
 
Waste as a problem 
Waste has traditionally been considered as a societal problem related to spatial, 
health and environmental issues relating to the generation and management of 
waste. In the EU alone, approximately 2,5 billion tons of waste is produced per 
year. In many low and middle income countries, waste management is the single 
largest budget expenditure; however, not dealing with waste in a proper manner 
tends to be even more expensive and have serious damaging effects on the 
environment (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012).  
 
Although we talk about ‘throwing away’ waste, ultimately there is no ‘away’ 
(ibid.). Throwing waste at un-controlled dumpsters may lead to several problems 
such as downward peculation of waste substance to groundwater reserves, soil 
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contamination and emission of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) from natural processing 
of organic waste (Christensen and Kjeldsen 1998). Waste Incineration solves some 
of the pollution and spatial issues of waste dumps, but the incineration process 
may produce air polluting gasses and a leftover by-product that needs to be dealt 
with, although techniques have been improved over time as environmental 
awareness and regulative demands have increased (Kleis and Dalager 2003). The 
benefit of incineration is also that it may be used for energy and heat production 
and thereby replacing other less sustainable sources, such as oil or gas. Likewise, 
methods of mechanical sorting and preparation for reuse and recycling may reduce 
energy use for new products, although these processes also involve energy 
consumption. Furthermore, transporting waste may lead to both energy 
consumption and emission of GHGs (White et al 1995). As such, new waste 
solutions may lead to new challenges.  
 
In Denmark, the first waste regulation was developed following the cholera 
epidemics in the capital city of Copenhagen in the mid 1850’ies, which directed 
attention to the health hazards of the practice of throwing garbage in the streets. In 
the beginning, waste was collected and gathered in dumps at the city outskirts, but 
spatial and health issues from crammed dumpsters led to a search for new 
solutions. After inspiration from England and Germany, the first incineration plant 
was established at Frederiksberg in 1903, and the technology was diffused across 
the country in the 1960-70s following the economic up rise after two world wars 
(Funch et al 1995). The growing environmental awareness in this period also led 
to an increasing concern for the environmental consequences of incineration, and 
the technology was improved along with the introduction of more restricted 
environmental regulation in the 1970-80s (Kleis and Dalager 2003, Odgaard 
2011). From the beginning of the 1990s, the output from waste incineration in 
terms of heat and energy was integrated with the district heating system (Kleis and 
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Dalager 2003), and today almost 20% of district heating and 5% of national 
energy consumption is delivered by waste incineration plants (DME 2013B).  
 
Since then, incineration has been broadly accepted in the Danish population as an 
efficient and less environmental damaging way of managing waste, which brings 
less expensive heat and energy to Danish households through district heating 
systems (DME 2013a). In the 1980s, incineration was supplemented by the first 
recycling stations (Funch 1995), and in 1992, the first national waste plan 
introduced targets for recycling, incineration and landfilling. Between 1985 and 
1997, landfilling of municipal waste was reduced from 61% to 12% and following 
to 1,5% by 2013 (EPA 2014a).   
 
In England, the first real regulation of waste was the Control of Pollution Act in 
1974, which delegated responsibility for waste management to local authorities 
(Slater et al 2007). For decades, waste was not really considered a problem. Early 
practices of incineration and kerbside recycling programmes in urban areas 
diminished in the 1930s to be replaced by landfilling, which was perceived as a 
cheaper and more efficient way of dealing with waste and at the same time ‘filling 
holes in the ground’ from the mineral extraction industry. The 1970s focus on 
sustainability led to some political scrutiny, and environmental concerns began to 
influence the predominantly economical and technical discourse on waste 
management. This coincided with emerging local challenges of finding new areas 
for landfilling, as the extraction industry retracted and a newly established 
Environmental Agency from 1996 was delegated regulatory responsibility for 
waste management and began to impose stricter regulatory environmental criteria 
for landfills (Davoudi 2000; 2009).  
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However, concerns of environmental protection did not have a strong impact in 
England, before new EU regulation applied pressure on the government to look for 
new collection and treatment methods (Weaver 2005, Bulkeley et al 2007). The 
EU regulation was implemented with the ‘Waste Strategy 2000’ (DETR), which 
for the first time introduced specific targets for recycling in England (Bulkeley et 
al 2005). In England, the introduction of incineration as well as other forms of 
recovery such as Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) has been accompanied 
with the challenge of finding outlets. The 73 incineration plants in England deliver 
energy to the national grit, but only five of these with combined heat and power 
(CHP) (Sheffield, Nottingham, Coventry, Grimsby, Slough) (DEFRA 2013a). By 
2013, England recycled 43% of municipal waste2, incinerated 24% and had 
decreased landfilling to 31% following one of the fastest transformations of waste 
management systems in Europe (DEFRA 2014, EEA 2013a). 
 
As the case of England shows, the EU has for many member states played an 
important role in the formulation of the waste problem and the regulation and 
transformation of waste management towards more sustainable solutions (Campos 
and Hall 2013). The revised Waste Framework Directive (WFD) determines the 
objective of EU waste regulation as: “to minimise the negative effects from the 
generation and management of waste on human health and the environment. 
Waste policy should also aim at reducing the use of resources, and favour the 
practical implementation of the waste hierarchy” (EC 2008, preamble, Odgaard 
2011).  
 
As such, EU regulation is based on the perception of environmental pollution and 
health issues from waste being a cross-European issue. The waste hierarchy 
adopted in the WFD as ‘a priority order in waste prevention and management 
                                                          
2 Here defined as Local Authority Collected Waste (LACW). 
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legislation and policy’ has been a strong narrative for sustainable waste 
management. The hierarchy ranks five options according to environmental impact 
from 1) prevention of waste, 2) preparing for re-use, 3) recycling, and 4) recovery 
with 5) disposal (landfilling) as the least favoured option (ibid., Article 4). As 
Figure 2 illustrates, the waste hierarchy is often depicted as a triangle. 
 
Figure 2: The European Waste Hierarchy  
 
Source: EC 2008 
The waste hierarchy has been implemented in Danish and English legislation and 
has along with binding targets for an upwards development in the hierarchy 
applied an increasing pressure for sustainability transformation of waste 
management practices. In line with the waste hierarchy, the WFD established 
specific targets for the management of municipal waste: 1) separate collection of 
at least paper, metal, plastics, and glass by 2015, and 2) reuse or recycling of at 
least 50% of household waste by 2020 (ibid.). These targets supplement the 
landfill directive targets of diverting the amount of biodegradable waste going to 
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landfill to 75% by 2010, 50% by 2013 and 35% by2020 in amounts compared to 
1995 levels (EC 1999). 
  
Table 5 shows the EU 2020 targets compared to the current levels of recycling of 
municipal waste in the EU, United Kingdom, England and Denmark. As the table 
show, neither Denmark nor England has yet reached the recycling target of 50% 
by 2020, whereas Denmark is far below the targets for landfilling (EEA 2013b). 
England is to achieve the EU targets within the United Kingdom (UK) (including 
also Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), where recycling collectively has 
slightly superseded the Danish percentage. The UK was given a four year 
derogation period from the landfill targets, but achieved the 2013 target on 50% 
diversion from landfilling by 2009 and is heading towards the 35% by 2020 target 
(EEA 2013c).   
 
Table 5: Targets and treatment of municipal solid waste in the EU, UK, 
England and Denmark, 2012 
 Landfilling Incineration Recycling and reuse, 
incl. composting 
EU 2020 target (35% of 1995 level) - 50% 
EU in total 34% 24% 42% 
United Kingdom 37% 17% 46% 
England 31% 24% 43% 
Denmark 1,5% 54% 44% 
Source: EC 1999, EC 2008, Eurostat 2014, EPA 2014a, DEFRA 2014 
 
However, the numbers in this table may not be completely comparable, as 
Denmark and England use various definitions of municipal waste. This is a 
general problem in the EU, where municipal waste may be calculated differently 
across member states thus making it difficult to account for and compare the waste 
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problem. In England, the definition of municipal waste has recently been aligned 
to the EU’s recommendations. From 2010, England’s definition of municipal 
waste was changed to include business waste, also including waste not collected 
by the municipality. Internally though, England continues to use the previous 
definition, which they now refer to as Local Authority Collected Waste (LACW). 
LACW refers to all waste types collected by local authorities, including 
commercial and industrial waste (DEFRA 2011). To be able to show the historical 
development of waste management, the thesis uses data for LACW (see also 
article 2).  
 
In Denmark, municipal waste covers all waste collected from households by 
municipalities or similar waste collected by municipalities from institutions, 
businesses and offices. A regulative change in 2010, where recycled industry 
waste was no longer allowed to be collected by municipalities, and thus was 
removed from municipal waste statistics, led to a decrease in recycling from 49% 
in 2009 to 42% in 2010. On top of this, a shift to a new waste data system by 2010 
has resulted in some irregularities, as for example 6-700,000 tonnes of waste from 
recycle stations were not reported correctly (EPA 2013). These technical issues 
significantly increase the distance to the 50% by 2020 EU target.  
 
Adding to this, the Danish government has chosen to calculate recycling og 
household waste only from certain types of household waste (organic waste, 
paper, plastics, glass, wood and metal). Accordingly the household recycling 
percentage reported from the ministry in the new waste strategy was only 22% 
(Danish Government 2013). The strategy sets the target of recycling 50% of these 
waste types from households by 2022 (compared to a total of residual waste, bulky 
waste and recyclable waste types from household waste) (ibid.). This may confuse 
the debate on recycling in Denmark, where the 22% is often compared to the EU 
92 
 
50% recycling target for municipal waste (see for example Politiken 2014). 
However, in EU terms Denmark is not less than half way to the 2020 target, but 
less than 5% from this, which is quite a difference.  
 
In the following Danish ‘Resource Plan’, the government announced that they 
would from now on report municipal waste targets according to these specified 
household waste types as a percentage of potential ‘recyclable household waste’ 
(the last part as directed by the EU Commission).  Since these new calculations are 
rather confusing and hard to compare to both other countries and national past 
performance, the dissertation we will keep to the ‘old’ data sets for municipal 
waste. Because of the challenges in data collection systems, the newest adjusted 
number have been acquired directly from the environmental Protection Agency 
(see EPA 2014a). If the government keeps to this new calculation method, it will 
mean that Danish municipalities will be very challenged in meeting these targets. 
 
Waste as a market 
Although the EU regulation of waste may have been developed mainly to 
minimise the negative effects of waste on the environment and human health, the 
harmonization of waste management also earned a different purpose: to develop a 
cross-European market for waste management services (Basse 1995). However, it 
is not necessarily obvious to see waste as a market good. As a by-product of 
production and consumption, waste has traditionally been perceived as an 
externality, a market failure, which the public sector needed to take care of for the 
common good. Although profits and recycling targets may increasingly go hand in 
hand, it might not be without problems to marketize waste products and services.  
 
Public managers may engage with various waste markets to deliver waste 
management services to citizens: an ‘input’ market, where waste materials are 
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secured, a ‘retail’ market for collection and transport services, a ‘processing’ 
market for waste treatment and disposal, a ‘technology’ market for various 
treatment technologies, vehicles and other equipment and a commercial ‘output’ 
market for recycled or otherwise processed products (Corvellec and Bramryd 
2012, Cruz et al 2013). The main focus in this PhD has been on the ‘retail’ and 
‘processing’ markets, although these are obviously affected by and linked to other 
markets. 
 
In most European countries, collection and treatment of waste have traditionally 
been provided in-house by local authorities. The marketization of waste 
management services started to take of in the 1980-1990s in line with the New 
Public Management (NPM) ideas and reforms of this period. The evidence of local 
authority reasons for contracting out is mixed, but most studies show that these are 
mainly found in more pragmatic considerations of cost concerns and budgetary 
restraints, rather than political ideology (Hirsch 1995, Dijkgraaf et al 2008, Bel 
and Fageda 2010, Simoes et al 2012). This might vary across national and local 
contexts.  
 
In the 1970s, a number of empirical studies argued that waste collection would be 
a good case for contracting out with prominent efficiency savings for local 
authorities (Savas 1977, Bennet and Johnson 1979). As a relatively simple, low-
tech public service, waste collection was considered an activity that was easy to 
specify and monitor, had low entrance costs and provided good potential for 
efficiencies through economies of scale (Domberger et al. 1986, Walls 1995). A 
study of some of the early waste collection contracts in England showed that 
contracting to private companies had reduced costs with about 22%, but also that 
competitive tenders awarded to in-house providers shared almost the same level of 
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cost reduction, thus suggesting that competition rather than ownership makes the 
difference (Domberger et al 1986).   
 
In contrast, researchers returning to this subject 30 years later found more mixed 
evidence. In line with previous research, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008c) calculated 
cost savings of 15-20% in the Netherlands, whereas Simoes et al (2012) suggested 
that the extra private productivity from contracting out seemed to decrease over 
time as a monopoly was established in the contract period. Ohlson (2008) 
calculated public production costs to be 6% lower than private production costs in 
a case study from Sweden. According to these newer studies, cost savings relating 
to contracting out may vary depending on for example the maturity of the market 
and historical relationships with private investors (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008d, 
Simoes et al 2012).  
 
In contrast to waste ‘retail’ markets’, waste ‘processing’ markets are generally 
considered entailing more market failures. The high asset specificity of waste 
infrastructure combined with the insecurity of long-term investments leads 
authorities to enter into ‘bilateral monopolies’, where they direct a pre-agreed 
amount of waste to a treatment facility in a longer time period (Cruz et al 2013). 
According to Cruz et al (2013), contracts in waste treatment tend to be longer than 
in waste collection, and whereas traditional outsourcing tends to dominate retail 
markets, various forms of cooperation in public companies or PPPs are generally 
more used in processing markets.  
 
In both England and Denmark, collection and treatment services have increasingly 
been marketized, and especially in England, through pressure on local authorities 
from central government. In England, waste service markets were practically non-
existent in the beginning of the 1980s. In 1981, only two local authorities had 
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private contracts, a number that had increased to 29 in 1986 (Domberger et al 
1986, p.70-80). In line with the general political NPM agenda, the Local 
Government Act in 1988 forced open the market with the implementation of 
‘Compulsive Competitive Tendering (CCT)’ (Davies 2007). Further with The 
Environmental Protection Act in 1990, local authorities were given the choice of 
contracting out waste treatment services to private providers or forming Local 
Authority Waste Disposal Companies (LAWDCs)  in ‘arm’s length’ of public 
authorities that would need to compete with private providers for contracts . The 
compulsive element was removed in 2000 following the shift from Conservatives 
to Labour, but the focus on private inclusion continued although within the more 
pragmatic rhetoric of ‘best value’ (Slater et al 2007). Today, private sector actors 
are involved in almost all processing services and around 50% of collection 
services (OFT 2006).   
 
In Denmark, there seems to have been a relatively long tradition for contracting 
out waste collection services to smaller, local haulier businesses often in a rather 
informal manner. However, in Copenhagen and Aarhus long term concession 
contract were chosen over competitive contracting in the 1960s to enable better 
control over the modernization of waste management services. In the 1990s, these 
municipalities were pressured by government and private contractors to dissolve 
these contracts, following the implementation of the EU public procurement 
directive and a growing political believe in the benefits of competitive contracting 
(Federspiel 2011). Today, almost all waste collection services are contracted out to 
private companies (Grønnegaard Chistensen 2001). In contrast, processing 
markets are generally split between public and private. Processing waste has 
traditionally been delegated from municipalities to public interest companies, who 
own the great majority of waste incineration plants. Some of these companies also 
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have recycling activities, but most of these activities are managed by private 
companies (ibid., DME 2013B).  
 
In both cases, there is a clear development towards internationalization and 
condensation of markets for municipal waste management services. Whereas these 
markets used to consist of smaller, local businesses, many of these have vanished, 
grown or become acquired by larger, more specialised companies that are now 
competing across the country or at international markets for waste services. In 
England, a market consisting mostly of smaller, regional and specialized small or 
medium sized companies (SME’s) has now become dominated by a few large 
multi-national companies, usually offering a broad range of treatment and 
collection services. These multinationals were seemingly attracted by the business 
opportunities in CCT and the prospective of the need for new waste facilities 
throughout the country (Davies 2007).  
 
The Danish markets are less internationalised, but there are a few international 
companies. Examples are RenoNorden, operating in the public retail market across 
the Nordic region, who established themselves in Denmark through an acquisition 
of the household division of Renoflex A/S, and Marius Pedersen, a Danish based 
company that expanded their activities in retail and processing waste to Czech 
Republic and Slovakia in the 1990s and in the period 2001-2014 were 65% owned 
by the French-based multinational Veolia Environmental Services, until the 
business was taken back on Danish hands (www.renonorden.dk, 
www.mariuspedersen.dk). It is likely that the Danish tradition of public processing 
and the comparably smaller market has not been enticing enough for large 
multinationals to set up Danish branches. 
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In the following sections I will shortly present the last three markets, the input 
market, technology market and output market, as far as their relevance to retail 
and processing markets. As mentioned before, the ‘input’ market has traditionally 
been dominated by municipal monopoly. EU principles of proximity and self-
sufficiency have allowed local authorities to direct, by whom and where locally 
produced waste should be treated. In general, concerns for the protection of the 
environment at a reasonable public expense have had a heavy weighing against 
competition rules (Grønnegaard Christensen 2001). However, recent years have 
seen this tradition challenged. The revised Waste Framework Directive (2008) 
opened for a liberalization of industry waste incineration across borders. This 
might threaten the Danish system, where municipalities have been able to direct 
waste treatment for both household and industry waste. For the last ten years, there 
has been a political debate on a potential liberalisation of publicly owned 
companies, which has not yet been settled (LGDK 2014). The former mentioned 
prohibition for municipalities to collect and treat industry waste from 2010, which 
was a result of a political agreement to change the organization of waste from 
2007, should also be seen as a part of this marketization (DME 2007). These 
developments are worth noticing, since they might create tensions between public 
and private actors, who increasingly compete for waste input. 
 
The ‘technology’ market has also been increasingly internationalised and local 
authorities generally turn to at least a European market to look for waste bins, 
treatment technology or new vehicles. ‘Green technology’ in waste management is 
increasingly becoming an export opportunity, as a growing number of countries 
realize the need for a transformation of these systems (Murray 1999). The first 
incineration oven was developed in England, where the first full scale incineration 
plant was introduced in Manchester in1876 (Funch 1995). However, as England 
shifted from incineration to landfill they seemed to lose this momentum. Denmark 
98 
 
continues to have a strong position in incineration technologies, where public and 
private companies have engaged with Danish research institutions in the gradual 
improvement of these technologies (DME 2013B). Danish private companies such 
as Babcock and Wilcox Vølund Aps and the engineering consultancy Rambøll 
A/S was engaged in the very first incineration plants in Denmark and have since 
delivered waste technologies and advisory services to an international customer 
base (Kleis and Dalager 2003).  
 
The ‘output market’ tends to be a mix of domestic and international markets, 
although transport costs and CO2 emissions from these provide domestic markets 
an economic and environmental advantage, when they exist. Markets for 
secondary materials have grown along with diminishing material resources and 
tighter regulation of energy use, which increasingly makes private companies 
switch from primary to secondary materials (Murray 1999, p.7). Accordingly, 
price volatility at these markets has become a new risk for waste managers and 
private companies to handle (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012).  
 
Waste as a resource 
From seeing waste as a problem and a market, recent years have seen the 
emergence of a new narrative of seeing waste as a resource.  This narrative 
encompasses both the marketization of waste, where waste is seen as something of 
economic value for new production processes, and a return to the 1970s 
discussions on sustainable development and the scarcity of world resources. After 
being largely absent in decades, sustainable development was again placed high 
on the global agenda with the climate change debates from around 2006-7 after 
new alarming reports from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
attention from prominent actors such as former presidential candidate in the US Al 
Gore, grasping the world’s attention with his documentary ‘An Inconvenient 
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Truth’. As a contributor to the emission of ozone depleting GHG gasses, waste 
management may also be a potential contributor to the reduction of emissions and 
hence, be a subject of climate change policies. A recent report from ISWA (the 
International Solid Waste Association) calculated that in the EU region, 
‘municipal waste management activities alone could potentially account for 18% 
of the EU Kyoto reduction target’ [20-30% in 2020] (ISWA 2009, p. 4).  
 
However, the resource agenda concerns more than climate change. As the EU 
Commission begins their strategy, ‘Roadmap for a Resource-Efficient Europe’ 
(2011), “Europe has enjoyed many decades of growth in wealth and wellbeing, 
based on intensive use of resources. But today it faces the due challenges of 
stimulating the growth needed to provide jobs and well-being to its citizens, and of 
ensuring that the quality of this growth leads to a sustainable future. To tackle 
these challenges and turn them into opportunities out economy will require 
fundamental transformation within a generation – in energy, industry, agriculture, 
fisheries and transport systems, and in producer and consumer behaviour.”(EC 
2011, p.2)  
 
As such, the roadmap sets the first milestones for a transformation towards a 
sustainable economy incorporating concerns for environmental protection, 
economic opportunities and security of supply (ibid.). According to the EU 
Commission, although some businesses have begun to realize the potential in 
resource efficiency, many businesses and consumers have not yet realized the 
urgency or experience barriers for making these changes (ibid.). This kind of 
transformation would demand a policy framework, where innovation and resource 
efficiency are rewarded through incentives for product redesign, sustainable 
resource management, recycling, substitution and resource savings (Ibid., p.2). 
The Roadmap sets the milestone that by 2020, waste will be managed as a 
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resource. This implies that 1) waste generation per capita is in decline, 2) 
recycling and reuse are considered economically attractive options and more 
materials are recycled, and 3) energy recovery is used only for non-recyclable 
material and landfilling is virtually eliminated (p.8). 
 
Following the roadmap, a new European waste programme, ‘Towards a circular 
economy: A zero waste programme for Europe’, was launched in July 2014 
outlining the future of EU waste management (EC 2014a). However, the proposal 
was ditched by the new EU Commission in December 2012 despite 11 member 
states urging the Commission to keep the proposal on the work programme. 
According to First Vice president Frans Timmermann: “because we want to put 
something on the table that is better and more ambitious. And that really has a 
huge contribution on the part of the European economy that really needs a boost 
which is the circular economy” (Euranet 2014). Accordingly, it is hard to say what 
this will mean for the development of EU regulation on waste, but it might be the 
case that economic concerns may be preferred over environmental concerns.  
 
The waste programme proposed new specific targets for waste management to 
follow the WFD: 
1) To increase recycling and reuse of municipal waste to 70% by 2030; 
2) To increase recycling of packaging waste to 80% in 2013, with interim 
targets of 60% by 2020 and 70% by 2025, including targets for specific 
materials; 
3) A ban on landfilling of recyclable plastics, metals, glass, paper and 
cardboard by 2025 and virtually eliminate landfill by 2030; 
4) Promoting markets for secondary raw materials; 
5) To reduce food waste by at least 30% by 2025; 
6) A clarification of the calculation method for recycled materials (EC 2014a). 
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As mentioned before, this last target on clarification is much needed, since the 
various methods of calculation in member states makes a comparison of recycling 
and reuse targets quite uneven. These new strategies and targets as well as the 
strong resource rhetoric points would have strongly increased demands for a 
transformation of European waste management and applied extra pressure on 
member states and local authorities already challenged by current targets.  
 
 In both England and Denmark, actors in the waste sector have to some degree 
adopted the ‘waste as resource’ narrative, but continue to have a grand challenge 
in front of them. In Denmark, the waste as a resource narrative has been broadly 
embraced.  In the waste community, for example the Danish Competence Centre 
for Waste, DAKOFA, has held several conferences on the potential consequences 
of seeing ‘waste as a resource’ (www.dakofa.dk), and as such the debate seems to 
be rolling among central actors. The newest government strategy for waste 
management, ‘Denmark without waste – reuse more, incinerate less’, is framed as 
a ‘resource strategy’ much in line with the rhetoric of former environmental 
minister, Ida Auken (Danish Government 2013). In the foreword to the strategy 
she states:  
“We should increasingly see waste as a resource that may be reused and recycled, 
rather than seeing waste as a residual. (…) With ‘Denmark without waste’ the 
governments suggest a new direction. In the last decades, almost 80% of 
household waste has been incinerated. Despite the fact that this has contributed 
significantly to deliver green energy, we have also lost materials and resources that 
could have been reused.” (ibid., p.5, authors translation).  
 
As such, the government attempts to push for a radical change away from the 
current practice of incineration and towards more recycling and reuse. However, 
although the strategy is called a ‘resource’ strategy, the strategy and following 
‘resource plan’ mainly addresses traditional waste management and does not 
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engage in a broader sustainability discussion on resources, besides a short section 
suggesting a connection between increased ecological farming and nutrition from 
organic waste and some vaguely formulated future initiatives, such as support for 
industrial symbiosis (see EPA 2014, p.72-73). In February 2014, a delayed waste 
prevention plan outlined two cross-going themes, resource-efficient companies 
and green consumption, and four action areas, food waste, buildings and 
construction waste, textiles and electronics and Packaging, but did not set specific 
targets. The strategy has been criticised for lacking tangible instruments and clear 
direction (Information 2015). Accordingly, the Danish government might still be a 
bit fumbling in regard to the implementation of the resource narrative.  
 
In England, Bulkeley et al (2007) identified a similar turn towards seeing waste as 
a resource, but only as a sub-trend to the dominant focus on diversion from 
landfill. According to the authors, ‘waste as a resource’ began as a social and 
economic rationale, but was increasingly linked to ‘‘stronger’ versions of 
sustainability in which the emphasis is on waste minimization and the reuse of 
materials’ (Bulkeley et al 2007, p.2749). However, these stronger versions of 
sustainability were mainly found in the community sector, where organisations 
such as charity shops, furniture reuse, community projects or informal networks 
provided alternative waste infrastructures or engaged through mutual learning and 
support (ibid.).  
 
There are signs, though, that this narrow discourse has been spreading. In 2000, 
the Waste and Resources Action Programme (WRAP) was created as a private 
not-for-profit company backed by government funding to help recycling take off 
in the UK. This organization has strongly embraced the resource agenda and has a 
stated vision of ‘a world without waste, where resources are used sustainably’. In 
line with this, a new government prevention strategy from 2013, ‘Prevention is 
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better than cure – The role of prevention in moving to a more resource efficient 
economy’. The strategy aimed to “improve the environment and protect human 
health by supporting a resource efficient economy, reducing the quantity and 
impact of waste produced whilst promoting sustainable economic growth” 
(HMGOV 2013, p. 13) and extensively referred to benefits of moving towards a 
circular economy: “Moving towards a more resource efficient, circular economy 
offers scope for innovation, sustainable growth and saving money, as well as 
reducing the impact on the environment” (ibid., p.5). The newly appointed 
Liberal-Democratic Minister for Environment and Resources, Dan Rogersen, 
emphasised in the foreword that the strategy ‘hinges on everyone playing their 
part’ with the government’s role being foremost to ‘get out of people’s hair’ and 
‘set the conditions and guidelines that allow the market, businesses, local 
authorities and people to make the changes that will propel us towards a more 
circular and sustainable economy’ (ibid. p.3).  
  
In line with these statements, the Minister recently announced that the government 
planned to refrain from new initiatives on waste and leave the work to relevant 
businesses and local authorities, since, as the minister states in a ‘letter to 
stakeholders’: ‘I believe a sustainable and resource efficient economy can and 
should be delivered with little Government intervention as industry responds to the 
clear business case for action’ (DEFRA 2013b).  The Minister announced that the 
government would continue to support WRAP, engage in EU negotiations on new 
waste and resources regulation and run a small prevention programme (ibid.). 
However, after playing an active role in the first steps towards landfill diversion 
and increasing recycling, it will be interesting to see, where this new ‘non-action’ 
plan will take England in the future.  
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Waste as non-waste 
Lastly, in relation to the new focus on prevention, a smaller but not insignificant 
meaning of waste is a shift of focus towards ‘non-waste’. As Pongráz and Pohjola 
(2004) points to, the formulation ‘intends to discard’ in the EU definition assumes 
that there is waste and that the owner plans to discard it. However, waste 
prevention, which is the most preferred option according to the EU waste 
hierarchy, would mean not to produce waste at all (p.142). As such, there might be 
an underlying challenge towards more sustainable waste practices in the way 
waste policies and waste management systems are built upon an understanding of 
‘waste’ rather than ‘non-waste’. Essentially, waste management systems have 
been designed to manage waste, rather than preventing waste to be generated in 
the first place. As Corvellec and Hultman (2012) show in the Swedish context, a 
narrative shift from ‘less landfilling’ to ‘wasting less’ has become a threat to the 
perception of Swedish public companies as successful recyclers and placed them 
in an uncomfortable situation with a growing scarcity of waste volumes and 
increased competition for waste input. Thus the focus on prevention might 
demand a new strategy for public authorities and public companies.  
 
Waste management systems rely on waste generation. When waste is removed 
from these systems, it becomes harder to increase recycling according to political 
targets. To provide a concrete example, the decline in people reading newspapers 
may be good for the environment overall, but may reflect negatively on paper 
recycling statistics. Accordingly, a strict focus on recycling targets may have the 
negative effect that reducing waste is not incentivized. As Local Government 
Denmark emphasised in a hearing document to the Danish waste strategy, these 
targets may also lead to some waste types being prioritized for non-environmental 
reasons:  
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‘Comparison and measurement of goal attainment should include consideration for 
the environmental effects and not only recycling percentages. The current 
calculation of the 50% targets applies a pressure on municipalities and might 
induce recycling of heavier waste types in favour of those providing the greatest 
environmental or climate change effects. For example plastic waste contributes 
less to recycling percentages, but significantly to climate change.”  
(LGDK 2013, p.2-3, Authors translation)   
 
This PhD project mainly focuses on waste management, as in the collection and 
treatment of waste that has been discarded by its owner. However, as the meaning 
of waste is changing, the meaning of ‘waste management’ might also be changing. 
As the EU strategies and the work in WRAP points towards, waste management is 
no longer only a task for local authorities. As such, these changing meanings of 
waste as not only a problem, but also a market, a resource or as ‘non-waste’ create 
a burning platform for change in local authority-based waste management policies 
and systems in EU member states such as Denmark and England. However, local 
authorities continue to have a central role to play in waste management. A 
scenario, where there is no longer produced municipal waste does not seem 
realistic, although the nature of this waste and the way it is collected and treated 
continue to change. Accordingly, there might be a need to specify the role of local 
authorities versus other actors such as the government, designers, producers, the 
waste industry and citizens in the transformation towards more sustainable waste 
management systems and also where results require a joint effort. The following 
section will show how modern waste management systems may be understood as 
socio-technical infrastructure networks in the context of these changes and discuss 
the challenges of managing such systems.  
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Waste management systems as socio-technical infrastructure networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above story re-told from Minervini (2013) of the travel of a vine bottle shows 
some of the complexity in modern waste management systems. This vine bottle 
was mainly transported between neighbouring cities, but even then, the process 
involved a network of public and private actors as well as individual households, 
acting on a basis of EU and national regulation. From being a simple, local service 
of collecting garbage and dumping it on a nearby landfill, waste management 
systems today involves multiple streams of waste that are transferred between 
various localities with a number of public and private actors involved. 
 
Modern municipal waste management systems may be characterised as complex, 
socio-technical infrastructure networks, encompassing not only physical artefacts 
and technologies, but also social structures such as organizations, regulations and 
social networks through which they are governed (Hughes 1983, Uyarra and Gee 
2012). These infrastructure systems are ‘highly durable, path dependent, resistant 
to rapid change and associated with incremental, rather than radical innovation’ 
(Uyarra and Gee 2012, p.101-102), and consequently may not be easy to change.  
The provision of new waste infrastructure tends to involve large-scale 
investments, which may lead to system lock-ins from sunk costs, vested interests 
and technical inter-linkages to existing systems (ibid., Corvellec et al 2013). 
Changes in these systems for example from landfilling or incineration towards 
An empty vine bottle is discarded from a household in southern Italian city. The bottle is 
delivered at a local bring bank, where the glass is picked up by a garbage truck from the 
municipal company ASM. The garbage truck delivers the glass to a nearby ASM plant, where it 
is washed and fine-sorted along with waste from three other neighbouring cities. This glass is 
forwarded to a private processing plant in a nearby city. Here, it is processed into new raw 
material for then to be transported to a furnace in another Italian city. (Minervini 2013) 
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recycling and reusing may require ‘active reconfigurations’ of existing regimes, 
rather than just minor technological advances (Uyarra and Gee 2012, p.101).  
 
Waste management systems are increasingly multi-level governed through a 
mixture of EU, national and local regulation. As the previous section showed, EU 
directives have formed both environmental and market regulation of European 
waste and greatly influenced the narratives, discourses and practices for national, 
regional and local waste management in member states (Campos and Hall 2013). 
In this more complex situation, municipal waste managers are increasingly 
dependent on other actors to achieve political targets. Through processes of 
‘splintered urbanism’, former monopolistic, comprehensive and centrally planned 
service delivery systems have partly been replaced by complex ‘patchworks’ of 
private companies (Marvin et al 1999, Graham and Marvin 2001). This 
marketization of waste has introduced private sector actors in a much higher 
degree as co-producers of waste management services through the various waste 
markets. For example, public managers are dependent on the existence of markets 
for recyclables to introduce increased source separation (Bulkeley et al 2005, 
p.12). Municipal managers are also highly dependent on the more or less 
voluntary engagement and ‘co-production’ (Alford 2002) from citizens in private 
households, especially in systems relying on source separation (Uyarra and Gee 
2012).  
 
Accordingly, as Bulkeley et al (2005) report from the English context: “Municipal 
waste, once the province of relatively autonomous local authorities concerned 
with the most economically efficient collection and disposal of waste, is now a 
complex process in which a range of international institutions, national, regional 
and local government agencies and non-state actors have a degree of influence 
and responsibility” (p.3). As such, local authorities are facing a dilemma of 
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increasing sustainability targets and decreasing ‘governability’ (Kooiman 2003) of 
waste management systems. As such, the changing field of waste management 
might lead to new managerial challenges for waste managers, who are 
increasingly dependent on other actors to develop and deliver more sustainable 
waste management services. The next sections will discuss why a partnering 
approach might be relevant in this context and look into the few accounts of PPPs 
in waste management services.  
Towards a partnering approach? 
There are at least two interlinked challenges in the described development of 
waste management that might lead to an emphasis on partnerships as policy 
instruments. First, developing more sustainable waste management systems is not 
a one actor job, but relies upon coordination and cooperation across networks of 
public, private and civil society actors. This means that realizing policy objectives 
may demand the introduction of new forms of interactive governing such as 
partnerships in which, although local authorities remain principal actors, they will 
rely upon the resources, knowledge and willingness of other actors to engage in 
the challenge (Entwistle 1999, Bulkeley et al 2005). Second, the turn towards 
marketization of waste management challenges the governing of waste. 
Limitations for dialogue and close collaboration in traditional contraction out may 
lead towards new forms of contracting.  According to Bulkeley et al.,‘responding 
effectively to the fast changing demands of the waste agenda in the context of 
long-term contracts demands flexibility and a partnership approach between 
authority and contractor’ (Bulkeley 2007, p. 2748).  
 
On the other hand, the increase of competition, not only between private 
businesses, but also increasingly between public and private actors might decrease 
the willingness to collaborate, whereas the sense of a loss of ‘governability’ may 
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lead public authorities to hold on to as much decision-power as possible, reduce 
the influence of private actors and keep to their traditional hierarchical form of 
governing. As such, there might be a tensions between collaboration and 
competition in waste management services, where public managers may be torn 
between an emerging acknowledgement of the need to cooperate and an urge to 
remain in control, also knowing that they have the responsibility for large scale 
changes, and private sector actors may have different objectives and not only 
deliver efficiency and new ideas, but also new obstacles.  
Empirical accounts of PPPs in waste management research 
Empirical investigations of how waste management PPPs work in practice is few. 
Evidence from Portugal (Simões et al 2012, Cruz et al 2013) and Spain (Bel and 
Fageda 2010) show that PPPs in the form of mixed public-private companies and 
contract-based PPPs play a significant role in waste management services. 
Whereas Bel and Fageda (2010) suggest that this ‘partial’ privatization was chosen 
by public managers as a non-ideological pragmatic middle way between purely 
public and purely private, Simões et al (2012) and Cruz et al (2013) concludes that 
these partnerships are not always successful and need more careful contract design 
and management. Although mixed companies may have a theoretical advantages 
of enabling a ‘relational’ approach to contracting, local authorities seemed better 
able to manage PFI style contract based PPPs, which tended to be more limited in 
scope. 
 
From England, Slater et al (1997) have provided an overview of various types of 
partnership working in waste management in England. Their approach was 
slightly broader than the PhD’s, as they included public-public partnerships and 
public-civil society partnerships, whereas this project mainly concerns 
partnerships between public authorities and private companies. The authors 
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describe five types of partnerships: A) A public-public partnership between waste 
collection authorities (WCAs) and waste disposal authorities (WDAs), B) A 
partnership between WCAs, WDA and one or more private providers, C) A 
partnership between a unitary authority (UA) and a private provider on an 
integrated contract, D) A partnership core between WCAs and WDA with 
partnership relations to a private provider and potentially community providers, 
and E) A partnership between a WCA and a community provider (p.648ff). These 
models especially show the importance and variations of public-public 
cooperation in the English two-tier system. Especially model B, C and D are 
relevant in this context. As I will return to in Methods in Chapter 5, I have aimed 
at displaying the variety of partnership arrangements in England. 
 
Slater et al (2007) also conclude on the outcome of these partnerships regarding 
the development towards more sustainable waste management. The authors stated 
that all investigated partnerships worked with the adoption of ‘so-called 
sustainable technologies indicating a willingness  to move beyond disposal as the 
only option’(p.661), but also that partnerships arrangements did not seem to affect 
the specific technologies applied or be necessary for the adoption of new facilities. 
Furthermore, the authors warned that the tendency of entering into long-term 
integrated contracts with a small number of large suppliers might restrict 
competition, limit flexibility and innovation and delegate disproportionate 
influence on the choice of sustainable waste solutions to these companies. 
However, partnership working across WDAs and WCAs towards new 
procurements did seem to have moved WCAs towards mutual learning and 
implementation of best practice in waste collection (Slater et al 1997, p.660ff). As 
such, they concluded that potentially “partnership working is creating the 
foundations for a future characterized by a more efficient version of business as 
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usual rather than a more effective shift towards sustainable management of 
resources and waste.”(ibid., p.663). 
 
As such, despite the general positive connotations to partnership working, 
according to Slater et al (2007) partnership working  do not seem to make a great 
difference in relation to the development of innovative sustainable solutions in 
waste management. In contrast, Uyarra and Gee (2012) describes the process of 
transformation in a local authority, where a new and more sustainable solution is 
developed and implemented through a PFI style PPP in Greater Manchester, 
England. However, their paper mainly focuses on the efforts of the public waste 
authority in the pre-procurement phase and does not engage with the public-
private cooperation in the PPP. As such, it leaves us curious on the cooperation 
between public and private actors in this very interesting case, which has also been 
a part of the empirical data in this dissertation. 
 
Accordingly, public-private partnerships are being used in waste management, but 
seemingly not only with overwhelmingly successful results. This might be curious 
compared to the high expectations to partnership working both in general and in 
waste management in particular. It is also puzzling that private influence on 
solutions in Slater et al (2007) is perceived only as a negative effect, despite the 
fact that access to private knowledge and ideas should be one of the main 
objectives of including private sector actors in service delivery. As the last section 
showed, there may be a number of challenges to partnership working, such as the 
regulatory restrictions for cooperation and an urge for public managers to stay in 
control. Nonetheless, PPPs remain a favoured policy instrument in waste 
management - as in many other policy fields - which in itself justify a further 
investigation.  
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More conceptual and empirical research on the role of PPPs in the development 
towards more sustainable solutions in waste management is indeed needed. This 
dissertation aims to dig deeper into the cooperation processes within these 
partnerships, the extent of private influence in partnership processes and the 
managerial opportunities for public managers to conduct innovation in cooperation 
with private sector actors in the context of a changing field of waste.  
Waste as an empirical field in public administration and public management 
research 
Waste management has traditionally been perceived and described mainly as a 
technical issue. In consequence, there has been little attention towards waste 
management in the social sciences.  However, this might be changing as scholars 
from various countries and disciplines have begun to address waste as a subject of 
social science (Campos and Hall 2013). This section aims to provide a short 
overview of some of the most relevant research, and proposes on this background 
an increased focus on waste as an empirical field in public administration and 
public management research, where this field has largely been overlooked.  
 
As the section on waste as a market in this chapter showed, the 1970s and 1980s 
saw a wave of political economic studies investigating waste management as a 
case for contracting out. In line with the growing new public management spirit of 
those decades, the starting point for these studies was a failing public sector. As 
Savas (1977) elegantly states in his introduction:  
”Many Americans feel that government - particularly local government, which is 
responsible for the daily delivery of highly visible services - is inefficient and 
ineffective: the disparity between what local government takes and what it gives 
looms large in the public eye, as manifested by the annual taxpayers' revolt. There 
is a growing belief that significant and enduring increases in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local government can be achieved only by recognizing the 
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institutional nature of the basic problems, designing management strategies to 
overcome them, and building the political support to do so.” (p.50).  
 
Back then as well as now, public administration and public management research 
was concerned with understanding societal governing and investigating potential 
solutions to improve this.  
 
In contrast to the clear recommendation of contracting out waste collection to 
increase efficiencies, researchers returning to this subject 30 years later observed 
that many local authorities had continued to provide waste management services 
in-house or through public companies (ibid., Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008b). This 
led to an interest in the reasons behind contracting out and the expectation that 
these might be political. However, in ‘The Waste Market’, an anthology of newer 
political economy studies on European waste collection markets, Dijgraaf and 
Gradus (2008a) concludes that the decision of municipalities generally seems to be 
pragmatic, rather than ideological. High levels of money transfer from central 
government (less economic pressure) and high local unemployment (fear of losing 
in-house jobs) tended to lead to in-house provision, whereas small scale 
municipalities tended to contract out to increase economies of scale (Dijkgraaf et 
al 2008).  
 
What these studies in general did not include, is that changes in waste 
management services towards more sustainable practices of recycling and reuse, 
as described in the previous sections, have complicated the activity of waste 
management. As such, the assumption that especially waste collection services 
should be an easy service to contract out might not hold in the 21th century. Walls 
(1995) made this point in a study of waste management contracts in the USA and 
also showed that contracts had not been adjusted to these new conditions, but 
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remained highly specified and did not include incentives to increase recycling in 
the contract period, thus allowing little flexibility to the contractor. In line with 
this study, it may be time to re-think the form of contracting out waste 
management services and in general cooperating with the private sector in the 
context of a fast changing field of waste management.  
 
The changing field of waste management have been described in a number of 
studies from various social scientific disciplines. A new landmark in waste 
management studies, the anthology ‘Organising waste in the city’ edited by 
Campos and Hall gathers analyses from ‘the sociology of environment and 
technology, social policy, public administration, political science, management 
and organization  studies, urban studies, geography and urban ecology’ (Campos 
and Hall 2013, p.1).  As waste is often considered a subject of urban governance, 
it is probably not surprising that it is within urban studies and related fields that we 
find many studies of the governing and organisation of waste management (for 
instance Davoudi 2000, Bulkeley et al 2005; 2007, Sharp and Luckin 2006, 
Davoudi and Evans 2009). From a sociological and organizational point of view, 
researchers have studied the shifting narratives, values and global discourses of 
waste (Carmo and Oliveira 2010, Corvellec and Hultman 2012, Zapata 2013) and 
traced the micro-processes of waste management in various contexts (Evans 2011, 
Minervini 2012, Campos and Zapata 2014). Waste has also been used as a case for 
the study of sustainability-oriented transition and transformation processes within 
Science and Technology studies (Geels and Kemp 2007, Kemp et al 2007, Uyarra 
and Gee 2012).  
 
Whereas a broad range of urban and environmental governance scholars in 
England has described the changes in English waste management (Davoudi 2000, 
Bulkeley et al 2005, Weaver 2005), Sweden also seems to be a locus for a 
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renewed interest in waste management. Large research projects such as 
‘Organising critical infrastructure services – A case study of waste management’ 
funded by the Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems (INNOVA) 
and ‘Waste in Translation: How ideas of waste management travel from global to 
local’ funded by the Gothenburg Centre of Globalization and Development have 
resulted in substantial contributions to the understanding of waste management. 
Especially relevant in this context is a number of publications on the challenges 
and contributions of Swedish waste management companies, which provide new 
insights to modern practices of organisation and management of waste and the 
challenges ahead for incumbent actors in the transformation towards more 
sustainable waste management practices, of which several of the resulting articles 
have also been referred to in this dissertation (see Corvellec et al 2011, Corvellec 
and Hultman 2012, Corvellec and Bramryd 2012, Corvellec et al 2013).  
 
Adding to these studies, a relatively new PhD from Phillip Karré (2011) from the 
Netherlands School for Public Administration, ‘Heads and Tails: both sides of the 
coin – An analysis of hybrid organizations in the Dutch waste management 
sector’, investigates hybrid waste organizations in the Dutch context, ie. public 
waste management companies that increasingly act as private companies and 
compete with these for waste services. The choice of these ‘middle-way’ public 
and private organizations as service providers express the strong public interest in 
waste management and the reluctance to leave these services completely to the 
market. This tendency is also evident in both England and Denmark, where 
municipal ‘arms length’s’ organizations play a prominent role in service delivery. 
In this context, public-private partnerships may be perceived as another hybrid 
manner of organizing waste management that also combine public and private 
characteristics.      
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However, in public administration and public management research, waste 
remains relatively unexplored. This is a shame, as waste provides a very 
interesting case on the transformation of public administration and public 
management.  Perspectives from this broad interdisciplinary field of waste 
management research may inspire public administration and management scholars 
to embrace this empirical field. As I have shown in this chapter and similar to 
results from researchers before me, the changing social narratives of waste 
influences the way waste is organised and governed; and as such, changes the 
‘socio-materiality’ of waste (Corvellec and Hultman 2012). This change has taken 
place mainly from the growing environmental awareness in the 1960s, but as this 
chapter has shown, with different speed and consequence across European 
countries.  
 
Interlinked with new ideas on sustainability, globalisation and technological 
innovation, new managerial tendencies such as New Public Management (NPM) 
and Governance, as well as an increased focus on innovation in the public sector, 
have had a strong impact on waste management services over the last 40 years, but 
also continue to be highly debated and contested in this field. This PhD 
dissertation aims to contribute to the growing amount of social science research in 
waste management by focusing on public-private partnerships as policy 
instruments for waste management and thereby, taking a public administration and 
public management point of view on waste.  
Conclusion: New managerial challenges in a changing field  
This chapter has described the empirical field in this PhD dissertation and shown 
how the perception of waste has changed over time followed by new regulation, 
new practices and new challenges for municipal waste managers. From being 
considered a spatial, health and environmental problem, waste is now also 
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perceived as a market, a resource and as ‘non-waste’.  These different narratives 
provide a layered reality of meaning that frames the task of waste management. 
An increasing marketization of waste has introduced private sector actors as 
important co-producers of municipal waste services, whereas the narrative of 
seeing waste as a resource has increased the pressure for development of more 
sustainable waste management solutions. Current waste management systems 
provide little incentive for the most preferred solution, non-waste - not producing 
waste at all, which would involve a range over other actors beside local 
authorities. Accordingly, there might be a need to specify the role of local 
authorities versus other actors such as the government, designers, producers, the 
waste industry and citizens in the sustainability transformation processes in waste 
management systems, and also where results require a joint effort. 
 
In increasingly complex and networked waste management systems, local 
authorities are dependent on other actors to achieve political targets. Private actors 
may be engaged in waste collection and treatment services, but also as producers 
of new technology and receivers of output material. In a situation of decreasing 
governability of waste management systems, a partnering approach to governing 
might be a way forward for local authorities. However, partnering may be 
challenged by a ‘competition for survival’ between public and private actors and 
strict regulations of public-private contracts that reduces the possibility for 
dialogue and collaboration. Empirical investigations of waste partnerships are few 
and conclude that the investigated partnerships needed more careful contract 
design and management and at most have resulted in ‘a more efficient version of 
business as usual rather than a more effective shift towards sustainable 
management of resources and waste’(Slater et al 2007, p.663). A single case study 
of a PFI from Greater Manchester in England did provide some optimism 
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regarding sustainable outcomes, but less concrete knowledge on public-private 
cooperation. 
 
However, partnerships remain a favoured policy instrument in waste management 
as well as in other fields, which makes it worth investigating closer the potentials 
and practices of this policy instrument for the development of more sustainable 
waste management systems. Whereas public administration and public 
management research has until recently mainly focused on waste as a good case 
for traditional contracting out, these large scale changes in the understanding, 
regulation and organization of waste might give reason to a revision of waste 
management as an empirical field within this discipline.  
 
In this PhD dissertation, waste management will be explored from a public 
administration and public management view, and as such, the aim is both to 
contribute to a growing field of social science research within waste management, 
and to open - or perhaps return to - waste management as an empirical field within 
public administration and public management research. The changes and 
challenges described in this chapter will be used in shortened versions as context 
in the empirical articles, especially in the second article, which specifically 
investigate the role of PPPs in waste management in England and Denmark in the 
context of regulative and organizational changes and developments in the 
sustainability transformations of English and Danish waste management systems.  
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Chapter 5: Methods 
As described in chapter 1, this dissertation is built on an explorative, comparative, 
embedded case study of waste management PPPs in England and Denmark. 
Adding to the presentation of the analytical design in chapter 1, this chapter will 
provide an overview of the methodological considerations, analytical strategies 
and data collection techniques used in the PhD. As such, some of the information 
here will overlap with the shorter methods sections in the articles. This chapter 
will firstly discuss the choice of an explorative case study and the level of 
conclusions sought through this approach. Secondly, I will extend the discussion 
on the selection of cases (begun in the introduction) and potential 
generalizability/comparability of these cases. The last part will concern the data 
collection process, interviews and the iterative process of data analysis and 
concept development.  
Explorative case studies 
George and Bennett (2005) define a case as ‘an instant of a class of events’ (p.17). 
As such, a case is one example of a ‘phenomenon of scientific interest’ in a 
historically defined period (ibid.). This PhD investigates cases of the phenomenon 
of PPPs and more specifically the development and implementation of innovation 
and sustainability change in PPPs. Whereas the second article focuses on the 
general use of PPPs in sustainability change of waste management systems in two 
national cases, the third article focuses on specific PPP projects in the two 
countries within the investigated time period. Case studies may provide ‘holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’ and may be used to ‘understand 
complex social phenomena’, especially when ‘boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2009, p.4; 18). They are typically based 
on a variety of data sources, such as interviews, archival data, observations, etc. 
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(ibid.). The complexity and context-bound experiences investigated in this thesis 
clearly calls for a case study.  
 
This PhD thesis applies an explorative approach to case studies (Eisenhardt 1989, 
Yin 2003, Bovaird 2007, Graaf and Huberts 2008). Explorative case studies aims 
to build theory on the basis of empirical evidence from one or more cases 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, Stewart 2012). An explorative approach is 
typically selected, when less is known about the studied phenomenon or when the 
phenomenon is so complex that neither the constructs nor relationships between 
them are fully definable (Graaf and Huberts, p. 639). In this case study, the main 
concepts, PPPs, innovation and sustainability, are all ambiguous and fluid, which 
in itself complicates a search for relationships between them and calls for a more 
explorative approach. Explorative case studies allow researchers to test theories 
and propositions on real-life situations within the analytic process. As Flyvbjerg 
(2006) states, “[t]he advantage of the case study is that it can “close in” on real-
life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in 
practice” (p.235). As such, case studies may ‘recognize patterns of relationships 
among constructs within and across cases and their underlying logic’ (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007). The analytic strategy in explorative case studies may be more 
or less inductive (Stewart 2012). In this case study, I have taken a starting point in 
a theoretical review to identify key concepts, proposed relationships and relevant 
questions to ask (Yin 2009, p. 14), which is then explored and adjusted through an 
iterative process between theory and data.  
 
As such, the thesis is not only empirically explorative, but also theoretically 
explorative. The main concepts have been guiding posts for the empirical data 
collection, but I have kept an open approach to the concepts to explore the 
meaning of them empirically in this context. The PhD thesis aims to connect these 
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concepts and suggest possible relations between them, while exploring the 
relatively new empirical field of waste management. Below I have attempted to 
describe the relationships between ‘variables’ and results in the main propositions 
of the thesis. 
 
In the key conclusions (somewhat simplified), I suggest that:                                                 
1) The mix of collaboration, competition and hierarchy (variable A,B and C) in 
PPPs provide a unique potential for conducting innovation (Y1 output); 
2) Managing these processes through hierarchical, network and market governing 
(D,E and F)  over the whole PPP process (G) is key to exploit this potential (Y1 
output); 
3) PPPs may connect actors between landscape, regime and niches in forums for 
co-production of innovative solutions (H) to enable sustainability change 
processes (Y2 outcome).  
 
I do not claim that these ‘variables’ are necessary or sufficient factors for 
conducting innovation in PPPs or use PPPs to foster sustainability change, only 
that the presence of these variables seem to ‘favour’ or be ‘contributing causes’ to 
this output and outcome (George and Bennett 2005, p.26-27). There might be a 
number of other conditions influencing processes and results in the selected cases. 
In general, it may be the rich explanations behind these statements that are most 
interesting, ie. What are the conditions for collaboration, and how may the 
involved actors collaborate through the PPP process?  
 
Furthermore, the regulative framework as well as the organizational form of PPPs 
is continuously changing and so must our perception of the potential for 
innovation and sustainability change in them as well. As stated in the introduction, 
the potential output, innovation, may take various forms, and the potential 
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outcome, sustainability, may in itself change as new technologies, methods and 
perceptions arise. This changing nature of the studied phenomena does not mean 
that it is not worth searching for regularities, but rather that we, as researchers, 
must ‘stay on our toes’ and remain open to the empirical world. The main 
objective of the PhD is to provide useful information to improve the understanding 
of these phenomena and their interrelatedness and develop guiding posts of 
awareness to practitioners working on this in practice. Hopefully, the PhD may 
also inspire new theory-based empirical investigations and new practical 
experiments that may alter PPPs as we observe them today. 
Case selection 
The empirical field of waste management provides the context for the embedded, 
comparative case study of waste management PPPs in England and Denmark with 
specific PPP projects as sub-units (see Figure 1 in chapter 1). As described in the 
introduction, the context of waste management might bring specific challenges for 
PPPs, especially concerning the demand for innovation of waste management 
systems, flexibility for continuous improvements and new political targets relating 
to sustainability change processes. Compared to usage-based PPPs (eg. roads, 
bridges), which tend to be paid by users, infrastructure PPPs in waste management 
are process plants (equivalent to water or waste-water processing plants), which in 
line with accommodation-based PPPs (eg. schools, hospitals) are measured by 
availability (Yescombe 2007). However, whereas accommodation PPPs may 
include facilitating services such as cleaning and maintenance, waste management 
PPPs demand an active participation in the processing of waste, and as such, a 
direct co-production of the public service. Whereas a public school may 
implement a new teaching programme without concern of the building, the private 
partner in a process plant would need to participate directly in the innovation of 
waste management services. As such, waste management provides an interesting 
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context for investigating innovation and the possibilities for collaboration and 
‘genuine’ partnership in PPPs, as the need for this might be bigger compared to 
PPP types in other sectors.  
 
Within the field of waste management, cases were selected for analytical purposes 
on the basis of a replication design, where similar investigations were carried out 
in a limited number of cases (Peters 1998, Yin 2009). Article 1 describes 
considerations in existing research on the potential and challenges for conducting 
innovation in PPPs in a parallel review of three provisional PPP types related to 
service delivery, infrastructure PPPs, service PPPs and innovation PPPs. Article 2 
focuses on the main case level, where England and Denmark were chosen as 
comparable, but different cases of using PPPs in sustainability transformation of 
waste management systems. As mentioned in the introduction, these countries 
were both in a continuing process of changing waste management practices 
towards greater recycling and reuse of waste facing the EU 2020 targets and 
currently have almost equal percentages of recycling. However they have had 
different trajectories of change.  
 
Denmark has been on the forefront of sustainable waste management for decades, 
but is now lacking behind the most advanced countries such as Germany, 
Switzerland and Sweden (EUROSTAT 2014). England on the other hand, has 
traditionally been ‘the dirty man of Europe’ relying mainly on landfill disposal up 
until the 1990s (Davoudi and Evans 2005). As mentioned in chapter 4, England 
has been moving forward and improving recycling rates faster than any other 
European country. Whereas Denmark increased recycling of municipal waste from 
31,5% in 2000 to 44% in 2013 (EPA 2014a), England delivered in the same period 
a massive step change from 12% to 40% recycling (DEFRA 2014). Preliminary 
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research showed that in both countries, efforts of transforming waste management 
systems to some degree involve public-private partnerships. 
 
As EU member states, both countries are subjected to EU regulation and hence 
obligated to fulfil EU targets and principles for waste management as well as 
public procurement rules. Furthermore, both countries have a large inclusion of 
private sector actors in waste management compared to other European countries 
(Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008a). This provides a reasonable level of comparability 
between the two cases. In England, around 50% of waste collection services are 
contracted out to private companies, whereas almost all treatment services are 
privately provisioned (OFT 2006). In Denmark, at least 80% of collection services 
are contracted out, whereas most treatment services are provided by municipally 
owned companies and private companies deliver most pre-treatment of recycling 
(Grønnegård Christensen 2001, MST 2011). These organizational differences may 
provide different conditions for the use of PPPs. For example, in Denmark 
introducing PPPs to a greater extent in waste treatment would be a change from 
public towards private inclusion in waste management, whereas in waste 
collection PPPs might just be an adjustment of current cooperation from 
traditional contracting towards partnering relationships.  
 
In article 3, I shift focus from a country comparison towards a comparison of 
selected PPP projects (embedded units) within Denmark and England. On the 
background of the identified partnerships in the two national contexts, two 
partnerships in each country have been selected for more in-depth analysis; a PPP 
in waste collection (service PPP) and a PPP in waste treatment (infrastructure 
PPP). These two PPP types appeared to be the most relevant for municipal waste 
managers and as they are based on contractual relationships, they pinpoint the 
interesting tension in PPPs between competition and collaboration. As I explain in 
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the fourth article, the specific cases were selected according to two main criteria: 
1, The PPPs should have an element of ‘partnership’ rather than being purely 
adversarial, and 2, the partnerships should be seen as innovative in the broader 
waste management community. As such, these cases were selected for the 
analytical purpose of showing the dynamics of innovation in PPPs (output-based), 
and hereunder investigating the importance of collaboration in PPPs (as one 
variable).  
 
The selected cases were: 
1) The partnering contract for waste collection and street cleansing services 
between the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and SITA UK, 
2) The PFI joint venture contract for a number of waste processing plants, transfer 
stations plus communication services and education services between Greater 
Manchester Waste Disposal Authority (GMWDA) and the private consortium 
Viridor Laing (Greater Manchester) Limited (VLGM Ltd.), which also included a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with the private company Ineos Chlor, 
3) The service partnership contract for waste collection services between the 
public company Renosyd I/S and the private company Marius Pedersen A/S, 
4) The potential joint venture partnership contract for the construction of a new 
‘resource centre’ and a number of administrative and service tasks in Vejle 
Municipality, which also included an innovation partnership with Marius Pedersen 
A/S in the development phase. 
 
The four cases were selected for the following reasons. In England, the 
partnership contract on waste collection and street cleansing between the Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) in the London Area and SITA UK 
was mentioned several times in interviews as an example of a partnership contract 
that did not just talk about partnership, but was really a partnership relationship. 
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This case did not have the most sustainable system of waste collection, but 
displayed continuous innovation effort in the contract period, where the partners 
managed to increase recycling from 16,5% in 2004 to almost 30% by 2011. In 
waste treatment, a pilot interview in September 2012 with Greater Manchester 
Waste Disposal Authority (GMWDA) in relation to a research seminar at 
Manchester University exposed the PFI joint venture contract with the private 
consortium VLGM Ltd. as an interesting case in at least two ways. First, the 
public manager described the management of the relationship in partnership terms, 
and second, the contractual arrangement was in itself innovative with political 
goals and incentives implemented in the contract to improve recycling.  
 
In Denmark, the service partnership contract between the publicly owned 
company Renosyd and Marius Pedersen A/S was the first contract of this kind in 
household waste collection services.  The choice of this organizational form was 
directly related to the public organization’s aim of achieving a more productive 
and less adversarial relationship with a private contractor. Compared to an almost 
parallel example of a similar service partnership contract in another municipality, 
Renosyd chose to change their collection system within the contract period. As 
such, the Renosyd case provided an example of service innovation within a 
partnership contract. 
 
In waste treatment, there is only one example of a PPP, Vejle Waste and 
Recycling, which for the first time in Denmark aims to create a closer 
collaboration with a private company in a joint venture PPP with the objective of 
providing both an innovative service delivery arrangement and new technology for 
mechanical sorting of recyclables. This PPP has not reached beyond the 
procurement process, which limits comparability, but on the other hand provides 
unique, detailed insight to the pre-contract period that is fresh in mind of the 
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interviewed managers. Following the data collection process, the Vejle contract 
was cancelled because of legislative complications, and the case provides a good 
example of both the appeal and the challenges for PPPs in waste infrastructure in 
the Danish context. 
Generalizability and comparability 
According to Yin (2009), case studies are ‘generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes’ (p.15). In this approach, case 
studies do not represent a sample of populations, which should produce the same 
results. In contrast, other case study researchers carefully select populations of 
‘similar’ cases, which their cases may represent (Rohlfing 2012).’Similar’ does 
not imply ‘exactly the same’, but rather that they share relevant scope conditions 
to provide comparable settings (ibid.).  
 
In this embedded case study, the specific experiences with PPPs from England and 
Denmark are not samples of PPP experiences in a group of countries. However, 
the identified relationships are likely to be comparable to similar situations. I 
prefer to use the phrase comparability as this softens the strong claims of 
generalizability. In article 2, Denmark and England are selected as comparable, 
but different cases, and the article does not claim that similar patterns should be 
found in other EU countries. However, similar PPPs types found in other EU 
countries are likely to have the potential for contributing in similar ways to 
sustainability change processes in waste management or other similar sectors. In 
article 3, the cases are selected as specifically collaborative and innovative (‘best 
cases’), and as such the dynamics are not likely to represent a general picture of 
innovation in PPPs. However, the article shows a potential in PPPs, which should 
be present in similar PPP types in Denmark and England as well as in other EU 
countries.  
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Inspired by the idea of ‘layered generalization’ in Rohlfing (2012, pp. 204-211), 
the conclusions from the embedded case studies may be compared to more or less 
‘comparable’ cases as scope conditions are extended. As such, the cases in article 
2 may be compared to the role of PPPs in sustainability change of waste 
management in other countries, the role of PPPs in similar or different sectors in 
the same country or further even the role of PPPs in different sectors and 
countries. Similarly, the PPP cases in article 3 may be compared to similar or 
different PPP projects in waste management in the two countries, similar of 
different PPP types in waste management in different countries, or similar or 
different PPP types in different sectors in the same or other countries. Figure 3 and  
Figure 4 show the comparability of these cases to other cases of the phenomenon.  
 
Figure 3: Examples of the comparability of cases in Article 2  
 
Source: Inspired by Rohlfing 2012      
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Figure 4: Examples of the comparability of cases in Article 3 
 
    Source: Inspired by Rohlfing 2012 
Data collection 
The dissertation is based mainly on qualitative, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews (Kvale 1994; 2006), supplemented by data from other sources such as 
policy documents, legal documents, websites and observations from participation 
in conferences, network meetings etc. in both countries. The interviews include 
four expert interviews and 39 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with private 
waste managers involved in municipal waste services and public waste managers 
mainly from local authorities in the two countries. In Denmark, I have conducted 
25 interviews with 38 respondents from 20 different organizations. In England, I 
have conducted 18 interviews with 20 respondents from 16 different 
organizations. The slight overrepresentation of Danish interviews and respondents 
does not represent a purposeful distribution of effort, but is rather a consequence 
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of the higher accessibility to Danish respondents. Interviews with public and 
private managers were recorded and transcribed for further analysis, except for 
one where the respondent asked to not be recorded. Expert interviews were either 
recorded or summarized in notes.  
 
Table 6 and Table 7 provide an overview of the interviews in the two country 
contexts. The data collection in Denmark took place between October 2011 to 
February 2013 with a few extra interviews in fall 2013/ spring 2014. Following an 
exploratory interview in September 2012, the main data collection in England took 
place in the period between May 2013 and September 2013 during a three month 
research stay and two extra data collection journeys to England.  
 
Table 6: Interviews in Denmark  
No. Date of 
interview  
Sector Organisation Number of 
respondents 
Location 
1 24/10 2011 Public Vestforbrænding 1 Glostrup 
2 21/10 2011 Public Aarhus AffaldVarme 2 Aarhus 
3 31/10 2011 Public Københavns Kommune, 
Affaldsområdet, Drift og 
udbud  
 
3 Copenhagen 
4 31/10 2011 Public Københavns Kommune 2 Copenhagen 
5 31/10 2011 Public Københavns Kommune 1 Copenhagen 
6 26/3 2012 Public Renosyd I/S 2 Skanderborg 
7 28/3 2012 Public Frederiksberg Kommune 1 Frederiksberg 
8 29/3 2012 Public Miljøstyrelsen 1 Copenhagen 
9 29/3 2012 Public Miljøstyrelsen 1 Copenhagen 
10 30/3 2012 Public Renosyd I/S 1 Telephone 
interview 
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11 12/6 2012 Private 
(expert) 
DAKOFA 1 Telephone 
interview 
12 11/09 2012 Public Vestforbrænding 1 Glostrup 
13 4/12 2012 Private Stena Recycling 1 Brøndby 
14 17/12 2012 Private HCS 1 Glostrup 
15 18/12 2012 Private M.Larsen 1 Brøndby 
16 19/12 2012 Private Haldor Topsøe 1 Lyngby 
17 9/1 2013 Private Meldgaard Miljø 1 Aabenraa 
18 10/1 2013 Private RenoNorden 2 Herfølge 
19 15/1 2013 Private RGS 90 3 Copenhagen S 
20 25/1 2013 Public/ 
Private 
Dong Energy 2 Gentofte 
21 15/2 2013 Private Marius Pedersen 1 Fjerritslev 
22 26/2 2013 Public Favrskov Kommune 2 Hammel 
23 5/11 2013 Public Vejle Waste and 
Recycling 
2 Vejle 
24 20/3 2014 Public Vestforbrænding 3 Glostrup 
25 23/4 2014 Public Amager Ressource 
Center (ARC) 
1 Copenhagen S 
In total:  25 interviews, 38 respondents and 20 organizations 
 
Table 7: Interviews in England 
No. Date of 
interview  
Sector Organisation Number of 
respondents 
Location 
1 28/9 2012 Public Greater Manchester 
Waste Authority 
1 Manchester 
2 1/5 2013 Public/private 
(expert) 
Partnership UK 1 Telephone 
interview 
3 13/5 2013 Public East London Waste 
Authority (ELWA) 
1 London 
4 21/5 2013 Private T March Consultants/ 1 Telephone 
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(expert) CIWM interview 
5 22/5 2013 Public and 
Private 
Greater Manchester 
Waste Disposal 
Authority and Viridor 
Laing (Greater 
Manchester) Ltd. 
2 Bolton 
6 29/5 2013 Public Blackburn with Darwen 
UA (GMWDA 
constituent council) 
1 Blackburn 
7 13/6 2013 Public Sheffield City Council 1 Sheffield 
8 13/6 2013 Private Veolia Environmental 
Services, Sheffield 
1 Sheffield 
9 21/6 2013 Public Manchester City 
Council 
(GMWDA constituent 
council) 
1 Manchester 
10 24/6 2013 Private SITA UK, RBKC 1 London 
11 25/6 2013 Public English Local Authority 
(anonymised) 
1 - 
12 29/7 2013 Public North London Waste 
Authority (NLWA) 
1 London 
13 1/8 2013 Public North London Waste 
Authority (NLWA) 
1 London 
14 12/9 2013 Public Sommerset Waste 
Partnership 
1 Birmingham 
15 13/9 2013 Public Shropshire Council 2 Shrewsbury 
16 13/9 2013 Private Veolia Environmental 
Services, Shropshire 
1 Shrewsbury 
17 17/9 2013 Public Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea 
1 London 
18 18/9 2013 Private Private consultancy 1 London 
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(expert) (working with DEFRA) 
In total: 18 interviews, 20 respondents and 16 organizations 
 
Most PPP projects were identified through a bottom-up approach of networking 
and ‘snowballing’ (Pedersen 1998), where I systematically asked contacts and 
respondents to recommend other relevant projects and contacts. For example, the 
Greater Manchester case was recommended as innovative by an expert from 
Partnership UK. To this author’s knowledge, there is no authoritative list of all 
waste management PPPs in either England or Denmark, although DEFRA did 
have a list of local authority PFI projects in waste management, which counted 29 
projects and helped provide an overview of potential cases in this context 
(DEFRA 2013c). I considered a more quantitative approach, for example through 
conducting a survey in all local authorities, but the work load of this exercise may 
have reached beyond the limits of this PhD project compared to the gain for the 
project, and thus I prioritized the detailed, processual understanding gained from 
conducting a range of qualitative interviews.   
 
The PhD partner organisations were helpful in pointing out interesting cases and 
providing contact information on respondents through their networks in both 
Denmark and England. Table 7 provides an overview of PPP projects included in 
the PhD. In Denmark, it was quite easy to get interviews and find the relevant 
persons in the involved organisations, for example through websites, press stories 
or the network of my partner organisations. In general, there was great interest in 
the PhD project, which probably helped me getting into the sector. As the material 
shows, I did not identify that many infrastructure and service partnerships in 
Denmark, but in the period of the PhD project there seemed to be a rise of both 
service partnerships and more networked technology innovation and policy 
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partnerships. The first example of an infrastructure partnership issued a tender in 
2013 and has not been completed.  
 
In England, I started with a pilot interview with Greater Manchester Waste 
Authority, which confirmed that these PPPs would be interesting in comparison to 
the Danish case. In general, it was considerable harder to get interviews in 
England. I made a preliminary list of English projects, which could be interesting, 
but had difficulties finding the right contact persons and getting people to respond 
and accept interviews. Therefore, I more extensively used networking and 
‘snowballing’ to get contact information on relevant cases and respondents. This 
also means that although my first aspiration was to get interviews from the 
different parts of the country, the interviews tend to cluster around North-West 
England and the London Area. However, as PFIs are obliged to follow the same 
government guidelines, this should not matter too much for the results.  
 
There is a great deal of variation in the organisation of waste management PPPs in 
England, which is caused by the various forms of public sector organisations with 
split-authorities etc. Through an initial mapping of variations of partnership type 
and organization, I aimed at including the broadest possible variation. I did not 
come across policy, innovation or technology partnerships through the interviews 
in England, but the decision to include these in the Danish context led me to an 
extra investigation towards the end of the PhD project, where I identified 
comparable organisational forms through descriptions and evaluation reports on 
WRAP and DEFRA’s websites. I also found out that one of the respondents in the 
Shropshire interview actually mentioned one of the technology partnerships, but 
without calling it a partnership. I did not conduct follow up interviews for these 
projects, as the written material was quite good and I at that point had decided to 
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focus on service and infrastructure partnerships for the in-depth analysis in article 
3. 
 
Table 8: Collected examples of PPP projects 
Denmark 
PPP type Cases (sub-units) Interview No. 
Policy partnerships 
(G-M-P+) 
Government initiated partnerships 
(incineration residue, shredder waste 
and mechanical sorting plants), 
Resursium, Copenhagen Cleantech 
Cluster’s (now Clean) partnership on 
plastic waste, Copenhagen Municipality 
transport partnership 
1, 3, 8, 9, 12, 25 
Infrastructure 
partnerships 
(M-P) 
Vejle Waste and Recycling (JV) 23, 11 
Innovation 
partnerships 
(M-P+) 
Vejle Waste and Recycling, 
(Vestforbrænding competitive dialogue 
on PCB in window frames) 
23 
Service partnerships 
(M-P) 
Renosyd-Marius Pedersen, Faurskov-
Meldgaard, Vestforbrænding-HCS 
6, 17, 21, 22, 24 
Technology 
partnerships 
(M-P+) 
Renescience Technology (DONG 
Energy - Amager Ressource Center, 
Haldor Topsøe, etc.), hybrid waste 
vehicle (Meldgaard – Banke AD - 
Esbjerg Municipality, etc.), electronic 
registration of hazardous waste (Odense 
Municipality - Stena Recycling), 
Innosort 
3, 12, 13, 16, 20, 25 
England 
PPP type Cases (sub-units) Interview No. 
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Policy partnerships WRAP initiated partnerships (Metal 
Matters, Local Reuse Partnerships) 
11 
Infrastructure 
partnerships  
- For waste treatment 
(WDA-P) 
- For waste treatment 
and collection (UA-P) 
 
- GMWDA-VLGM Ltd. (JV), NLWA, 
ELWA-Shanks 
 
- Shropshire-Veolia, Sheffield-Veolia, 
(Sommerset Waste Partnership – KIER/ 
May Gurney (public partnership with 
partnership relationship to contractors)) 
 
1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 3, 12 
 
14, 15, 16, 7, 8 
Service partnerships  
(WCA-P) 
RBCK-SITA UK, Trafford Council-
Veolia, Manchester City Council-
Enterprise (JV) 
10, 17, 11, 9 
Technology 
(innovation) 
partnerships 
Anaerobic Digestion (Shropshire 
(District) Council - (Biogen) 
Greenfinch), Mechanical Heat 
Treatment (Merseyside WDA - Orchid 
Environmental) 
15 
Abbreviations: M: Municipality or municipal company, P: Private Company, G: Government 
organization, WDA: Waste Disposal Authority, WCA: Waste Collection Authority, UA- 
Unitary Authority, JV: Joint venture. Italic: no interview, Bold: selected for comparison in 
article 3 
 
I did not demand specific respondents when asking for interviews, but sent an 
outline of the main interview themes and questions to the provided contact, and 
asked if they or one of their colleagues would be able to assist me.  In some cases I 
talked to Managing Directors or Heads of waste management having an overview 
of the organisation, in some cases with contract managers designing and operating 
the contracts in practice and sometimes with both levels. This probably also linked 
up to the size of the organisations involved. A managing director in a small waste 
collection company may be closer to the operational process, than a comparable 
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person in a large multi-national company. In local authorities I sometimes 
interviewed both Heads of Waste managements and operational staff. In some 
cases, the public or private contact in the case organisation was helpful in setting 
up interviews with both partners in the same day. I had one joint interview with 
the public and private organisations together, GMWDA and VLGM, which was 
helpful as they could supplement each other’s understanding of the process, but I 
decided to split up future interviews to make sure that the respondents did not feel 
they needed to dilute their descriptions of experiences and relationships because of 
the presence of their partner. In the articles I reference to the specific organization 
or to a ‘respondent’ from the organization regardless of the specific title of the 
interviewed to uphold anonymity of the source.  
 
Besides sub-unit cases of specific PPP projects, I also interviewed public and 
private managers in cases, which were more ‘borderline’ partnerships or plain 
traditional contractual relationships to get a fuller picture of partnership choices. I 
also interviewed one public authority with mostly in-house waste collection and 
one with some in-house. In Denmark I began by interviewing the three partner 
organisations and a number of private waste management companies to achieve 
familiarity with the field and get an impression of the current organisation and 
main challenges experienced in the Danish waste management sector. A main 
result was the identification of a general feeling of distrust between public and 
private actors and an interest from both sides in improving relationships between 
public authorities and private contractors. As such, this provided the background 
for understanding the broad interest in service partnerships. The results of the 
interviews with private actors were collected in an empirical report, which was 
discussed with the PhD partner organisations. 
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The inclusion of ‘odd cases’ was also to assure that I had captured the difference 
between traditional contracting out, in-housing and partnership arrangements. 
These cases are not included in the articles, which focus on PPPs, but they provide 
interesting insights and perspectives on the PPP cases. I will return to the analytic 
consequences of this in the section on data analysis. Table 9 shows the included 
alternative organizational arrangements (odd cases). 
 
Table 9: Collected example of alternative organizational arrangements 
Denmark 
Organizational form Examples Interview No. 
In-house Frederiksberg Municipality 
(residual waste/recycling), 
Renosyd (paper) 
7, 10 
Traditional contracts Copenhagen - HCS, M.Larsen, 
RenoNorden, RGS90, Aarhus 
Municipality - Miljøteam, 
Vestforbrænding - M.Larsen 
1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 
19 
England 
Organizational form Examples Interview No. 
Traditional contracts Blackburn with Darwen UA 6 
 
As mentioned, interview data has been supplemented by textual data from 
websites, procurement material, contracts, policy strategies, reports, legislation 
etc. as well as observations from participation in meetings, seminars and 
conferences in both countries. In Denmark for example, I attended several of 
DAKOFAs conferences (Dansk Kompetencecenter For Affald – Danish Waste 
Competences Centre), which gathers public and private actors and legislators. I 
also attended meetings in a public procurement network between some of the large 
public actors in the sector, which I used to discuss some of my first ideas, and I 
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was present at various events hosted by the Copenhagen Cleantech Cluster (now 
‘Clean’), a relatively new networked cluster facilitating innovation partnerships in 
waste management among other green technology subjects, in order to experience 
how these events were organised. Furthermore, I was allowed to observe a 
partnership meeting in a Danish service partnership, which gave me an impression 
of the ambiance and the type of subjects discussed.  
 
In England, I attended the RWM conference 2013 in Birmingham, a large Waste 
Industry conference organized on a yearly basis, where I followed the debates and 
conducted an interview, and I was at a waste seminar at Manchester University, 
where I conducted the exploratory interview. I had a three month research stay at 
Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (MIoIR) at Manchester University 
from primo March to end of May 2013 primarily to begin the collection of data, 
but also to follow their research in innovative procurement and sustainability 
transformation. I also attended two academic conferences in Birmingham and 
Liverpool, the yearly Public Management and Administration Post-Graduate 
Conferences, to discuss my research with English researcher in the field. 
Furthermore, I attended the International Solid Waste Association’s (ISWA) 2013 
conference in Vienna with a paper presentation for an international audience.  
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Summing up the process of data collection, this process unfolded in five iterative 
phases (see Figure 5): 
 
Figure 5: The process of data collection 
 
Interviews 
As mentioned, the interviews were qualitative, semi-structured, in depth 
interviews (Kvale 1994; 2006).Most interviews were face-to-face, but some of the 
expert interviews and one follow-up interview were telephone interviews. 
Interviews typically lasted between 1-2 hours and were recorded with consent 
from the respondents, except for one case, where the respondent preferred not to 
be recorded. Interviews were generally conducted in the respondent’s own 
environment, which also provided the possibility of getting an impression of the 
organisation and facilities (Cassell 2009, p. 504-5). Interviews were conducted on 
the basis of interview guides outlining main topics and provisional key questions 
1 
• Exploring the field and getting a language (Conducting pilot and expert 
interviews, participating in meetings, seminars and conferences, 
background reading on waste managements and PPPs) 
2 
• Identifying PPPs in Denmark and England (Networking, researching, 
snowballing and mapping) 
3 
• Designing interview guides based on the conceptual framework and 
preliminary data collection 
4 
• Arranging and conducting interviews and getting access to central 
documents 
5 
• Additional data collection for case reports and articles (checking up on 
statements and storylines from respondents, reading provided material and 
finding additional material on selected cases) 
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constructed on the basis of existing literature and preliminary constructs in the 
conceptual framework. Although the interviews were structured towards a specific 
aim, the lines of questioning were fluid to allow openness towards the 
respondents’ answers and storylines (Kvale 1994, p.129, Cassel 2009, Yin 2009). I 
took time at the end of the interview to check, if we had covered central topics and 
questions.  
 
Interview guides were evaluated and adjusted over time and altered to fit each 
interview situation. They tended to follow this general outline: 
1. Personal background and organisation 
2. The public-private partnership (organisation, process, objectives, 
relationships, etc.) 
3. Innovation (examples, innovation types and scopes, innovation dynamics 
(competition/collaboration/(hierarchy)) 
4. Context (sustainability transformation, public/private developments, market 
developments, external relations/networks, EU/National legislation). 
 
The interviews aimed both at retrieving factual accounts and the opinion and 
experiences of the respondents (Yin 2009, p.107). The main purpose of the 
interviews was to get the interviewees to describe PPP and innovation processes, 
in which they had been personally involved. I also asked about their perception of 
sustainability as a political objective in the sector and in their own organisations, 
and how this affected their work. Many of the informants had at least ten years of 
experience in the waste management sector and were able to provide first hand 
stories of developments over time and thus place the projects in this context. As 
such, respondents were interviewed as ‘experts’ having specific knowledge of 
these processes, which was not available elsewhere (Gläser and Laudel 2009). 
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Examples of interview guides for public and private managers in England and 
Denmark may be found in Appendix 1. 
 
However, the interview situation is a constructed situation and the descriptions of 
processes expressed the respondents’ memory and interpretation of the situations 
and relationships (Cassel 2009). To strengthen the validity of results I aimed at 
interviewing both public and private actors in a partnership when possible, and 
supplemented and triangulated interview data with data from other sources (see 
section on data analysis). Overall there was a good correspondence between 
interviews from the same cases, which supported the descriptions and 
interpretations in single interviews.  
 
As some of the themes were abstract theoretical concepts and relationships, I 
attempted to translate and operationalise these to a practical context in interview 
questions. For example, I could not ask a public waste manager: ‘Did competitive 
drivers lead to innovation?’ Instead I might ask, a) if there had been competition 
for the contract, and b) if the private bidders brought new ideas in the procurement 
process or c) initiated or contributed to improvements in the contract period? 
Sometimes I would get the answer that it was not possible for private actors to 
bring new ideas because of the procurement rules, or that they weren’t usually 
expected or asked to do so, which potentially led to a discussion of the legal 
framework. As such, I allowed the interviews to take different turns. 
 
The other way around, I also had to build up a language to talk to respondents and 
understand the ‘lingo’ of waste management and PPPs (Yin 2009). This was 
especially a challenge in the first interviews in England, where I was less familiar 
with the organisation of waste management and the technologies used. For 
example, Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) technology is well-known in 
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England, where in some cases it replaced incineration as a treatment technology 
for residual waste, but is not used in Denmark.  Therefore, especially in the 
beginning, I also asked rather technical questions in the interviews asking for 
example about the technologies, the English organisation of waste, etc., which I 
could then follow up on afterwards in my research.  Especially since the PhD was 
concerned with innovation, I needed to understand the basics of standard 
collection and treatment methods, technologies and forms of organizing to discuss 
potential innovations with respondents.   
Ethical considerations 
Two key ethical considerations when conducting interviews is power relations and 
protecting the interviewee from being abused (Cassell 2009). I have aimed for the 
interview to be a good experience for the interviewee and for building a 
professional, but trust-based relation, where informants felt they could share their 
understanding of both positive and more critical aspects of their experiences to an 
interested listener. However, building trust also means taking responsibility for the 
information provided and protecting the respondents personally as well as their 
organizations from potential harm (ibid.). As Kvale (2006) suggests, the interview 
might employ an asymmetrical power relationships, where the interviewer both 
directs the interview and upholds the monopoly on interpretation. I was especially 
aware of this, when I interviewed private companies, where publicised results 
could influence a competitive situation. In Denmark, some of the interviewees 
were contractors to the partner organisations, and since this might be a sensitive 
situation, where I could be seen as representing the partner organisations, I have 
not included any of these in the selected cases for the third article.  
 
However, as Lawthom (1998) suggests, power relations in the interview situation 
may be more complex. In line with her, I went out in the field as a relatively 
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young woman interviewing typically elder men with more knowledge and 
considerable power in their organisations. In these situations, I needed to establish 
myself as a knowledgeable person worth talking to and able to control the 
interview processes to avoid ‘parent-child’ like relations. In relation to the before-
mentioned task of ‘getting a language’, the asking of technical questions needed to 
be balanced with establishing myself as a serious person, and so I spent a 
considerable amount of time reading up on waste management as an empirical 
field, following current debates at conferences or in the media, reading relevant 
regulation and policy strategies, etc. 
 
Whereas anonymity is often used to protect respondents, I have chosen to only 
anonymize respondents personally and in general not the organisations in the 
articles. This choice was made to be able to describe the context for and rich 
details in the cases, which I felt was important to provide in-depth understandings 
of conditions and processes. The choice was made in conjunction with the 
analytical choice in article 3 of selecting cases that were considered innovative 
and collaborative, and as such, may be described as being ‘successful’ 
partnerships. In these cases, non-anonymity might actually be an advantage for 
participants as this grants them ‘ownership’ of their own work (Patton 2002, 
p.141).  In contrast, I was very careful of mentioning partnerships where 
relationships could be characterized as more troubled. It could have been 
interesting to include one or two cases in article 3 that were not innovative or had 
developed into a conflicted, transactional relationship, but this would most likely 
have demanded anonymity of the cases. To make up for the lack of anonymity, I 
have presented respondents represented in the articles with the within-case 
analysis of their own organizations to provide them the opportunity to correct 
potential factual mistakes or problematic citations. This resulted in minor 
alterations and one request for anonymity.  
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Data analysis and concept development 
The process of data analysis has taken place in an iterative process between theory 
and data. Cases were analysed separately through within-case analysis and 
afterwards compared to identify variations and patterns through cross-case 
analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, Stewart 2012). Cross-case analyses were constructed 
and presented in matrixes (Miles and Huberman 1994). Article 1 provides a matrix 
of potential and challenges to innovation in three PPP types derived from existing 
theories and empirical categorizations (cross-case analysis) and a figure placing 
these PPP types between NPM/competition and governance/collaboration 
compared to the scope of innovation (cross-case analysis). Article 2 provides 
matrixes of identified PPP types with empirical examples (cross-case analysis) and 
the role of PPPs in sustainability change in England and Denmark (cross-case 
analysis). Article 3 provides matrixes of mixed governing strategies for innovation 
in each case (within-case analysis) and across cases (cross-case analysis). 
 
I used the qualitative data programme NVivo 10 for some of the first screenings of 
the material to test and develop the conceptual frameworks. NVivo was helpful in 
pushing for close ‘sentence to sentence’ reading of the interviews and 
development of inductive categorizations. For example, I coded for different types 
of organization and PPPs, different types of innovation identified in interviews 
and ‘drivers/strategies of innovation’. The last mentioned category was expanded 
from collaboration and competition to include hierarchy after several statements in 
the interviews, which directed attention towards the importance of this managerial 
strategy as well. However, I found the programme less helpful in providing an 
overview of single cases, and it was often the case that several mechanisms (such 
as collaboration and competition) were at play in one section, which was easier to 
identify through conventional manual coding (see article 3). Therefore, I also 
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coded the interviews either manually or in the app ‘iAnnotate’ (which allows for 
multi-coloured coding of pdf files).  
 
From this coding I produced case reports (Yin 2009) structured by the main 
interview topics on each of the cases mentioned in the articles and some of the 
‘odd cases’ for comparison. The case reports also included additional sources, 
such as websites, contracts etc., which I used to triangulate interview data 
,especially regarding factual issues such as the form of the contract, time of 
procurement, recycling percentages mentioned, political strategies, etc. The case 
reports provided an overview of the single cases and were very helpful in the 
writing process. The thesis does not include examples of coded interviews or case 
reports due to sensitivity issues for the involved organizations. 
 
I began the process with a theoretical review combined with introductory 
interviews and background reading on waste management. As such, the first draft 
of article 1 was developed in tandem with the introductory interviews with public 
and private managers in Denmark, which helped sharpen the constructs and get a 
‘real-life’ picture of how these abstract dynamics might work in practice in the 
empirical field.  From the beginning of the PhD I was especially inspired by Erik-
Hans Klijn’s (2010) chapter in Hodge, Greve and Boardman’s International 
Handbook of Public-Private Partnerships, ‘Public-private partnerships: 
deciphering meaning, message and phenomenon’ on PPPs as hybrid ideas inspired 
by NPM and Governance, and Vivian Lowndes and Chris Skelchers (1998) article, 
‘The Dynamics of multi-organizational partnerships: an analysis of changing 
modes of governing’, in which they describe network, hierarchy and market as 
various forms of social coordination in PPPs and describe competition and 
collaboration as various organizing principles. Furthermore, the work of especially 
Steijn, Klijn and Edelenbos (2011) and Weihe (2010) directed my attention to the 
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potential advantage of a processual approach to studying PPPs and the importance 
of management. These theoretical considerations directed the first interview 
guides. 
 
I identified a gap in literature on the process of innovating in PPPs, and also a 
confusion regarding collaboration and ‘synergy’, which was the most used 
argument as to why PPPs should bring ‘better solutions’, but also criticised by 
authors stating that this close collaboration did not actually take place. As such, 
the PhD journey began with the following main puzzles: PPPs are often connected 
to objectives of innovation, but do they actually bring innovative solutions? Is 
close collaboration necessary to conduct innovation in PPPs, and are PPPs 
collaborative? How may managers increase innovation from PPPs? The theoretical 
review in the first article came out of numerous questions from peers regarding 
why I investigated innovation in PPPs? Why should PPPs be particularly 
innovative? Why did I not start by tracing innovations to see if PPPs were the best 
policy instrument among others? This paper provided the first answers to ‘why 
PPPs should lead to innovation’, or as formulated in sub-question 1, ‘What is the 
potential for conducting innovation in PPPs?’, which was further developed and 
adjusted in the data analysis process towards  the conceptual framework used in 
the third article.  
 
Whereas in the first article I identify hierarchy as a potential ‘third’ driver of 
innovation in PPPs, the third article expands the conceptual framework to include 
this aspect as well. I did not change the framework of the first article, as I still 
believe this was a valid starting point from existing theory. The third article also 
more explicitly adds management of PPPs as a variable supporting contract and 
organizational form in getting innovative results. Much of the information on 
management was derived from the descriptions of the PPP and innovation 
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processes, but I also specifically asked the respondents how these partnerships 
were managed between the partners and what elements were important for well-
functioning partnerships. In article 2, I identify and categorize various PPP types. 
These ‘ideal types’ were constructed partly in an iterative process based on 
theoretical categorizations from existing PPP literature, the differing roles of 
actors identified through the sustainability transformation framework,  the 
empirical categorizations in chapter 3 and an inductive categorization of 
empirically identified partnerships.  The sustainability transformation framework 
was especially useful in showing the structural conditions in waste management 
systems for the development and implementation of more sustainable solutions, 
discussing the outcome of innovation processes and the strategic roles of various 
actor groups in innovation and sustainability processes.  
Perspectives from ‘odd cases’ 
Finally, I would like to describe some of the perspectives and considerations, 
which came from interviewing public and private respondents from other than 
partnership arrangements, the odd cases. These cases were not directly included in 
the articles, which focus on PPPs, but they nonetheless were part of the analytical 
process. One interesting observation was that not only PPPs, but also traditional 
contracting out arrangements could have more or less ‘genuine’ partnership 
relationships depending on the actors involved.  The construction of the 
hierarchy/competition/collaboration framework was actually developed through 
coding processes that included also more traditional contracts in the Danish 
context. For example, Copenhagen Municipality had a traditional contract with a 
private company, in which contract managers on both sides were eager to ‘make 
things work’ and described the relationship as ‘partnership like’.  This supported 
the initial expectation that management matters a great deal in forming PPPs in 
practice.  
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In the in-house example, Frederiksberg Municipality, the municipality had 
attempted to contract out its waste management services, but for most waste types 
(except hazardous waste and glass, which were contracted out) only one bidder 
had emerged and the municipality’s control bids were lower priced. The 
municipality had a separate operational unit, which performed according to the 
policies decided in the political waste and recycling department, and as such there 
was an organisational split quite similar to a contractual arrangement. When I 
conducted the interview in March 2012, the municipality had just announced a 
saving of 13% of the budget by in-housing compared to the cost in their contract 
with R98 (dakofa.dk). Thus, despite the fact that most of the respondents recalled 
budget savings from contracting out, this case showed that a well organised in-
house arrangement could bring savings and innovation as well. This confirms the 
conclusions of Slater et al (2007) that PPPs may not necessarily be more 
innovative than other organisational forms. In general, the empirical material 
includes many interesting stories, which sadly could not all be included in the 
articles. 
Conclusions: Exploring through a comparative, embedded case study 
The PhD is based on a comparative, embedded case study investigating the 
development and implementation of innovation and sustainability change in PPPs 
in two national cases, England and Denmark, and four sub-units, one service 
partnership and one infrastructure partnership from each country. The selected 
PPP projects are: 
1) The partnering contract for waste collection and street cleansing services 
between the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and SITA UK, 
2) The PFI joint venture contract for a number of waste processing plants, transfer 
stations plus communication services and education services between Greater 
Manchester Waste Disposal Authority (GMWDA) and the private consortium 
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Viridor Laing (Greater Manchester) Limited (VLGM Ltd.), which also included a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with the private company Ineos Chlor, 
3) The service partnership contract for waste collection services between the 
public company Renosyd I/S and the private company Marius Pedersen A/S, 
4) The potential joint venture partnership contract for the construction of a new 
‘resource centre’ and a number of administrative and service tasks in Vejle 
Municipality, which also included an innovation partnership with Marius Pedersen 
A/S in the development phase. 
 
The case study is explorative and aims to test and develop theory on the basis of 
real-life empirical cases analysed through an iterative process of moving between 
theory and data. The case study is mainly based on qualitative, semi-structured, in-
depth interviews supplemented and triangulated by data from other sources such 
as policy strategies, contracts, websites, etc. The interview respondents were 
public and private managers involved in PPP projects as well as experts and 
managers from alternative organisational arrangements. The data includes four 
expert interviews and 39 interviews with public and private managers.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, contributions and outlook 
This chapter concludes the PhD and provides a collective answer to the main 
research question based on the introductory paper and the three research articles. 
The chapter also outlines the main contributions from the PhD thesis to various 
research fields and provides an outlook with suggestions for further research. 
Main conclusions 
This PhD thesis has taken a journey through recent developments and 
contemporary challenges in municipal waste management. The thesis has focused 
on the potential role of PPPs in the development of innovative and more 
sustainable solutions in municipal waste management. Recent years have shown 
increasing demands for municipal waste managers to move toward the top levels 
of the waste hierarchy, while ensuring efficiency in service delivery through 
contracting out arrangements with private contractors.  
In this traditionally strong public service, private businesses are also increasingly 
involved in the development of new waste technologies and as receivers of 
recycled products at processing plants and for new production processes.  As such, 
there is an increasing interdependency between public waste managers having 
‘ownership’ of municipal waste and being responsible for service delivery to 
citizens and private businesses participating in these processes. This 
interdependency has amplified the attention towards public-private partnerships as 
policy instruments. 
 
However, theoretically based, empirical investigations of innovation and 
sustainability changes in PPPs have been scarce, scattered between various sectors 
and research fields and shown different results. On this background, the thesis has 
asked the following main research question:  
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What are the potentials and challenges in public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
for conducting innovation towards the objective of sustainability 
transformation of municipal waste management systems? 
 
The main research question was supported by three sub-questions: 
1) What is the potential for conducting innovation in PPPs? 
2) How may PPPs contribute to sustainability transformations? What is the 
role of PPPs in English and Danish sustainability transformations of waste 
management systems?  
3) How is innovation conducted in PPP processes, and in what way may 
public managers support this? 
These sub-questions were addressed in three independent research articles, which 
feed into this general conclusion. 
 
To answer the research question, the PhD has engaged in a focused review of PPP 
literature, where PPPs are defined broadly as ‘cooperative institutional 
arrangements between public and private sector actors’ (Greve and Hodge 2005). 
PPPs come in many forms and shapes and continue to evolve as new PPP types 
emerge and older forms are adjusted to current needs. This created a need to 
clarify which types of PPPs would be relevant to focus on in municipal waste 
management (Why is the PPP initiated? Who participates in the PPP? How is the 
PPP organized? (Glendinning and Powell 2002)). The PhD has mainly focused on 
PPPs between local authorities responsible for municipal waste management 
services (or publicly owned companies to whom this task has been delegated), and 
private businesses taking part in the development and delivery of these services. 
These PPPs are generally organized through contracts, joint venture arrangements 
or less formal collaborative agreements. The thesis also includes more networked 
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forms of partnerships, where local authorities and private businesses take part in 
efforts of developing or implementing new policies and/or technological solutions.  
 
Furthermore, the review pointed towards the need to understand PPPs in the 
context of particular historical, cultural and political contexts and revealed a 
‘processual and managerial turn’ in PPP research stressing the importance of 
investigating the micro-processes of PPPs and especially how these processes are 
managed. The review suggested that PPPs are not simply collaborative or non-
collaborative, but can be more or less based on ‘genuine’ partnership relationships 
and managed through a mix of hierarchical, market-based and networked forms of 
coordination. Although innovation is not always the main objective of PPPs, 
innovation is often implicitly embedded in the idea of PPPs. Two ideas on PPP 
innovation risk being mixed up; a) the idea of achieving efficiencies through 
delegation to private businesses (NPM), and b) the idea of bringing together actors 
and organisations to pool ideas, resources, expertise and knowledge to develop 
better solutions to complex societal problems (Governance). The PhD suggests 
that these arguments should be clearly separated to produce more precise 
expectations and ensure the application of appropriate governing strategies. 
 
The potential and challenges for the identified PPP types were investigated 
through an embedded comparative case study of the role of public-private 
partnerships in sustainability transformation processes of English and Danish 
waste management systems with in-depth analyses of innovations processes in 
four selected PPPs. The data collection included 43 qualitative interviews with 
experts and public and private waste managers involved in different PPP types 
across England and Denmark, which was supplemented by textual data from 
policy strategies, contracts, websites, EU and national regulations, etc. The 
process also involved a longer research stay in England and observations from 
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network meetings, conferences etc. in the English and Danish waste sectors. Data 
collection took place between February 2012 and April 2014. 
 
On this background, the PhD thesis concludes that public-private 
partnerships do have potential to be relevant policy instruments for 
conducting innovation towards the objective of sustainability transformation 
in municipal waste management systems, but also that challenges remain. The 
PhD shows that various forms of public-private partnerships play a prominent, but 
also contested role in the sustainability transformation processes of municipal 
waste management in England and Denmark. The thesis identifies a number of 
different partnerships in waste management with various purposes, such as service 
delivery, policy development and technology testing. The investigation of these 
partnerships points towards various potentials and challenges for conducting 
innovation towards sustainability transformation of municipal waste management.  
 
Public-private partnerships provide a unique potential for conducting innovation 
through a mix of hierarchical, market-based and networked governing strategies, 
which in the right balance provides possibilities for both organizational and 
service innovation. The formation of a public-private partnership in a specific 
setting may also in itself be considered an innovation, and the thesis shows how 
the form and specific organization of partnerships continuously evolve. A broad 
palette of partnerships from more networked types to more tightly organized 
contractual partnership may contribute to sustainability transformation processes 
through a patchwork of experimentation in collaborations between actor groups 
with different positions in the waste system. In these partnerships, policy makers, 
legislators, knowledge institutions, local authorities and private businesses may 
engage in reciprocal processes of dialogue and negotiation to align policy 
development and legislative frameworks with the development and testing of new 
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technologies and implementation of market mature solutions in practice. The 
thesis suggests that an overarching strategy for public authorities might be to 
engage in a broad palette of partnerships to gain from the potential in various 
partnership types.  
 
However, there are also challenges for conducting innovation towards 
sustainability objectives in public-private partnerships. Especially contractual 
partnerships for service delivery may involve inherent tensions between 
hierarchical, competitive and collaborative strategies conditioned by a restrictive 
public procurement regulation. A main challenge for public managers to strike a 
good balance between these various governing strategies, so that unnecessary 
hierarchy does not block for private input, an intense market-focus does not shift 
the focus away from environmental concerns and too much collaboration does not 
lead to standstill. Accordingly, adding to their ‘old’ role as administrators and 
service providers, municipal waste managers may need to take on new roles as 
markets and network managers to mobilize and engage various actors in the 
resource challenge.  
 
Despite the positive connotations to partnership working, the argument of societal 
gains from involving private actors more directly in the provision of waste 
facilities and services to some degree remains unclear. Regardless of new 
narratives of waste as a market, resource or ‘non’ waste, waste continuous to be an 
environmental problem that needs public safeguarding. Partnership contracts 
provide a monopoly situation, where public authorities are bound to one contractor 
for potentially 20-35 years. Especially in times of transformation, this lock-in can 
become a challenge. For partnerships to be potential preferable policy instruments 
to more flexible and easy controllable in-house solutions, increased flexibility, 
mutual dialogue and improved incentive systems are strongly needed. Essentially, 
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for this to work there need to be willingness in the involved organisations to work 
in partnership. Some of the newer partnerships identified in this PhD do work 
towards these aims, and the future will show if they will succeed in these efforts 
through the length of the contracts.  
 
The role of PPPs should be seen in connection to the political, cultural and 
historical contextual environment, where new waste narratives, political targets of 
sustainability transformation and shifting public-private relations challenge waste 
management as we know it today. The thesis revealed waste management as a 
very competitive sector, where sustainability objectives are interlinked with 
various potentially conflicting interests. Future solutions are not yet clear, but it is 
likely that some degree of public-private partnership working will continue to be 
part of it. However, this will depend on strategic choices in various actor groups. 
The new public procurement directive points towards more innovative 
partnerships in the future, but it remains to be seen how this opportunity will be 
exploited by local actors and how it will work in practice. 
 
Whereas this thesis has mostly considered increasing recycling, which has framed 
the efforts of sustainability transformation so far, the prospect of moving even 
further up the waste hierarchy towards waste prevention provide a new challenge 
for public waste managers and partnership arrangements. Here, public managers 
may be in lack of viable tools. Waste minimisation campaigns and reuse shops 
may go some of the way, but eventually this task mainly lies with private design 
and production companies – or preferably – in dialogue between these two parts of 
the waste system. Also in waste prevention, different interests may be in play. 
Preventing waste production may reduce costs of waste management for local 
authorities, but it also removes waste from waste treatment facilities they have 
invested in and diminishes their role in waste systems. National governments may 
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foremost have an interest in reaching EU targets for recycling and diversion from 
landfilling, whereas prevention might actually decrease recycling percentages. 
Private companies may have an interest in branding themselves as responsible 
businesses and see the potential in reducing production costs by safeguarding 
materials, but such change processes demand resources.  
 
In Denmark, these new actors are increasingly enrolled in networked partnerships 
such as the plastic waste partnership facilitated by Copenhagen Cleantech Cluster. 
However, in this case, the former environmental ‘laggard’ England may point the 
way with initiatives such as ‘metal matters’, where the metal industry and local 
authorities engage in concrete local change processes towards common aims of 
increasing recycling. Whereas the dialogue between waste producers and waste 
managers may be manageable in local and national contexts, today’s global 
production systems provide even more challenging conditions for local authority 
managers and private waste companies searching for better solutions. Why should 
Adidas choose to collaborate with Næstved Municipality and their private 
contractor from Denmark? Waste management is essentially a ‘glocal’ problem 
and therefore there will also be a need for international and cross-European 
initiatives. Hopefully, experiences from existing partnerships ‘do’s and don’ts’ 
may be canalised into future partnerships to increase the possibility for good 
results. 
Contributions from the research articles 
The following section will describe the more detailed contributions to the 
conclusion from the three research articles. 
 
The first research article in the PhD mainly addressed the first research sub-
question, ‘What is the potential for conducting innovation in PPPs?’ The article 
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suggests that although existing empirical analyses also included less innovative 
results, the few positive examples show that there is potential for conducting 
innovation in various PPP types, which may be further explored in the future. The 
potential for conducting innovation varied between the three investigated PPP 
types, where they could be connected to the various mixes of competitive and 
collaborative drivers in the organizational form of these PPPs.  
 
- Infrastructure partnerships employed a strong competitive driver for innovation 
within the public organisations affordability limit, and whereas procurement 
legislation limits the dialogue between public authorities and private bidders, the 
introduction and ease of access to ‘competitive dialogue’ show a realization of the 
need for more collaborative processes. Because of the risks involved, 
infrastructure partnerships may introduce innovative technology in a specific local 
setting, but is less likely to bring radical innovation.  
 
- Service partnerships specifically focus on moving away from adversarial 
contracting towards a more collaborative approach in order to develop more 
flexible, trust-based and open relationships. These relationships are supported by 
economic incentive systems that align the interests of finding improvements for 
public and private organisations and may bring either ‘big bang’ or more gradual 
improvements. However, it may be difficult to develop trust-based relationships in 
practice, where differences in culture and interests remain a challenge.  
 
- Innovation partnerships are designed to provide a forum for more radical 
innovations and tend to be less formal and more collaborative than other 
partnership types. There is a strong competitive driver for private companies in 
achieving competitive advantages from the development of new solutions, which 
are tested and tried on ‘customers’ in a public organisation. The main challenges 
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mentioned are the cultural differences, legal complexities and a lack of model 
procedures, which to some degree might be remedied with the coming EU 
procedure for innovation partnerships. 
 
Accordingly, it seems that at least some of the experienced challenges of finding 
innovative solutions in cooperation between public and private actors in PPPs 
have been improved by the new public procurement directive, and it will be 
interesting to see how this potential will be exploited and if the future will bring 
more innovative PPPs in service delivery. Existing results suggest that a broad 
understanding of innovation, encompassing both radical and more incremental 
forms as well as combined technological, product, process, organizational and 
political changes involved in service innovations, is important to shed light on the 
many possibilities for conducting innovation in PPPs.   
 
The second research article moved on to explore the role of PPPs in waste 
management in the two national cases, England and Denmark illustrated by 
examples of identified PPPs. The article mainly addresses the second sub-research 
question, ‘How may PPPs contribute to sustainability transformations? What is the 
role of PPPs in English and Danish sustainability transformations of waste 
management systems?’ The article shows that three broad types of PPPs are used 
to develop and implement new solutions as part of sustainability transformation 
processes in English and Danish waste management, where they contribute to 
various degrees of sustainability change. The article suggests that PPPs may 
contribute to sustainability transformation by facilitating interplay between actors 
across landscape, regime and niche levels to align policies, regulations, challenges 
and new solutions in processes where more sustainable technologies may be 
developed, tested and directed into existing regimes. These processes are not 
without challenges, as new solutions may contest existing systems and actor 
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positions, where lock-ins due to heavy investments, vested interests, regulation 
favouring existing systems, interdependencies in complex networks of actors and 
organisations and old ways of thinking may produce resistance to and difficulties 
for change.  
 
The article identified three types of PPPs in English and Danish sustainability 
transformations of waste management systems: policy partnerships, service 
delivery partnerships (including infrastructure and service partnerships) and 
technology partnerships.  
 
- Policy partnerships were used to develop new solutions nationally or in local 
contexts to implement sustainability objectives in existing policies. In England, 
the government facilitated and supported networks and local reuse partnerships 
between local authorities and private businesses through the arm’s lengths 
organisation WRAP. In Denmark, the government and other facilitating 
organizations gathered various actors to identify solutions to pressing problems, 
which supplements a long tradition of incumbent regime actors collaborating to 
continuously improve and test new waste technologies. Whereas English policy 
partnerships focus on implementation of new solutions in specific local contexts, 
Danish partnerships can lead to more or less concrete results, and it may be 
important for government organisations and other facilitators to remember that 
solutions need to be anchored locally to reach implementation.  
 
- Service delivery partnerships were used especially in England to provide more 
sustainable waste treatment facilities with private funding, whereas the tradition in 
Denmark has been that publicly owned companies provide this infrastructure 
(mostly in terms of incineration plants), whereas private companies have managed 
facilities for preparation of recyclable products to further use. However, there is a 
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continuous pressure for privatization of waste treatment in Denmark and the future 
for publicly owned companies is insecure. PPPs have come into play in relation to 
the potential establishment of new mechanical sorting plants for recyclables, 
which are new in a Danish context, but used broadly in England to separate co-
mingled collected recyclables. There is reluctance towards PPPs among both 
public and private actors. Local authorities and public companies have an interest 
in bringing in private actors to be able to include business waste and thereby 
increase economies of scale, but are reluctant to enter into stiff contracts that 
would lock them into solutions for many years that they are less able to affect. 
They prefer the model of joint ownership in public-private companies, but 
legislation today prevents this model. Private businesses may see a business 
potential in new sorting plants, but may be less interested in giving up exclusive 
right of collecting and treating business waste.  
 
Looking at the experiences in England, especially early PFIs have been challenged 
by contractual arrangements that prevent them from following new policies of 
increased recycling. Newer PPPs have worked towards increasing contract 
flexibility, better risk sharing and providing the right incentives, but the future will 
show if these PFI/PPP contracts will also lock-in waste management practices. In 
England, PFI contracts are generally arranged as joint ventures, which co-govern 
the contract across various levels in the involved organisations. There seems to be 
a more flexible approach to PPP arrangements in England, which may inspire 
actors in Denmark. Nonetheless, English PFIs have also been criticized for not 
being ‘value for money’, amongst other reasons because the complexity of these 
large integrated projects increases risks and decreases financial transparency, and 
for leading focus towards large-scale recovery solutions rather than smaller 
recycling schemes. There is an irony in the fact that the Danish waste management 
sector considers PPPs at a time, when the English government have stopped their 
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PFI programme. However, in England this seems mostly to be a question of the 
government reducing its spending on waste management as a part of the financial 
cuts following the global economic and financial crisis.  
 
In both England and Denmark, there has been a move towards more partnering 
arrangements in waste collection, where ‘service partnerships’ and ‘partnering 
contracts’ have provided new contractual frameworks to improve relationships 
between authority and contractor and provide greater flexibility for gradual 
improvements of waste collection systems. In Denmark, these partnerships have 
arisen on the background of increasingly adversarial relationships in traditional 
contracting out, where distrust between public and private actors have spread from 
former bad experiences. In line with increasing competition, prices for waste 
collection have fallen with some private companies perhaps bidding too low to 
win contracts, and then hoping to gain extra profit from the contract later on, for 
example by adding prices for extra services. This has in turn led public authorities 
to be more aware of the wording in the contracts, and as contracts have gotten 
longer and longer, flexibility in these cooperations declines. Service partnerships 
may contribute to breaking this dead still and build trust between public and 
private organizations. Experiences so far have been good, although the potential 
for joint innovation could be explored even further. 
 
In England, the introduction of partnering contracts seems to be more connected to 
the need for flexibility and innovation of waste collection systems in a time of 
rapid political and systemic change. Local authorities are asked to increase 
recycling in a time, where they have also been facing continuous economic cut 
downs in their budgets. However, increasing landfill taxes have made it more 
expensive for them not to introduce new solutions. An example in the article 
showed how such a close-knit, open and equal relationship made possible a 
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change in collection rounds that led to economic savings while safeguarding 
recycling. Although these partnerships may not necessarily be more innovative 
than other contracts, English experiences suggest that they seem to increase 
flexibility and the willingness to find the best solutions for both partners in these 
change processes.  
 
- Lastly, technology partnerships provided incubation rooms for development and 
testing of new technologies in closed groups of actors including for example local 
authorities or publicly owned companies, various technology producers and 
private waste management companies often supported by state funding. In 
England, DEFRA launched the New Technology Demonstrator Programme to 
encourage the development of new technologies for waste recovery, which until it 
was closed in 2009 supported two local partnership arrangements that brought new 
knowledge on Anaerobic Digestion and Mechanical Heat Treatment and led to the 
establishment of commercial plants. In Denmark, a number of programmes for 
technology support exist. The focus on engaging and investing in innovation 
projects seems more rooted in the Danish waste sector, where a number of 
technology innovation projects are initiated by either public or private 
organisations. These differ in size and scope and may even have global outreach 
such as the REnescience project.  
 
Summing up, the article contributes with a more systemic perspective on 
innovation and system change, which places PPPs in the political and historical 
context of complex, interlinked processes of transformation and resistance 
between various actor groups in socio-technical systems. English and Danish 
experiences show that a broad palette of partnership types may be mutually 
supporting in the innovation of waste management systems towards gradual 
system transformation, although in both countries, especially service delivery 
164 
 
PPPs remain contested as policy instruments for sustainability transformation. The 
future for PPPs in waste management in England and Denmark depends on 
strategic choices by central actor groups.  
  
From this overview, the third research article zoomed in on four selected service 
delivery partnerships, an infrastructure PPP and a service PPP in each country, to 
investigate the processes of innovating in more detail. As such, this article 
followed down the line of the ‘processual and managerial turn’ in PPP research to 
investigate the processes of these PPPs from the pre-contract phase and contract-
design to the following post-contract phase. The article mainly addresses the third 
research-sub question, ‘3) How is innovation conducted in PPP processes, and in 
what way may public managers support this?’ The articles suggests that PPPs may 
deliver innovation in terms of the PPP itself or through adjustments to current PPP 
forms (governance and organizational innovation), and in terms of service 
innovations, which tends to combine elements of technology, product and process 
innovation. The four cases all displayed a mix of governing strategies from 
hierarchy, market and network in all phases of the PPP. The article shows that the 
main potential for conducting innovation in PPPs lies in this mixing of governing 
strategies, which in practice were highly interwoven and is not only related to 
managerial efforts before and after contract signing, but also to the specific 
contract design and organizational form of the PPP, which frames the possibilities 
for co-production of innovation in the contract period.  
 
In the four analysed cases, various forms of innovation across the PPP process 
contributed to objectives of sustainability transformation: 
- In the partnering contract between the Royal Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea and Sita UK Ltd for waste collection and street cleansing, a political 
pressure for sustainability transformation led the authority to search for a more 
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collaborative and flexible form of contract, which supported by an agreed profit 
and a profit sharing mechanism secured an incentive and willingness for both 
partners to work towards continuous improvements of waste management 
services. A challenge of finding economic efficiencies was solved by the 
contractor through a collection process redesign, which secured continuous focus 
on recycling. This contract was the most collaborative and showed that daring to 
take a ‘leap of faith’ rather than constructing control mechanisms could lead to 
smooth daily problem solving and improvement of collection rates even under 
challenging conditions. 
 
- In the PFI joint venture organised contract between Greater Manchester Waste 
Disposal Authority (GMWDA) and the consortium Viridor Laing Greater 
Manchester Ltd. (VLGM Ltd) for the provision and operation of an integrated 
network of waste treatment facilities, a networked political and market dialogue 
process led to the decision to procure an innovative solution based on a mix of 
technologies, which was tried and tested, but had not been seen introduced at this 
large scale before. The partnership was especially innovative in terms of the 
organisation, where a solution was found to secure an outlet for the Refused 
Derived Fuel (RDF) produced in the treatment process. Both partners emphasised 
the need for ‘partnership working’ to make this complex contract work in practice. 
Main challenges overcome was to engage the constituent councils in a common 
solution, convince the market to take a risk on a more innovative solution and 
secure funding in times of financial difficulties in the global economy. 
 
- The service partnership contract between the public owned company Renosyd i/s 
and the private company Marius Pedersen A/S for waste collection services was 
developed on the basis of an adversarial relationship with a former contractor, 
which led Renosyd to experiment with a more collaborative contract inspired by 
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partnership contracts in the construction industry. The contract was based on a 
‘partnership charter’ and a ‘dynamic budget system’ to secure economic 
incentives for gradual efficiencies and quality improvements. In the contract 
period, the partners introduced a new collection scheme with a ‘resource bin’ for 
recyclables developed in dialogue between the partners. A looming conflict on 
waste collection in a harsh winter period was solved by holding on to the 
partnership principles. 
 
- The joint venture contract in Vejle Municipality aimed to find a new solution for 
a rundown optical sorting plant and took inspiration from especially English PFI 
contracts and Danish service partnerships to develop the outline of a new 
‘resource centre’ contracted out as a collaborative joint venture arrangement (the 
first of this type in Denmark) including a modern sorting plant, adjacent buildings 
and a number of administrative and service tasks. The pre-contract phase had also 
involved an ‘innovation partnership’ with the private company Marius Pedersen to 
discuss possible organizational forms (PPP contract, joint venture, pure public or 
private) in a structured dialogue process to identify a solution suitable to both 
types of organizations. The procurement process was halted because of challenges 
in Danish waste and procurement regulation, and the project has not been realized 
yet. 
 
As such, these contract-based PPPs contributed to national and European 
sustainability transformation processes through local ‘piecemeal’ innovation 
processes involving governance, organizational and service innovations. 
Hierarchical target setting processes provided direction combined with networking 
and market outreach processes to identify potential solutions and secure that 
contracts would be viable at a competitive market, whereas hierarchically 
organised contracts supported by collaborative forums and market-inspired 
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economic incentives secured that partners would work in the same direction and 
have a willingness to work together to find the best solutions in the contract 
period. The case of Vejle Municipality did, however, show that there are specific 
legal challenges in Denmark, which may complicate partnership working in waste 
management. 
 
Returning to the questions raised in the introduction, PPPs in various forms did 
actually play a prominent role in the sustainability transformations of both English 
and Danish waste management systems – only in Denmark, more networked PPPs 
for policy and technology development have until now played a bigger role than 
contractual PPPs in service delivery. This is not surprising compared to the 
English and Danish PPP histories. What may be surprising is the differences in 
governing strategies with the UK government taking a more hands-on approach 
directing local authorities into PFIs and making available consultants through 
WRAP to facilitate local change processes, whereas the Danish government has – 
so far – taking a softer hands-off approach trying to encourage and facilitate the 
development of new solutions through networked partnerships. There is no recipe 
for these kinds of transformation processes, and as this PhD has shown there 
might be advantages and disadvantages in both governing approaches.  
 
Meanwhile, Danish municipalities remain sceptic towards PFI-like PPPs and the 
risk of losing control over waste infrastructure. Perhaps with good reasons – the 
English experiences have shown that lock-ins may become a problem, when 
policies change. This thesis has indeed shown that there might be both great 
potential and serious challenges in using PPPs as policy instruments in 
sustainability transformations of municipal waste management. Perhaps the 
greatest potential is actually in the less used service partnerships for waste 
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collection, where local authorities in both countries might be ‘wasting’ 
opportunities.  
 
Specific contributions to various research fields 
With the above conclusions the PhD delivers contributions and comments to 
scholarly debates in at least four different research fields: Public-private 
partnerships, innovation the public sector, sustainability transformation in socio-
technical regimes and the empirical field of waste management (see Figure 6). 
This section sums up these contributions. 
 
Figure 6: Contributions to scholarly debates 
 
 
 
In the scholarly debate on public-private partnerships, the PhD has contributed 
mainly by developing an empirically tested conceptual model for investigating 
innovation in PPPs. In contrast to existing research, this model stresses the 
importance of a processual and managerial perspective on PPPs as well as a solid 
contract design. The analysis also shows that the idea of PPPs developing through 
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phases of hierarchy, market and network might be somewhat simplified. Rather, 
PPPs involve a mix of these governing strategies in the organizational form and 
management of the PPP over the whole PPP process from pre-contract phase, to 
contract design and post-contract phase. The PhD also contributed to the debate on 
‘genuine’ partnership by showing how contractual PPPs may be more or less 
collaborative, whereas it does not make sense to demarcate sharply between 
‘contract-based’ and ‘collaborative’ PPPs. In line with this, the articles showed 
that purely contract-based PPPs are not necessarily less collaborative than joint 
venture PPPs (mixed companies). 
 
Furthermore, the dissertation emphasised the neglected influence of the historical, 
cultural and political context on the role of PPPs in a specific field, which was 
addressed by investigating PPPs in the context of shifting public-private relations 
and sustainability transformation of socio-technical regimes in national and urban 
contexts. Inspired by Rosenau (2000), Bovaird (2004) and Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff (2011), the PhD delivered a unique categorization of PPPs in this 
context based on purpose and showed how three identified PPP types contributed 
to sustainability transformation thereby linking sustainability transformation 
literature to PPP theory. The thesis also showed that there are different, but to 
some degree converging systems of categorizing PPPs in England and Denmark, 
where governments have increasingly emphasised partnering as a general 
approach to policy-making and a relevant policy instrument in local authorities’ 
service delivery.   
 
More broadly speaking, the PhD contributed to efforts of developing theory on 
PPPs (Hodge and Greve 2013). As Hodge and Greve (2013) suggest, ‘there is a 
real need to articulate the potential causal factors behind why PPPs may be 
capable of producing superior performance compared to traditional 
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arrangements’ (p.1). This thesis attempted to contribute to this challenge by 
showing the unique potential (but also challenges) in PPPs for conducting 
innovation towards sustainability objectives. Efforts of theory development were 
based on a cross-national, embedded comparative case study thus answering to ‘a 
growing academic and political interest in comparative issues related to PPPs and 
their implementation’ (Verhoest et al 2015, p.119). Through this comprehensive 
exploration, the thesis has added to the few existing empirical investigation of 
PPPs in waste management with descriptions of experiences in England and 
Denmark. 
 
In the scholarly debate on innovation in the public sector, the PhD dissertation 
especially contributes to efforts of describing the potential and managerial 
challenges in cross-organizational and collaborative innovation processes, where 
PPPs are investigated as one policy instrument for conducting innovation in the 
public sector. The PhD shows that existing research of innovation in PPPs is 
scarce, scattered and show mixed results and suggests that these variances may be 
connected to possibilities for ‘collaborative competition’ in the organizational 
forms of various PPP types. The PhD also adds to existing attempts of defining 
and categorizing innovation in a public sector context emphasising the broad range 
of innovation types relevant to public service innovation. 
 
In the scholarly debates on sustainability transformation in socio-technical 
systems, the PhD aligns with urban scholars critiques of the tendency in this 
research stream to a) focus mainly on changes at the national level and neglecting 
place-specific formation, contestation, negotiation and management of socio-
technical regimes and transformation processes, b) overemphasizing niches as 
drivers of innovation and overseeing the interplay between landscape and regime, 
and  c) seeing niches as ‘closed incubation rooms’ rather than ‘open ended’ 
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patchworks of experimentation in the politic-strategic urban regime. The thesis 
adds to their efforts with a focused analysis of the role of PPPs in sustainability 
transformation processes, which emphasises PPPs ability to facilitate interplay 
between various national, local and niche actor groups not only in local contexts, 
but across all three levels (landscape, regime and niches).  
 
Lastly, the PhD contributes to a renewed social scientist interest in waste 
management as an empirical field. The PhD suggests a renewed attention 
towards waste management in public administration and public management 
research, reflecting the tremendous changes in the narratives, organisation and 
management of waste, which challenges former approaches to contracting out 
waste management systems and provide an interesting case for studying the 
hybridity in modern public administration and management. Whereas the 
developments in English waste management organisation have to some extent 
been described in existing research, the PhD also specifically contribute with 
description of these change processes in the Danish context.  
 
Outlook and future research 
This PhD has focused on the organisation of waste management in two EU 
countries, England and Denmark, and whereas this approach was helpful in 
conducting in-depth case studies, it could be interesting to broaden the scope to 
other European countries. As the difficulties of comparing municipal waste across 
EU countries point to, municipal waste management is organised different in 
different ways across member states. In particular, it might be interesting to 
investigate and compare the country-specific interplay between competitive, 
environmental and waste specific regulations and the organisation of new 
solutions between public and private actors across a broader range of countries. 
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For example, this dissertation did not include some of the best performing 
countries in the EU benchmarking of municipal waste such as Austria and 
Sweden, which may bring new perspective on roads toward sustainability 
transformation. Such an analysis might contribute to the development of a fairer 
benchmarking system and provide an important step forward in the comparison 
and learning across EU countries. 
 
Whereas the identification and categorization of PPPs in this dissertation was 
based on a qualitative approach, it might be interesting to see a more 
quantitatively based mapping of partnership working in waste management to 
provide a more general picture. This could for example be done through web-
based questionnaires or telephone interviews. However, a very clear definition of 
‘partnership’ would be necessary, as this concept continue to be ambiguous and 
loaded with various meanings, which might lead to less comparable results. 
Further work on the categorization of PPPs might indeed be needed, especially at 
the empirical level. For example, the presented Danish overview of PPP types 
from Udbudsportalen remarkably excludes more networked partnership types. 
Following the ‘purpose’ of the PPP might provide some direction for future 
classifications. As the forms and shapes of PPPs continue to evolve, this might be 
a ‘Sisyphus’ task, but none the less important. 
 
The thesis briefly comments on the question of joint venture versus pure contract-
based PPPs, which at the moment are very pressing in the Danish waste 
management sector. In contrast to previous research, the most collaborative PPP in 
the PhD was purely contract based. This indicates that joint venture PPPs might 
not necessarily be the only road towards collaborative PPP arrangements. 
However, considerable more research focusing specifically on this subject would 
be needed to draw any firmer conclusions. In line with this, the PhD did in the 
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data collection process include non-partnership arrangements, odd cases, to better 
identify the particular characteristics and potentials of partnerships. Whereas these 
interviews did not indicate that PPPs should necessarily be more innovative or 
provide more sustainable solutions than a well-organised in-house arrangement or 
an innovative, well-functioning traditional contract, this investigation does not 
permit any stark conclusions. These comparisons are in general hard to make, as 
the organizational form in itself can be hard to separate from other factors, 
whereas external factors such as specific market conditions may also influence 
results. Nonetheless, this is the decision that public legislators and managers are 
facing and as such, it might deserve more attention. 
 
The first and second articles in the PhD outline a conceptual model for 
investigating innovation in PPPs on the basis of a review of existing research and 
explorative case studies. Whereas this model provided a good starting point for 
investigating this issues the depth and richness in the model might be further 
developed in the future, for example by engaging in the comprehensive literatures 
on hierarchical, market and network governing and add more case studies. It might 
also be interesting to integrate further the concept of ‘co-production of services’ 
(Alford 2009) to capture the contributions from various actors in the re-
production, innovation and transformation processes relating to public services. 
 
Whereas the transformation from disposal and recovery towards recycling remain 
a challenge for governments and waste managers, the most pressing future 
challenge will be the prevention of waste. As described in this thesis, this issue 
involve new challenges, new actors and perhaps new forms of coordination and 
new divisions of responsibilities for waste and resources. It will be interesting to 
follow how the EU, national governments, local authorities and private businesses 
takes up this challenge following the first national prevention strategies. Most 
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likely, the nearest future will see a mix of technological solutions to manage waste 
and easier recyclable products. Research may for example contribute to these 
processes through critical analyses of words and actions, comparisons of empirical 
experiences and policy instruments and by offering new perspectives to guide 
decision-makers and managers in these endeavours. 
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PART II: RESEARCH ARTICLES 
This second part of the PhD dissertation presents the three articles in the PhD: 
- Article 1: The Potential for Conducting Innovation in Public-Private Partnerships 
(to be submitted to International Public Management Review) 
- Article 2: The Prominent, but Contested Role of Public-Private Partnerships in 
Sustainability Transformations of Waste Management Systems – Comparing 
English and Danish experiences (to be submitted to Environment and Planning A) 
- Article 3: Network, Hierarchy and Market: Managing Mixed Governing 
Strategies for Innovation in Public-Private Partnerships (to be submitted to Public 
Administration). 
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Article 1 
 
The Potential for Conducting Innovation in 
Public-Private Partnerships 
 
 
Sofie Dam, PhD Fellow at Department of Business and Politics, CBS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Public service delivery increasingly takes place under challenging conditions of 
complex societal problems, increasing citizen demands and restricted budgets, 
which demand innovative solutions. This article investigates the potential for 
conducting innovation in public-private partnerships (PPPs) for which evidence so 
far has been lacking. Based on a review of existing ideas and empirical 
investigations of innovation in PPP research, the article suggests a conceptual 
approach focusing on two potential drivers of innovation in PPPs: ‘competition’ 
and ‘collaboration’. This framework is used to identify drivers and challenges for 
conducting innovation in three PPP types, Infrastructure PPPs, Service PPPs and 
Innovation PPPs, illustrated by a number of examples. The article suggests that the 
combination of competitive and collaborative strategies in PPPs forms a unique 
potential for conducting innovation, whereas challenges tend to arise, when this 
potential is being limited. Identifying the conditions of ‘competitive collaboration’ 
in PPPs may be a useful starting point for further empirical investigations and 
theory development on PPP innovation.  
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Introduction 
Today’s public sector is met by complex societal challenges such as climate 
change, poverty or social inequality in an increasingly fragmented and diverse 
society, where growing citizen expectations to individualized solutions and 
restrained public budgets in austerity times place governments in a cross-pressure 
situation. These developments have led to an emphasis on innovation in public 
services to deliver ‘more for less’ (Kooiman 1993, Albury 2005, Sørensen and 
Torfing 2011, Bekkers et al 2011). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been 
brought forward as a policy instrument to gather actors and resources to develop 
new solutions and improve public service delivery (Leiringer 2006, McQuaid 
2010, Hodge et al 2010). PPP have been recommended as a strategic instrument 
for governments to increase innovation and deliver better public services by for 
example the OECD (OECD 2007; 2008; 2011), whereas the EU recently 
announced a revised public procurement directive with a new specific procedure 
for innovation in partnerships (EC 2014).  
 
In contrast to this attention, theoretical and empirical evidence to support 
innovative results from PPPs seems lacking. Research based investigations of 
innovation in PPPs remain scarce, scattered between various sectors and research 
fields such as health care, waste management and construction works, which 
seldom refer to each other, and show mixed results. Whereas some PPPs are 
reported to lead only to ‘business as usual’ (Ball et al 2000, Hurst and Reeves 
2004, Slater et al 2007), others document innovative outcomes (Akintoye et al 
2003, Bovaird 2006, Esteve et al 2012). Furthermore, there does not seem to have 
been an attempt to develop a general, theory-based approach to the analysis of 
innovation across PPP types and sectors. As Leiringer concludes, despite the 
acceptance and embrace of PPPs as governing instruments for innovation in both 
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government and industry ‘the theoretical basis to support them seems strangely 
underdeveloped’ (Leiringer 2006).  
 
On this background, this article conducts a review of ideas and empirical 
experiences on innovation in PPPs to produce a conceptual framework, which are 
used to identify drivers and challenges for conducting innovation in three PPP 
types, infrastructure partnerships, service partnership and innovation partnerships. 
Whereas innovation may also be affected by other factors such as external 
pressure and individual entrepreneurship (see for example Eaton et al 2006), this 
article focuses on the influence of organization.  The article will ask the main 
research question: What is the potential for conducting innovation in public-
private partnerships? 
 
The article is structured as follows. First, the article will present two central 
research contributions. Second, the article will define the nebulous concepts 
innovation and PPPs. Third, the article will fold out two ideas and strategies on 
innovation in PPPs. Fourth, this conceptual framework will be used to investigate 
drivers and challenges for innovation in three PPP types illustrated by examples 
from existing literature, before, finally, the article will discuss results and 
conclude on the innovative potential in PPPs. The article suggests that although 
competition and collaboration are often seen as contradictive, the potential of 
conducting innovation in PPPs lies in the unique possibilities of combining these 
strategies, whereas challenges tend to arise, when these are limited.  
 
Main contributions from existing research 
Whereas several articles include innovation as a relevant output and outcome 
amongst other success criteria (Ball et al 2000, Akintoye et al 2003, Hurst and 
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Reeves 2004, Bovaird 2006), only few articles have focused more explicitly on 
innovation in PPPs. This section will shortly present two central contributions.  
 
In the first contribution, Leiringer (2006) investigates the possibilities for 
technological innovation in infrastructure PPPs. The author identifies and 
investigates the effect on innovation in four issues of prominence in PPP research: 
collaborative working, design freedom, value for money and risk transfer. On the 
basis of a four year multi-methods study of PPPs from 1999-2003, the author 
concludes that these commonly used arguments are imperfect and provides 
suggestions towards a more precise understanding. Leiringer concludes that 
although there is potential for innovation, there also are several challenges for 
innovation in PPPs. Whereas we will return in more detail to Leiringer’s main 
points in the analysis of infrastructure PPPs, this framework of investigation may 
also be relevant for other PPP types and, as we shall return to, to a certain degree 
corresponds with the ‘competitive collaboration’ framework.  
 
In the second contribution, Esteve, Ysa and Longo (2012) and Ysa, Esteve and 
Longo (2013) makes a valuable effort in integrating public innovation theory in a 
PPP framework. The authors argue for a broad understanding of innovation in 
public services encompassing both product, service and organizational innovation, 
which has also been the starting point of this article. The authors identify different 
types of PPPs in a single case study of a best case of collaborative innovation, the 
Blood and Tissue Bank in Spain, leading to various types and scopes of 
innovation. The article suggests that there is potential for more radical innovation 
in PPPs and that actors typically choose closer forms collaboration, when 
uncertainty and required investments are higher. However, the authors focus 
mostly on collaboration and overlook the likewise importance of competition. 
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Innovation in public services 
Innovation is a creative process of developing new ideas to change existing 
practices in a specific setting and also involves the implementation and diffusion 
of these ideas (Mulgan and Albury 2003, Walker 2006, Van de Ven et al 2008). 
As several scholars emphasize, innovation is not the same as ‘invention’, but 
requires the active adoption and implementation of an idea in a specific setting 
(Mohr 1969, Osborne 1998, Mulgan and Albury 2003). The process of innovating 
involves generating a new idea, implementing, adjusting and integrating the idea 
in a specific setting and potentially diffusing the idea to other settings (Rogers 
2003, Eggers and Sing 2009). Although there is a general agreement that 
innovation is something ‘new’ (Osborne 1998), new ideas are rarely grabbed out 
of the thin air, but are often piecemeal solutions, where old ideas are connected 
and re-used in a new context (Rogers 2003).  
 
According to Osborne and Brown (2011), innovation has mostly been perceived as 
new technologies, products or production processes in a private sector context, 
whereas this understanding may not fully capture the nature of public service 
innovations.  In public service innovations, the adoption of new technologies or 
products requires new forms of organizing and delivering public services. 
Furthermore, public sector innovation takes place in a political and institutional 
context, where the need for change is articulated through new political discourses, 
strategies and concepts (Hartley 2005). Whereas the main objective of innovation 
in the private sector is to gain ‘competitive advantage’, public sector organisations 
aim to deliver ‘public value’ to citizens following politically defined objectives 
(Moore 1994; 2005).  
 
Innovations can be radical, break-through technologies leading to large-scale 
changes in public service delivery, but also smaller, incremental changes to 
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existing services can bring increased public value. In contrast to private 
enterprises, public agencies rarely capitalize on innovations, which tend to be 
diffused through the adoption of ideas across agencies, rather than through one 
agency ‘buying’ an innovative service from another agency. As such, a main 
objective in the public sector may be to nurture public agencies that are open, 
adaptive and attentive to new developments and have the ability to continuously 
learn and evolve (Moore 2005). The next section will define PPPs and explain the 
categorizations used in this article, before we outline the potential in PPPs for 
contributing to a more innovative public sector.  
 
Public-Private Partnerships 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly used by governments all over 
the world to deliver public infrastructures and services in cooperation between 
public and private sector organisations (Osborne 2000, Rosenau 2000, Hodge et al 
2010, Greve and Hodge 2013). PPPs may be broadly defined as ‘cooperative 
institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors’ (Greve and 
Hodge 2005). These arrangements may provide the opportunity for public and 
private actors to jointly develop and deliver public infrastructure and services, 
while sharing risks, costs and resources involved for a time-limited period (Ham 
and Koppenjan 2001, Klijn and Teisman 2005, Greve and Hodge 2013).  PPPs 
may take many forms and there have been several suggestions towards 
categorization (see for example Linder 1999, Savas 2000, Weihe 2008, Klijn 
2010, Hodge and Greve 2013, Stelling 2014a). This article categorizes PPP based 
on ‘purpose’ (see Bovaird 2004, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011) which is a 
categorization close to practice-based empirical categorizations and thereby easy 
to operationalize in empirical analyses.  
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The article focuses on three PPP types, Infrastructure Partnerships, Service 
Partnerships and Innovation Partnerships3, which are all relevant for and used in 
public service delivery. Infrastructure partnerships typically involve a bundling of 
tasks such as the design, construction, finance, operation and maintenance of an 
infrastructure, for example a school building or processing facility, in a long-term 
contract of 20-35 years. In this period, the private consortium either owns the 
facility or share ownership with the authority in a joint venture company, whereas 
the authority pays for the availability and services delivered in the contract period. 
Following, the facility is typically transferred to the authority (Yescombe 2007). 
Infrastructure partnerships originated in the UK with the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) scheme introduced in 1992 by the Conservatives and was expanded and 
rebranded as ‘PPP’ by the incoming Labour government. Whereas the UK remain 
a market leader with 641 signed PFI contracts by 2009 (Hellowell 2010), Kapeller 
and Nemoz (2010) report a total of 1340 infrastructure PPP projects across Europe 
reaching financial close between 1990 and 2009 with a capital value of EUR 253 
million. In recent years, infrastructure PPPs have been diffused from the 
traditional sectors of transport (e.g. roads, bridges) and public buildings (e.g. 
schools, prisons) to the environmental sector (e.g. water processing and waste 
treatment) (ibid.).  
 
Service partnerships include an often complex bundle of tasks to that are jointly 
managed in close dialogue between the contractual parties. Service partnership 
contracts typically outline a less adversarial approach to disputes, a more 
collaborative approach to contract reading in a ‘partnership spirit’, sharing of risks 
and possible gains and an ‘open book’ approach to accounting (DCLG 2006, 
Udbudsportalen/LGDK 2010). Whereas the long-term infrastructure PPP has 
                                                          
3 Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) also mention policy, capacity building and economic development as 
potential purposes, but the article limits the scope to three types to be able to provide some depth in the analysis. 
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largely dominated scientific and practitioner debates on PPP, service partnerships 
have received less attention (although see Domberger and Fernandez 1999, Baker 
2007, Stelling 2014b). Compared to infrastructure partnerships the amount of 
private investment involved is considerable smaller (or non-existent) and service 
partnerships usually involve short to medium term contract periods of typically 4-
7 years (Domberger and Fernandez 1999).  
 
Innovation partnerships involve “a setting in which public and private players 
work together to develop innovative solutions targeted the public sector” (Evald et 
al 2014, p. 34). The ‘players’ are considered cooperation partners and as such 
expected to ‘develop innovative solutions together through a continuous transfer 
of ideas and knowledge between the players involved’ (ibid.). Innovation 
partnerships are rarely based on a tender and may be organized in more or less 
formalized contracts and ‘collaborative agreements’. The scale of innovation 
partnership may vary from large scale multiple actor projects to small, local 
innovation projects with two-three partners (DECA 2009). The process tends to 
include phases of problem definition, conceptual development, production of 
proto-types and testing by users, development of the final solution and potentially 
continuous cooperation and improvement (ibid., Brogaard and Petersen 2014b). 
 
Innovation partnerships may be considered a new subject of study in PPP research 
as well as a relatively new organizational arrangement (Olesen 2013, Evald et al 
2014).  This article will mainly draw on experiences from Denmark and other 
Scandinavian countries, where innovation partnerships have been increasingly 
popular and a number of helpful evaluation reports are available. A recent 
mapping from the research institution KORA counted at least 249 finalized or 
operational innovation partnerships in the Danish welfare sector by the beginning 
of 2014 (Brogaard and Petersen 2014a). These are mainly situated in health care 
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and eldercare, perhaps because there is a strong focus on efficiencies and new 
ways of easing citizens’ ability to take care of themselves in these sectors (DECA 
2009). 
 
Two ideas to why PPPs should bring innovation to the public sector 
In this section, we will explore two ideas and related governing strategies which 
may show an innovative potential in PPPs. The public sector has traditionally been 
perceived as almost the opposite of being innovative. In these hierarchical, 
bureaucratic organizations, ineffective, rule-abiding public servants have been said 
to resist radical change in fear of the political consequences of failure (Albury 
2005, Sørensen and Torfing 2011). Whereas this description may always have 
been slightly overdramatic, the public sector has changed considerably since the 
heavy planning regimes of the 1970s. In the 1980s, New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms increasingly looked to private enterprises and competitive market 
structures as an ideal for public organizations leading to a disintegration of the 
public sector through privatization or contracting out public service or placing 
service delivery in ‘arm’s length’ of bureaucratic mother organizations  (Hood 
1991, Osborne and Gabler 1992). In the 1990s, these ideas were supplemented by 
the blooming concept of ‘governance’, which in opposition to ‘government’ 
signalled a more networked form of governing. The attention towards governance 
may both be seen as an attempt to reconnect the disaggregated public sector and as 
an acknowledgment of the increasing complexity, diversity and fragmentation in 
society which demanded a resurrection of the state in a new role as societal 
coordinator (Kooiman 1993, Rhodes 1996, Kickert et al 1997, Jessop 1998, Stoker 
1998).  
 
Accordingly, NPM and governance reforms focused on including a broader range 
of actors in societal governing, but suggested two different strategies for bringing 
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innovation into the public sector. Whereas the NPM strategy suggests the 
introduction of competitive structures to incentivise public and private actors to 
innovate public services, the governance strategy encourages public and private 
actors to collaborate to develop new solutions sharing resources, competencies and 
ideas (Sørensen 2012). Accordingly, ‘competition’ and ‘collaboration’ can be seen 
as two different ideas and strategies for the coordination of interaction between 
public and private actors to drive forward innovation supplementing the traditional 
hierarchical form of coordination in the public sector.   
 
In their pure forms, competition and collaboration may also provide challenges for 
innovation. The contracting out arrangements of NPM typically establish a 
principal-agent relationship between a public authority and a private contractor, 
where information is unevenly distributed and the principal risk opportunistic 
behaviour from the agent (Reeves 2008). In consequence, public authorities may 
decide to determine objectives and procedures with less input from the agent 
(Sørensen 2012). Furthermore, public procurement regulation with the aim of 
ensuring equal competition may force public authorities to provide detailed 
specifications with restricted possibilities for dialogue in the procurement process, 
where new solutions begin to take form (Greve 2010).  The problem of restricted 
dialogue has to some degree been remedied with the procedure for ‘competitive 
dialogue’ (see EC 2004), which has become easier accessible in the new 
procurement directive along with the new ‘innovation partnership’ procedure (EC 
2014).   
 
In contrast, governance reforms aims to establish self-governing arenas where 
public and private actors are motivated to take joint responsibility and collaborate 
to develop better solutions. However, as Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) 
suggest, cross-sector collaboration is no ‘panacea’ for developing good solutions. 
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Collaboration may not solve all the problems that they attempt to tackle and 
collaborative processes may even create new problems (ibid.). In consensus-
oriented innovation processes, more radical ideas can become oppressed, because 
everyone needs to agree on the solutions, and any clear direction of innovations 
may be lost (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011, Sørensen 2012).  
 
Although competition and collaboration strategies may to some degree be in 
competition, in practice they tend to co-exist in a hybrid ‘layering’ of various 
ideas, strategies and governing structures in the public sector (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2011). Both ideationally and organizationally, PPPs clearly take 
inspiration from both NPM and Governance reforms (Klijn 2010). As contractual 
arrangements and arm’s length organisations PPPs strongly rely on NPM ideas. 
However, the idea of mutual added value, joint production of services and 
developing new solutions together evidently lean towards governance ideas (Klijn 
and Teisman 2003, Klijn 2010). This article suggests that specific PPP types may 
to a varying degree take inspiration from NPM and governance ideas, and as such, 
the specific ways in which PPPs are organized to provide competition and/or 
collaboration may provide various drivers and challenges for conducting 
innovation in public services.  
 
Drivers and challenges for innovation in three PPP types 
On the basis of the above outline of a conceptual model for understanding the 
potential for conducting innovation in public-private partnerships, this section 
identifies drivers and challenges for innovation in three PPP types, infrastructure 
partnerships, service partnerships and innovation partnerships. Table 1 provides an 
overview of results from the analyses of the three PPP types. 
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Table 1: Organizational form, innovation drivers and challenges in three PPP 
types 
PPP type Organisational form Innovation drivers Challenges 
Infrastructure 
Partnerships 
Long-term contract or 
joint venture for the 
design, construction, 
finance and operation of 
a facility 
- Strong competition for 
the best solution within 
the public budget 
- Incentives for 
improved solutions 
through bundling of 
tasks and risk transfer 
- Open specifications 
and minimal 
requirements provide 
freedom for private 
optimization 
- Detailed contract 
specifications prevent 
private input 
- Too much risk 
transfer disincentives 
private experimentation 
- Lack of flexibility in 
long term contracts 
 
Service 
Partnerships 
Contract or joint venture 
on the delivery and 
development of services 
in a collaborative, trust-
based relationship 
- Specific focus on 
developing a flexible, 
trust-based relationship 
to jointly identify and 
develop the best 
solutions 
- Economic incentive 
systems supporting ‘big 
bang’ or incremental 
improvement  
- Difficulties of 
developing trust 
between the partners 
Innovation 
Partnerships 
Development contract or 
more informal 
arrangement to jointly 
develop and potentially 
procure innovative 
solutions targeted the 
public sector 
- A specific focus on 
innovation of solutions 
targeted the public 
sector 
- Pooling of knowledge 
and resources towards a 
solution not specified on 
- Legal complexity and 
lack of adequate 
models 
- Different interests and 
work procedures 
between public and 
private actors 
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beforehand 
- Public and private 
actors share risks and 
gains as equal partners 
with strong commercial 
and public value interest 
in the project 
- Lack of 
implementation 
 
 
Infrastructure Partnerships 
The main idea of the UK PFI contract was to reduce pressure on public budgets by 
providing public infrastructure with private finance, while getting around 
restrictions on public spending (Hodge and Greve 2013), and it can be discussed if 
PFIs and similar infrastructure partnerships are actually ‘partnerships’ or merely a 
financial arrangements (see for example Hodge and Greve 2007). Besides the 
financial argument, infrastructure PPPs have also been linked to promises of 
increased ‘value-for-money’ (VfM) and more innovative solutions (OECD 2008, 
Hodge and Greve 2013).  
 
The contract transfers a number of risks to the contractor with the purpose of 
providing an incentive for the contractor to employ whole-of-life planning and on-
time delivery and thereby for the ‘agent’ to follow the ‘principal’s’ interests. PPPs 
tend to have relatively open output specifications combined with minimal 
technical requirements and service level agreements to provide greater freedom to 
private providers (ibid.). Competition and the high transaction costs involved in 
bidding should induce bidders to be innovative and try out new ideas to deliver the 
best possible solution within the budget and thereby impress the client (Ball et al 
2003, Akintoye et al 2003, Leiringer 2006). Especially when the ‘competitive 
dialogue’ procedure is used, bidders will have the opportunity to apply market 
knowledge, technical know-how and project management skills to direct their 
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proposals better towards public objectives and deliver a more efficient and 
effective solution than the public authority might have come up with by itself. As 
such, competitive and collaborative structures may supplement each other to drive 
forward innovation. 
 
Despite these expectations of innovation, empirical investigations display mixed 
results. In a single case study of a PFI high school in the UK, Ball, Heafey and 
King (2000) conclude that the most innovative features could be found in the 
project requirements directed by the client.  Investigating waste management PPPs 
also in the UK, Slater, Frederickson, Thomas, Wield and Potter (2007) suggest 
that although these PPPs were often considered innovative in a UK context, they 
did not seem to provide more innovative solutions than other organisational 
arrangements, such as pure private ownership (Slater et al 2007). Hurst and 
Reeves (2004) conclude that the first infrastructure partnership in Ireland for a 
public school ‘has not resulted in significant innovations and the public sector has 
failed to provide any evidence of value for money’ (p.379).  
 
In contrast, Esteve, Ysa and Longo (2012) show how the Spanish the Blood and 
Tissue Bank conduct innovation in collaboration with external stakeholder through 
various forms of cooperation including infrastructure partnerships. Examples from 
the study include an infrastructure partnership for designing a new headquarters 
for the Bank, which became one of the most energy efficient to be found in 
Mediterranean countries employing innovative technologies to drastically reduce 
energy demands for heating and cooling. The authors suggest that radical, high-
risk innovation projects increase interdependency between the partners and tend to 
lead them towards more tightly organised forms of collaboration (Esteve et al 
2012).  
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Three main challenges for conducting innovation in infrastructure partnerships 
may explain these mixed results. Firstly, public authorities tend to write too 
detailed specifications and thereby prevent private sector input (Ball et al 2000, 
Hurst and Reeves 2004, Leiringer 2006). Leringer (2006) suggests that the 
stringent manner in which contracts are formulated in practice in combination with 
regulatory standards leave little leverage for the contractor to make changes as the 
project develops. Ball, Heafey and King (2000) show that although output 
specifications in this procurement was relatively open, the client used the 
competitive dialogue process to direct bidders towards specific solutions (Ball et 
al 2000). Effectively, infrastructure partnerships may sometimes provide little 
leverage for private companies to bring innovative ideas.  
 
Secondly, the idea that risk transfer should incentivize innovation may not hold. 
According to Leiringer (2006), the characteristics of PFI contracts may incentivize 
private businesses to only bring tried and tested technologies and ‘best practice’ 
solutions to the table in order to limit risk exposure. Accordingly, too much risk 
transfer may actually reduce the private company’s interest in experimentation 
(Greve 2010). On the basis of a comparative case study of transport PPPs in the 
Netherlands, Koppenjan (2005) suggests that the creation of added value do not 
emerge simply by switching risks to the private actor, but rather through early 
cooperation to ensure that projects are convincing and motivational projects for 
public and private actors.  
 
Thirdly, the long duration of contracts combined with detailed specifications can 
become a challenge in the contract period, as it may prevent the adjustment of 
contracts to emerging political objectives or new technological developments. As 
the contractor will have the ownership of the facility and thereby a monopoly on 
service delivery in the contract period, additions and service changes will need to 
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be negotiated and may lead to higher costs (Ball et al 2000). Leiringer (2006) 
describes how the parties of PFI contracts have to ‘go out of their way to establish 
routines that effectively counter the restrictions in collaborative working forced 
upon them by stringent contracts’ (p.305). As he suggests, while this might be 
possible if the parties are willing, it may be tempting for the public authority to 
fall back on old habits of hierarchical steering. 
 
In conclusion, the combination of competitive and collaborative drivers in 
infrastructure partnerships in principle provide a potential for conducting 
innovation, but competitive drivers for innovation may in practice be reduced by 
too much risk transfer, whereas the importance of collaboration in close dialogue 
between public and private partners across the PPP process have tended to be 
overlooked. Infrastructure partnerships tend to involve only best practice tried and 
tested technologies, but as Leiringer suggests, transferring tried and tested 
technology to a new setting may also be considered innovation. Whereas these 
early experiences point towards several challenges for innovation in infrastructure 
PPPs, future examples might be expected to show more innovative results as 
learning from early projects are diffused and the possibility for competitive 
dialogue is improved with the new procurement directive. 
 
Service Partnerships 
In contrast to infrastructure partnerships, service partnerships are more directly 
concerned with partnership relationships. In comparison to the typical PFI contract 
where a relational dimension may be developed over time on the basis of a 
contract, service partnerships specifically aim to provide flexibility and facilitate 
close collaboration in contracts. As Stelling (2014b) suggests, service 
partnerships’ ‘contractual foundation makes a future relationship constitutive, 
rather than extra-contractual’ (p.140). As such, service partnership contracts may 
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be strongly related to the concept of ‘relational contracting’, which outlines a more 
collaborative, flexible and trust-based form of contracting out compared to 
traditional adversarial contracting (Williamson 1985, Reeves 2008). Because of 
the complex and changeable nature of the involved tasks, service partnerships are 
typically defined through output-specifications and performance measures to 
allow for flexibility and continuous improvement towards political objectives 
(Domberger and Fernandez 1999).  Innovations in service partnerships may be 
implemented either as a ‘big bang’ operation in the beginning of the partnership or 
incrementally over the partnership lifetime (DCLG 2006). 
 
PPP research provides only few accounts of innovation in service partnerships, but 
experiences seem generally positive4. In the example of the before mentioned 
Spanish Blood and Tissue Bank, a joint venture partnership with the private 
company Caridien framed the development of an innovative technological process 
to automatize the separation of blood components. This ‘big bang’ service 
innovation was afterwards diffused to other blood banks around the world (Esteve 
et al 2012). In an example from England, Bovaird (2006) show how the London 
Borough of Harrow developed and implemented a new ICT system in revenue and 
benefits services in close cooperation with a private partner.  The contractor would 
get a reduction in payments, if they saved less than projected, whereas additional 
savings would be shared between the partners. Three years after signing the 
contract a new system was implemented, which after some initial technical 
difficulties delivered a number of innovations and costs savings of 16%. Examples 
of innovations were the integration of emails directly into the workflow (process 
innovation) and introducing ‘e-billing’ (a new service) (Bovaird 2006, pp. 86-88).  
 
                                                          
4 These examples provided here are not specifically named ’service partnerships’ in the referenced articles, but 
the description of them fits this partnership type. 
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However, there may also be challenges involved for conducting innovation in 
service partnerships. Investigating two anonymized contract-based service 
partnerships in Danish health care, Stelling (2014b) questions the level of trust 
actually developed in these ‘ strong relational’ partnerships. Both partnerships 
aimed to deliver innovation and efficiencies in a specific service area, where the 
private consultants would assist public agencies in improving their work 
processes, thus quite similar to Bovaird’s case. The private partner took most of 
the financial risk with the potential for gaining a profit, when efficiencies were 
obtained. However, projects experienced difficulties in trust development between 
the organizations. Whereas top-level managers had initiated the partnership and 
counted on middle managers and employees to participate, initial scepticism 
towards private consultants in the organizations developed into distrust and 
erosion of partnership relationships, which made it difficult for the private agents 
to deliver results (Stelling 2014b, pp. 137-161).  
 
In conclusion, there seems to be strong potential in service partnerships for both 
more radical ‘big bang’ service innovation and/ or more incremental 
improvements in the organization and delivered services. Service partnerships 
combine competitive contracting with a more collaborative approach to 
contracting out based on market-based economic incentives. However, as Stelling 
(2014b) shows, flexible, trust-based partnership relationships do not necessarily 
develop between the partners, which may challenge the possibilities for 
collaboration and commercial gain from these partnerships.   
 
Innovation Partnerships 
In contrast to infrastructure and service partnerships, the main purpose of 
innovation partnerships is to provide an institutionalised cooperation for public 
and private actors to jointly develop innovative solutions to challenges in the 
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public sector. Innovation partnerships generally do not establish a principal-agent 
relationship, where the private agent delivers a pre-described service to the public 
principal, but rather involves a pooling of ideas, knowledge and resources between 
two or more equal partners to develop a solution that may not be specified on 
beforehand (Damvad 2010, Munksgaard et al 2012). Whereas the private partner 
usually brings technical know-how, the public party may contribute with 
knowledge of user experiences and access to ‘real life’ facilities for testing 
solutions (DECA 2009).  
 
PPIs may be initiated either by a public authority experiencing a specific challenge 
or by a private company wanting to test a product or idea. PPI reports outlines 
clear benefits for both partners. The private partner may benefit from 
commercialisation of the developed product or service, increased knowledge of 
user needs from product testing and networking with public or other private actors 
(DECA 2009). Testing the solution in a public environment may also bring 
increased legitimacy to the solution and ease the opening of new markets (DBA 
2014). The public organization may improve public services, achieve efficiencies 
in work flows, deliver politically high profile projects, improve the working 
environment and support an innovative culture in their organization (DECA 2009).  
 
There are many examples of successful PPIs having delivered radical innovation 
with potential for national, European and international diffusion or more 
incremental innovation, but there are also examples of partnerships where one or 
both partners did not achieve their objectives (Brogaard and Petersen 2014b). An 
example of radical innovation with international commercial potential is the 
development of an ‘incubator station for fertility treatment’ in a PPI between the 
Danish Herlev Hospital and the English company Ruskin Technologies which had 
the technical skills to realize the idea.  The final product could improve fertility 
225 
 
rates by 50% compared to traditional methods and has been marketed by Ruskin 
Technologies in both England and the Nordic countries (DECA 2009). The PPI 
project ‘Bonusrens’ could be characterized as a more incremental innovation, 
where Fredensborg Municipality and the private company ‘Bonusrens’ tested the 
use of steam to sterilize furniture and toys in day care institutions resulting in 
implementations of this solution in several institutions (Brogaard and Petersen 
2014b). A so far less successful project was the development of the ‘KOL 
suitcase’ to enable patients to be treated at home, which has stranded between 
development and implementation (DECA 2009).  
 
There are two main challenges for conducting innovation in PPIs: legal 
complexity and the differences between interests and working procedures in 
public and private companies (Munksgaard et al 2012). Firstly, public 
procurement regulation, the risk of state aid and distribution of property rights 
outline a complex legal framework for innovation partnerships (Olesen 2013). PPI 
participants have stressed the lack of solid procurement and cooperation models 
and guidelines as a main challenge and report spending a lot of time and resources 
on designing meaningful frameworks from scratch (DECA 2009, Damvad 2010). 
A main challenge is to hinder that the private company involved in the 
development of the new solution becomes disqualified in further procurement 
processes because of EU equal treatment principles (DECA 2009).  
 
Secondly, the collaborative process may be challenged by differences in interests 
and working procedures between public and private organizations. Whereas 
private actors tend to favour an effective process towards product development 
focusing on economic gains, public authorities may focus more on long term 
competence building and innovation in work procedures in line with their main 
objective of creating public value. Lack of clear direction and mutual expectations 
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can lead to disputes and dissatisfaction in both organizations (Munksgaard et al 
2012). For example, in the project ‘Prevention of digital bullying’ both public and 
private partners experienced that an unclear purpose and role division led to 
collaborative difficulties. The result was that none of the developed solutions was 
implemented (Brogaard and Petersen 2014b).  Furthermore, private companies 
experience long public decision procedures as unnecessarily tiresome. The 
prolonging of the process tends to increase the costs of projects, which can be a 
serious challenge for especially smaller private ventures (DECA 2009).  
 
The new procurement directive may to some degree mend the challenges in PPPs 
by introducing ‘innovation partnerships’ as a distinct procedure for innovative 
procurement. The procedure outlines an integrated two-step procurement process 
with the aim of developing an innovative product or service and subsequently 
purchase the developed solution, provided that the solution correspond to agreed 
performance and price levels.  The partners are allowed to negotiate everything 
except for minimum requirements and award criteria. As such, this new procedure 
allows the authority to combine the innovation process and purchase of a solution, 
thus releasing the authority from having to contract out the implementation of the 
developed solution in a distinct procurement process (EC 2014, article 31).  
 
In conclusion, the potential for conducting innovation in innovation partnerships 
lies exactly in the clear competitive drive and upfront technological knowledge in 
private companies which in collaborative processes with public organisations and 
users may be channelled towards new products, processes, services that increase 
societal value. Although legal rules and public private differences are considered 
challenges to collaborative and competitive strategies, strong results show that it is 
often possible to overcome these in a manner that fits specific innovation project.  
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Discussion 
The analyses of the potential for conducting innovation in these three types of 
partnerships, infrastructure partnerships, service partnerships and innovation 
partnerships, show that although experiences so far have been mixed and tending 
towards the negative, there is a potential for innovation in all three partnership 
types, which may be further explored in the future. Applying the concepts of 
competition and collaboration assisted in showing the drivers and challenges for 
innovation and explaining the mixed experiences so far.  
 
Infrastructure PPPs provide a competitive driver for the private sector to be 
innovative to gain the opportunity of a long term profit if they manage to impress 
within public budgets. Whereas bundling of tasks and risk transfer are thought to 
support the incentive for improved solutions, experiences show that too much risk 
transfer to the private sector might reduce their incentive to experiment. Empirical 
experiences also show that too detailed contract specifications have in some cases 
prevented private input, whereas long term duration of contracts may reduce 
flexibility. Infrastructure partnerships tend to bring tested and tried solutions that 
may be considered innovative in a specific setting, but are less likely  to bring 
more radical innovation. In general, the importance of collaboration to support 
competitive structures seems to have been underestimated in the implementation 
of this PPP type.   
 
Service partnerships specifically focus on moving away from the adversarial 
relationships of traditional contracting out and developing close, flexible and trust-
based relationships between public and private partners. The relationship tends to 
be supported by an economic incentive structure, which makes it advantageous for 
both actors to work for improvements. Service partnerships may bring innovation 
either as a ‘big bang’ operation of a radical solution with potential export 
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opportunities or as more incremental service improvements and efficiencies over 
time. However, the idea of close collaboration may be challenged in practice, 
where building trust can be difficult.  
 
Innovation partnerships are relatively new organizational arrangements, which 
provide the framework for public and private actors to jointly develop innovative 
solutions by pooling knowledge and resources. There are strong drivers for 
collaboration based on the commercial potential for private companies and the 
prospect for public authorities of gaining public value through new solutions. 
These processes may be challenged by legal complexity and public-private 
differences. A new EU procurement process for innovation partnerships may to 
some degree remedy these challenges. 
 
Accordingly, it seems that there is most potential for conducting innovation in 
innovation partnerships, which is not surprising since they are organized directly 
with this purpose in mind. Innovation partnerships are close to governance ideas, 
as they stress the joining of resources and knowledge in equal collaborative 
relationships, but also include a strong competitive driver for private companies in 
the prospects of developing new products and markets. In contrast, infrastructure 
partnerships are closer to NPM ideas of achieving innovative ideas and 
efficiencies by letting the private sector deliver public services in competitive 
processes. There tends to be less emphasis on collaboration in these partnerships, 
although the introduction and ease of access to ‘competitive dialogue’ show a 
realisation of the need for more collaboration in these partnerships as well.  
Service partnership may be the most ‘hybrid’ of the three, being modelled after 
competitive contracting out, but strongly emphasising collaborative relationships.  
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Figure 1 places the three partnerships on a provisional scale based on their 
organizational inspiration from NPM/competition to governance/collaboration and 
the scope of innovation. It is important to stress that this scheme outlines a 
typology and consequently specific infrastructure, service and innovation 
partnerships may be placed differently compared to these ‘ideal types’.   
 
Figure 1: The inspiration from NPM (competition) and governance 
(collaboration) in three PPP types compared to the scope of innovation 
 
 
Whereas this scheme provide an overview of current experiences of conducting 
innovation in these three partnership types, the key issue is not to compare the 
‘innovativeness’ of these PPPs. The interesting outcome of this review is rather 
the identification of potentials for innovations in each PPP type and collectively 
across PPP types to enable increased societal gains from PPPs. The good news is 
that there seems to be a potential. PPP research and evaluation reports show 
examples of innovative output and outcomes from all three PPP types, which bring 
value to both public and private sector organizations. As mentioned, the aim is not 
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necessarily for all PPP types to deliver radical innovation, but rather to support an 
innovative culture in the public sector where new ideas are continuously 
developed, adopted and diffused. Accordingly, the article points towards the value 
of a broad innovation concept incorporating various types and scopes of 
innovation which are often interconnected in the innovation of public services. 
The degree of open dialogue needed between public and private actors may vary 
depending on the type and scope of innovation in play.   
 
The article also points to potential learning points between the different PPP types. 
For example, good experiences with collaborative relationships from innovation 
and service partnerships may to a greater extend be integrated in infrastructure 
partnerships, whereas the structured focus on risk sharing in infrastructure 
partnerships may provide a better foundation for innovation partnerships. There is 
always a risk involved in innovation projects and if that risk is borne by one 
partner alone, there might be less incentive to innovate. 
 
The review also show examples of less innovative PPPs and innovation processes 
which have failed. Across PPP types, main challenges for conducting innovation 
remain the legislative framework and public-private differences. Ironically, the 
legislative framework aiming to ensure equal competition to gain efficiencies may 
prevent private input. As several authors have stressed, private-private models of 
collaborative innovation through ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough 2006) are 
generally more collaborative and less restricted than public procurements 
(Sørensen 2012, Munksgaard et al 2012). PPPs continue to exist in ‘the shadow of 
hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997) not only because of complex legislative frameworks, 
but also when public agencies in practice keep to their habits of hierarchical 
governing. However, political and administrative processes should not only be 
perceived as challenges for conducting innovation. As this review indicates, policy 
231 
 
development and administrative objectives of continuous improvement may also 
be an important driver of innovation. As such, hierarchy may be considered a third 
driver of innovation in PPPs. Striking the balance between flexible collaboration 
and securing accountability and equal access to public service markets may not be 
an easy task for public authorities. 
 
As such, the results of this review support the findings of Esteve et al (2012) that 
PPPs provide an interesting potential for conducting innovation to improve public 
service delivery. This article specify that the innovative potential lies in the ideas 
and strategies embedded in the organizational form of PPPs with the prospect of 
combining collaborative and competitive drivers to conduct innovation through 
processes of ’competitive collaboration’. Accordingly, managers involved in PPPs 
should not focus on either collaboration or competition, but on the integrating both 
aspects wisely in the contract design and management practices of PPPs.  
 
This article has provided small sneak-peaks into innovation processes in PPPs 
based on a conceptual framework and current experiences. However, there is a 
great need for more conceptually based empirical work on how innovation 
processes are conducted in practice in PPPs. The ‘competitive collaboration’ 
framework may provide a solid starting point for further debate. In comparison to 
the framework provided by Leiringer (2006), the issue of risk might be slightly 
underestimated in the competitive collaboration framework.  Whereas risk sharing 
has been integrated in this framework as a factor influencing the possibilities for 
competition or collaboration, it may also be argued that risk sharing should have a 
more prominent position in the analysis of innovation in PPPs.  
 
  
232 
 
Conclusion 
This article has investigated the potential for conducting innovation in public-
private partnerships. The article identified innovation drivers and challenges in 
three types of PPPs: Infrastructure partnerships, service partnerships and 
innovation partnerships. The article shows that a mix of competitive and 
collaborative strategies in processes of ‘competitive collaboration’ provide a 
potential for innovation in all three PPP types, although there are also challenges 
for activating these drivers in practice. Political and administrative hierarchy may 
be considered a third driver.  
 
The main challenge for conducting innovation in PPPs remains the legislative 
framework and public-private differences. If the public actor resists the temptation 
to fall back on hierarchical governing mechanisms and both partners make an 
effort to build trust and find common ground across differences, innovative results 
show that it is possible to overcome these challenges.  The new public 
procurement directive may improve these possibilities, and it will be interesting to 
follow whether and how these new possibilities will be taken up by public 
procurers in Europe over the next years.  
 
The article has contributed with a conceptual framework for analysing innovation 
in PPPs and an overview of current ideas and experiences from PPP research and 
evaluations reports, which may be a solid starting point for new empirical 
investigations. There is a need for more empirical case studies, which make a 
serious effort to investigate at the micro-level how public and private actors may 
conduct innovation in PPP processes within the available frameworks. Employing 
the right drivers for innovation in the contract design and management of PPPs 
may bring added value to both public and private sector organizations.  
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The Prominent, but Contested Role of 
Public-Private Partnerships in Sustainability 
Transformations of Waste Management 
Systems 
 
Comparing English and Danish experiences 
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Abstract 
This article investigates the role of public-private partnerships in the context of 
sustainability transformations of waste management systems. Urban scholars have 
pointed to the importance of investigating sustainability transformation processes 
in place-specific local contexts and pointed towards the role of partnerships in 
gathering actors, strategies and resources to solve the complex challenge of 
sustainable development. However, these scholars has not engaged in depth with 
the partnership phenomena or the growing body PPP research, which on the other 
hand has mostly focused on the financial benefits of PPPs.  This article bridges 
these perspectives through a comparative analysis of the role of PPPs in 
sustainability transformations of English and Danish waste management systems. 
The analysis is based on qualitative, in-depth interviews with experts and public 
and private actors engaged in various types of PPPs supplemented with policy 
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papers, contracts, websites, etc. The article concludes that PPPs do play a 
prominent role in strategies for sustainability transformations of waste 
management systems in England and Denmark and show concrete examples of 
contributions to sustainability change from policy partnerships, service delivery 
partnerships and technology partnerships. Nonetheless, PPPs remain contested as 
policy instruments in waste management, where local authorities traditionally 
have played the main role as service providers. The future of PPPs in waste 
management in the two countries depends on strategic choices of various groups 
of public and private actors. 
 
Introduction 
Today, we face the challenge of sustainable development in several domains such 
as energy, water management, transport and resource management (Markard et al 
2012). These systems may be understood as socio-technical infrastructure 
networks (Uyarra and Gee 2012, Bulkeley et al 2014), not only encompassing 
physical components and technologies such as waste treatment facilities, power 
plants or transport networks, but also social structures such as organizations, 
regulation and social networks (Hughes 1983). Socio-technical infrastructure 
networks tend to be highly path dependent, durable and resistant to rapid change, 
not only due to the fixity and sunk costs of the technical and physical components, 
but also to the vested interests of incumbent social groups (Monstadt 2009, Uyarra 
and Gee 2012). Adding to this, infrastructure systems have become increasingly 
‘splintered’, as neo-liberal policies have led to deregulation and liberalization of 
service provision (Van Vliet 2012). In consequence, despite pronounced political 
ambitions of more sustainable production and consumption patterns, it has proven 
difficult to deliver these necessary fundamental system changes in practice 
(Hartman et al 2002).  
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Socio-technical systems are not only stable, but also provide a key to change. 
Researchers in sustainability transformation have investigated how these 
fragmented systems can be managed to influence and direct collective efforts 
towards transformation (Loorbach 2004, Kemp et al 2007). Whereas these 
scholars (and those working on socio-technical regime theory in general) have 
tended to focus (often implicitly) on change processes at the national scale, urban 
scholars have emphasized the need to investigate socio-technical transformation 
processes in place-specific urban contexts. These studies suggest that local actors 
may respond to or contest pressure for system change or perhaps even initiate and 
facilitate change from below (Hodson and Marvin 2010, Uyarra and Gee 2012, 
Bulkeley et al 2014). In this emerging research field, investigations have shown 
that public-private partnerships may play a role in the governing of change 
processes (Bulkeley and Broto 2012, Bulkeley et al 2014).  
 
However, neither socio-technical regime theory or urban infrastructure literature 
have seriously engaged with the partnership phenomena and the growing body of 
public-private partnership (PPP) research emerging over the past decades 
(Rosenau 2000, Osborne 2000, Weihe 2008, Hodge et al 2010, Greve and Hodge 
2013). Likewise, PPP researchers have in general mostly focused on the financial 
benefits of PPPs and broadly disregarded potential social and environmental 
effects (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009). In contrast, researchers in environmental 
governance have suggested , international, regional and local multi-stakeholder 
partnerships directed at promoting sustainable development as necessary policy 
tools to gather actors with relevant knowledge and competences to solve the 
complex challenge of sustainability transformation (Hartman et al 1999, Bruijn 
and Tukker 2002a, Malmborg 2003).However, despite the empirical relevance and 
general promotion of partnerships for sustainability, there continues to be little 
research based evidence on the possibilities of PPPs to contribute to the 
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sustainability transformation of urban infrastructure systems. This article aims to 
fill this research gap by investigating PPPs as policy instruments for sustainability 
change.  
 
The article explores the role of PPPs in sustainability transformations of municipal 
waste management systems through a comparative case study of two national 
contexts: England5 and Denmark. An analysis of the transformation of waste 
management in the Netherlands from landfilling towards an integrated system of 
recycling and recovery during the 1970s to 1990s has shown that socio-technical 
regime theory  can be useful for describing these processes (Geels and Kemp 
2007, Kemp 2007, Kemp et al 2007). Similar transformation processes are taking 
place in England and Denmark (Uyarra and Gee 2012). The article is based on 
qualitative interviews with experts and public and private waste managers in both 
countries, triangulated with policy reports, procurement material, etc. Three main 
types of PPPs are identified: Policy partnerships, service delivery partnerships and 
technology partnerships. These partnerships play a prominent role in sustainability 
change of English and Danish waste management systems in various ways, but 
continue to be contested as policy instruments.  
 
The article begins with an introduction to theory on sustainability transformations 
of urban infrastructure networks and moves onto propose and discuss PPPs as 
policy instruments in this context. Following, the article will introduce the external 
pressure for change on English and Danish waste management systems and 
describe these historical transformation processes. This introduction will be 
succeeded by a section on methods and data collection. On this background, the 
                                                          
5 England is selected as a case rather than the whole of UK, since the Devolved Administrations of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have their own waste management policies. As England has no devolved administration, I will 
however refer to the UK government. 
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analysis will describe the identified PPP types and their contribution to 
sustainability change illustrated by examples of ‘placed-based’ PPPs from the two 
countries. After discussing and comparing the results, the article will conclude on 
the general applicability of PPPs as policy instruments for sustainability 
transformation of urban infrastructure networks and the fruitfulness of combining 
perspectives on sustainability transformation of urban infrastructure and PPPs.  
 
Sustainability transformation in urban infrastructures networks 
Socio-technical regime theory provides an ambitious attempt to describe the 
process and governance of system innovation (Loorbach 2004, Geels 2005a, Schot 
and Geels 2008, Markard et al 2012). In the multi-level perspective (MLP), 
sustainability change in socio-technical regimes are described as interlinked 
processes between three layers: regime, niches and landscape. The socio-technical 
regime is ‘a seamless web of interrelated social and technical components’ 
(Bulkeley et al 2014, p.1472), where incumbent regime actors provide 
stabilization through established roles, routines, cognitive patterns, practices or 
contracts supported by formal regulation and existing infrastructure arrangements. 
The niches-level are ‘incubation rooms’ shielded from mainstream markets, where 
new technologies may be fostered and matured (Geels and Kemp 2007). The 
socio-technical landscape is in principle an exogenous environment to regime 
actors, including aspects such as ‘economic growth, broad political coalitions, 
cultural and normative values, environmental problems and resource scarcities’ 
(ibid., p.443). 
 
As Uyarra and Gee (2012) describes, socio-technical systems are ‘highly durable, 
path-dependent, resistant to rapid change and often associated with incremental, 
rather than radical, innovation’ (p.101). Vested interests, sunk costs and lockins 
tend to lead towards stabilization and change requires an active reconfiguration of 
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these complex, large infrastructure systems (ibid.). Researchers in this field have 
investigated how old systems despite of these challenges are transformed or 
neglected in favour of new systems (Rotmans et al 2001, Geels 2005a; 2005b, 
Kemp 2007). According to the MLP perspective, system change comes about 
through interplay between all three levels. Pressure from the landscape on the 
existing regime may open for the possibility of new ideas emerging from the 
niches level to enter and perhaps even threaten the existing regime. In 
reproduction and transformation processes, innovations improve the existing 
regime and potentially redirect the trajectory through incremental changes, 
whereas transition processes imply a discontinuous shift to a new trajectory or 
system (Geels and Kemp 2007).  
 
Whereas urban scholars have embraced the idea of understanding infrastructure 
networks as socio-technical, they have also pointed to limitations in this theory of 
system change. First, researchers have criticised the over-emphasis on niches as 
drivers of change, as this might understate the importance of interplay between 
landscape and regime. Pressure for change may be expressed and perceived 
differently across regimes, in which actors may have various resources to contest 
or adapt to new demands. Accordingly, regime transition and transformation may 
develop through a variety of trajectories (Hodson and Marvin 2010). Second, 
urban scholars have questioned the often implicit focus on the national level, as it 
fails to acknowledge the ‘place-specific formation of sociotechnical regimes and 
the contestation, negotiation, and management of urban transition strategies’ 
(Monstadt 2009). Third, they suggest it might be difficult to separate niches from 
regimes. Instead of being closed ‘incubation rooms’, niches may be ‘open-ended’ 
experiments in the political-strategic urban regime. Accordingly, rather than 
decisive transitions from one regime to another, change may evolve in fragmented 
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and plural regimes, where various solutions are tested, contested and adopted or 
discarded in local contexts (Bulkeley et al 2014).   
 
With this critique in mind, the article will investigate how PPPs may contribute to 
sustainability change in the national and local contexts in Denmark and England. 
The next section will show how PPPs are identified and categorized, where after 
the following section will discuss the potential in PPPs for contributing to 
sustainability change.  
 
Identifying and categorising public-private partnerships 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) may be broadly defined as ‘cooperative 
institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors’ (Greve and 
Hodge 2005). PPPs may provide a framework for public and private actors to 
work jointly towards an agreed purpose, while sharing risks, costs and benefits 
involved (Ham and Koppenjan 2001). Whereas most PPP research has focused on 
long-term infrastructure contracts, such as the Public Finance Initiative (PFI) in 
the UK, this paper aims for a broader approach to capture the variety of PPP types 
in waste management. This strategy aligns with the ‘policy approach’ in Rosenau 
(2000) ed., where public-private constellations within a specific policy area are 
described and analysed in the context of a specific policy field (Weihe 2008). This 
article mainly focuses on PPPs in the ‘place-specific’ urban context, where local 
authorities are responsible for the development and delivery of municipal waste 
management services and may cooperate with private waste management 
companies for this purpose. However, the article also includes partnerships for 
developing or implementing new policies and solutions for municipal waste 
services, which may also include a broader range of actors, such as government, 
knowledge institutions, etc.   
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The variety of PPPs has led researchers to warn against drawing general 
conclusions about PPPs without specifying what is meant by ‘PPP’ (Weihe 2008). 
Accordingly, a starting point for investigating PPPs in this article has been to 
identify, categorize and describe PPPs in the context of municipal waste 
management. Three main questions may characterize PPPs: 1) Why is the PPP 
initiated?, 2) Who participates in the PPP?, and 3) How is the PPP organized? 
(Glendinning and Powell 2002) This article develops an empirical categorization 
based on ‘purpose’ (‘why’), such as PPPs for the purpose of ‘service delivery’ 
(Bovaird 2004, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2010). As Bovaird (2004) suggests, 
each purpose “is likely to require partnerships with different membership, 
strategies, structures and operational processes and there are likely to be different 
criteria against which the partnerships will be monitored and evaluated” (p.202). 
As such, this categorization opens for variations in membership (‘who’) and 
organizational form (‘how’) and enables a discussion of contributions from 
various PPP types.  
 
PPPs and sustainability transformation 
As Tukker and Bruijn (2002) conclude, system transformation might ‘just happen’ 
as new technologies evolve, but this may not necessarily result in the most 
sustainable solutions. Therefore, there is a strong need for leadership, especially 
from public authorities, to bring together interdependent actors, for example in 
new partnerships (ibid.).The idea of partnership is widely celebrated as a plus sum 
word signalling win-win solutions. A main idea in partnerships is for the involved 
organizations to achieve gains that exceed the benefits from working alone 
(Rosenau 2000). In a diverse network society, where actors with relevant 
knowledge and resources are dispersed and interdependent, partnerships may 
gather relevant knowledge, skills and resources to better address complex societal 
challenges such as sustainability and potentially develop innovative solutions to 
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pressing problems (McQuaid 2000, Hartman et al 1999, Bruijn and Tukker 2002b, 
Klijn and Teisman 2005). 
 
According to Hartman et al (2002), collaboration in partnerships may also 
facilitate the development of new relationships and social values, which can 
provide the seeds for system change. In line with this, Bulkely et al (2014) suggest 
that the establishment of new partnerships such as the London Energy partnership 
‘provided critical means through which to gather relevant actors, strategies and 
projects around the low-carbon energy logic’ in the process of transforming the 
city of London towards a low-carbon energy future (p. 1478). In contrast, critics 
have claimed that partnerships typically involve mainly strong, incumbent regime 
actors and therefore tend to produce only incremental change to keep status quo 
(Levy 1997). Furthermore, especially the former UK Labour government has been 
accused of labelling PFI projects as partnerships, although they were rather 
contractual instruments for getting private finance for public projects ‘off the 
balance sheet’. ‘Partnership’ collaboration, in terms of moving the client-
contractor relationship from traditional outsourcing towards intense co-production 
and joined decision-making, was perhaps a diminishing part of the scheme 
(Falconer & McLauglin 2000, Klijn & Teisman 2000). 
 
Accordingly, there might be a potential for developing more sustainable waste 
management solutions in PPPs, but researchers have also pointed out potential 
challenges for real-life PPPs to deliver system transformation. Various PPP types 
may contribute to different levels of sustainability change; improvement and 
optimization of existing systems, system redesign through incremental innovations 
or more radical system transition. Before engaging in the case studies of PPPs, the 
next section will present the landscape pressure on national and local governments 
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towards more sustainable waste management systems, which seems to have 
opened a window of opportunity’(Kingdon 1984)  for change. 
 
The comparative case study 
The article is based on an embedded comparative case study, where subunits of 
specific PPPs have been identified and categorized in the two national cases 
through an iterative process of moving between theory and data (Eisenhardt 1989, 
Yin 2009, Stewart 2012). The analytical approach of a comparative case study was 
chosen to enable some degree of generalization across cases, while permitting a 
context-based understanding of the complex processes of sustainability change 
(Peters 1998). The mapping included expert interviews, snowballing (Pedersen 
1998), background research (reports, websites, etc.) and observations from 
conferences, workshops etc. in the waste management sector. In the subunits, 
semi-structured in-depht, qualitative interviews was conducted with public and 
private waste managers and triangulated with document studies of policy reports, 
procurement material, websites, contracts, etc. Based on these data, the articles 
provide an overview of various forms of partnerships in England and Denmark 
without claiming to present a comprehensive or exclusive list. 
 
The data collection process aimed at including the broadest possible variation of 
PPPs and also a few examples of in-house and traditional contracting arrangement 
to contrast findings. All in all, 43 interviews with 58 respondents from 36 
organizations were conducted, hereof 25 interviews in Denmark and 18 in 
England. The respondents involved in specific PPPs were asked to describe their 
considerations for engaging in a PPP, the organization of the PPP and the process 
of establishing and managing the PPP with an emphasis on the possibilities and 
challenges for innovation of more sustainable solutions.  Data collection took 
place from February 2012 to April 2014. Interviews with public and private 
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managers were transcribed and coded in main themes for further analysis. Names 
and titles of specific persons and some of the organizations have been anonymised 
for sensitivity reasons. 
 
England and Denmark have a reasonable level of comparability, as they 1) are 
both EU member states with a common legislative framework directing national 
waste and public procurement policies, 2) share similar levels of recycling around 
the EU average, are both challenged by the 2020 EU target and undergoing a 
continuous transformation of their waste management systems, but have had 
different trajectories of sustainability transformation, and 3) both have a 
comparably high inclusion of private actors in waste management services in a 
European context. Introductory research showed that whereas PPPs had played an 
important role in the recent English sustainability transformation, the main 
changes in Danish waste management took place earlier and seemed to primarily 
have involved municipal companies. As such, these cases suggest that PPPs may 
not be necessary, but could be an efficient instrument for sustainability 
transformation.  
 
The following section will define sustainability and look into the external 
landscape pressure for sustainability transformation of waste management shared 
by both countries. 
 
External landscape pressure for sustainable waste management 
Sustainable development was defined in the Brundtland report as ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987). This development outlines 
trajectories of change, which combine the objectives of economic growth, 
environmental protection and social cohesion. Developing more sustainable waste 
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management systems has received renewed political interest in the light of scarcity 
of global resources, economic restraints after the global financial and economic 
crisis and acknowledgement of the effect of waste management on the emission of 
ozone depleting gases leading to climate change (Calmin and Gaillochet 2009). 
Over the past few years, these consideration have led to waste being increasingly 
seen as a resource that should be fed back into production and consumption rather 
than discarded, which challenges modern ‘make-use-throw away’ practices (EC 
2011, Corvellec and Hultman 2012).   
 
In many member states, the EU has been a major driver of sustainable 
development in waste management (Campos and Hall 2013). The revised Waste 
Framework Directive (WFD) established the purpose of EU waste regulation as to 
prevent the generation and management of waste from harming the environment 
and human health, refrain from excessive resources use and develop close-loop 
systems for material recycling (EC 2008). The framework also provided a ‘Waste 
Hierarchy’ ranking waste management methods according to environmental 
impact from 1) prevention of waste, 2) preparing for reuse, 3) recycling, 4) 
recovery (for example incineration with energy production) and 5) waste disposal 
(landfill) (ibid, article 4). In line with the waste hierarchy, the EU Landfill 
Directive established binding targets of diverting the amount of bio-degradable 
waste going to landfill to 75% by 2010, 50% by 2013 and 35% by 2020 (EC 
1999), whereas the WFD demanded 1) separate collection of at least paper, metal, 
plastics and glass by 2015, and 2) reuse or recycling of at least 50% of household 
waste by 2020 (EC 2008).  
 
Adding to the pressure from existing targets new policies from the European 
Commission point towards even more demanding targets in the future. The vision 
of a ‘circular economy’ with ‘zero waste’ outlines a broader agenda with waste 
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management not only being about creating ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions for managing 
waste, but also focusing on preventing and minimizing waste production (EC 
2011, EC 2014). Hence, the external landscape pressure for sustainability change 
of waste management practices in member states will most likely only increase in 
the coming years. 
 
Transformations of waste management in England and Denmark 
England has been known as an environmental laggard in a European context and 
continued the practice of literally dumping waste in holes in the ground up until 
the late 1990s. However, within the past 15 years the country has taken a huge 
step towards transforming waste management systems from landfilling towards 
recycling, reuse and recovery. Denmark, on the other hand, has for many years 
been an environmental frontrunner and slowly progressed on recycling from the 
1980s. In the EU comparison of municipal waste though, Denmark now appears to 
be lacking behind some of the best recyclers in Europe, such as Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland (EUROSTAT 2014), and as figure 2 shows, seems to have been 
almost standing still over the past five years. In both countries, waste specific 
measures towards sustainability transformation have coincided with organizational 
reforms towards a greater inclusion of private actors in waste management 
services, which have changed the conditions for local authorities. Table 1 provides 
an overview of waste management in the two cases.  
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Table 1: Waste management in England and Denmark, 20116/2013 
 England Denmark 
Waste production in total 
(2011) 
228 million ton per year 9 million ton per year 
Household waste production 
(2011) 
22,9 million ton 2,4 million ton 
Household waste production 
per capita (2011) 
423kg/person/year 447 kg/person/year  
Treatment of municipal 
waste 
(2013) 
31% landfilling, 24% 
incineration, 43% recycling 
and reuse  
1,5% landfilling, 54% 
incineration and 44% 
recycling and reuse 
Source: DEFRA 2011a, DEFRA 2014a, DEFRA 2013a, EPA 2014b, p. 17, EPA 2014a 
 
England 
England produces around 228 million tons (mt) of waste, whereof 2,9 mt is 
generated by households with 423 kg per person (DEFRA 2011b; 2014a). The EU 
term ‘municipal waste’ has in England been used to describe local authority 
collected waste (LACW), which DEFRA has reported since 2000. Besides 
household waste, LACW also include waste from other sources collected by local 
authorities (DEFRA 2014b). Figure 1 shows the development in the treatment of 
LACW over time. Over the eleven years from 2000 to 2010 England increased 
recycling percentages from 12% to 40%, whereas in the same period reducing 
waste going to landfill from 79% to 43,3% and increasing recovery through 
incineration from 9% to 15,1%. Although the pace of change has slowed down in 
the past years and landfill is still relatively high, England continues to move closer 
                                                          
6 In general 2011 data was used, since more recent data was not accessible for all categories. However, 2013 data was used to describe 
municipal waste treatment to provide the most recent progress towards the EU 2020 targets. 
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to the EU targets. By 2013, 43% LACW was recycled, 31% was landfilled and 
24% incinerated (DEFRA 2014a)7.  
 
Figure 1: The transformation of municipal waste management in England 
over time (percentage/year) 
 
Source: DEFRA 2014a 
 
In England waste management is regulated mainly through the Department of 
Food, Rural Affairs and Agriculture (DEFRA), whereas local authorities (LAs) 
have the statutory responsibility for collection and disposal of municipal waste 
(see Bulkeley et al 2005 for further details). The responsibility of LAs is divided 
between two levels: County Councils (or specific Waste Authorities) are 
responsible for waste disposal as Waste Disposal Authorities (WDAs), whereas 
district or borough councils are responsible for collection as Waste Collection 
Authorities (WCAs). Following critiques of the inefficiency and fragmentation of 
the two-tier system some authorities joined in formal Unitary Authorities (UAs) 
                                                          
7 In 2010 DEFRA aligned definitions of municipal waste with the EU and reported only waste from households as MSW (DEFRA 2011c). This 
calculation method resulted in 44,2% recycling in 2013, which in consequence moves England a little bit closer to the EU 50% recycling target 
(DEFRA 2014b). As this data has only been reported from 2010, this article has kept to LACW to be able to show the development over time in 
English waste management. 
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responsible for both treatment and collection (Slater et al 2007). There are approx. 
273 WCAs, 40 WDAs and 81 UAs (OFT 2006).  
 
Early experiments with incineration and recycling schemes in the 1800’ds were 
abandoned in the 1930’ies in favour of landfilling, which was seen as a cheaper 
and more efficient way of dealing with waste and at the same time filling up holes 
in the ground from the extraction industry (Funch 1995, Davoudi 2000). The 
global focus on sustainability of the 1970s led to some political scrutiny, and 
coincided with emerging local challenges of finding new areas for landfilling as 
the extraction industry retracted. In 1996, the Environmental Agency was 
delegated regulatory responsibility for waste management and began to impose 
stricter environmental criteria for landfills (Davoudi 2000; 2009), and in the 
1990s, the first non-binding targets for recycling were introduced. However, 
England did not engage in serious efforts towards a transformation before  the EU 
Landfill Directive from 1999 added tangible economic pressures on the 
government (Weaver 2005, Bulkeley et al 2007). If the targets of diverting 
biodegradable waste from landfill to 75% of the 1995-level by 2010, 50% by 2013 
and 35% by 2020 would not be met, the UK risked fines up to £180 million by 
2020 (Bulkeley et al 2005). 
 
In 1996, a Landfill Tax Escalator was introduced to increase the costs of 
landfilling over time, which was supported by the Landfill Allowance Trading 
System (LATS) until the escalator reached a high enough level (EEA 2013b). The 
Waste Strategy 2000 included the first binding targets for recycling at least 25% of 
household waste by 2005, 30% by 2010 and 33% by 2013, which was translated 
into statutory local authority targets. In the development of the strategy especially 
the future role of incineration was highly disputed. Whereas the first draft outlined 
a dramatic increase in incineration capacity, press and public protests lead to the 
257 
 
reformulation that incineration was only to be considered, when recycling and 
composting was not possible (Bulkeley et al 2005).  
 
Subsequently, the Waste & Resources Action Programme (WRAP) was 
established to promote sustainable waste systems and develop markets for 
recycled products (wrap.org.uk). An important initiative was also the introduction 
of mandatory (now voluntary) Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategies 
(JMWMS) in 2000/2001 to establish local strategies for reaching government 
targets in coordination between WDAs and WCAs (Bulkeley et al 2005). In 2003 
the New Technologies Demonstrator Programme (NTDP) was established by 
DEFRA to encourage the development of new technologies and  offset the risks of 
demonstrator projects for emerging technologies (Powrie, no date, Bulkeley et al 
2005). In 2006, the Waste Infrastructure Delivery program (WIDP) was 
established to accelerate and support development of local waste infrastructure 
through PFIs (DEFRA 2006, EEA 2013b). 
 
The introduction of waste specific strategies, measures and targets coincided with 
organizational reforms towards greater inclusion of private actors in the 
management of municipal waste. For most of the 20th century, municipal waste 
management services were provided in-house by local authorities (LAs). 
However, in line with the Thatcher government’s focus on privatization, the Local 
Government Act introduced Compulsive Competitive Tendering (CCT) in 1988 to 
allow for private provision of local services. In 1990, the Environment Protection 
Act demanded LAs to either contract out waste disposal services to the private 
sector or place these services in Local Authority Waste Disposal Companies 
(LAWDCs) in ‘arms’ length’ of authorities (Slater et al 1997). With Labour taking 
over government in 1997, CCT was abolished in favour of ‘Best Value’ stating 
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that in principle it did not matter who delivered the service, as long as they 
provided ‘value-for-money’ and high quality for users (Connoly and Wall 2013).   
 
Today, around 50% of waste collection services and almost all treatment services 
are delivered by private businesses, the last mentioned usually in PFIs or PPP 
arrangements (OFT 2006). According to the respondents, and probably linked to 
political history, the choice of contracting out waste collection has been politically 
polarized in the UK with Labour councils tending to keep waste in-house and 
Conservatives contracting out. In comparison, private sector inclusion in waste 
treatment services seems to be a more pragmatic choice, which may be connected 
to the successful separation of LAWCD’s in arm’s length from local authorities, a 
heavy pressure for privatization of these and local authorities being reluctant or 
unable to single-handedly invest in expensive treatment facilities. The market for 
waste management services has undergone a process of internationalization, 
economic growth and vertical integration with a few large multi-nationals 
dominating the market (Davies 2007). Accordingly, this shift towards private 
inclusion has formed the conditions for local authorities’ possibilities for 
organizing sustainability transformation and introducing new waste management 
systems.   
 
Denmark 
Denmark produces around 9 mt of waste per year of which 2,5 mt is household 
waste, but in comparison to England the amount of waste produced by person is 
higher. As Figure 2 shows, a large step change in Denmark took place 
considerably before the English transformation and following a steady increase in 
recycling has taken place8.   
                                                          
8 There was a small decrease in recycling in 2010, which was most likely a technical issue caused by a new waste registration system and the 
privatization of recyclable commercial waste (EEA 2013c). 
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In Denmark waste management is regulated by the Ministry of Environment 
having in practice delegated this responsibility to the Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA, in Danish: Miljøstyrelsen). The 98 Danish 
municipalities have the statutory responsibility for collection and disposal of waste 
and enjoy great freedom to organize these tasks. In general, this has been done 
through the establishment of inter-municipal companies, which finance, deliver 
and operate waste treatment facilities and sometimes also deliver collection 
services (Grønnegaard Christensen 2001). By 2010, 79 municipalities were co-
owners of 21 out of 29 existing incineration plants through publicly owned 
companies (EPA 2010). In contrast to incineration, pre-treatment for recycling is 
often handled by private companies (EPA 2013a). 
 
Figure 2: The transformation of municipal waste management in Denmark 
over time (percentage/year) 
 
Source: EPA 2014a9  
                                                          
9This data is required directly from the Environmental Protection Agency in Denmark and include corrections to the numbers reported to 
EUROSTAT for 2011 and 2012. There is a hole in the data from 1985 to 1995. 
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Main Government initiatives towards landfill diversion and recycling were taken 
before 2001 (EEA 2013c). In 1979, as the first country in the world, Denmark 
introduced a law on reuse of paper and beverage packaging, and in the 1980s the 
first recycling stations were established (Funch 1995). In 1987 the government 
introduced a tax on landfill and incineration to encourage recycling followed by a 
total ban on landfilling of combustible waste in 1997. Between 1985 and 1997 
recycling increased from 21,2% to 30,2%, landfilling decreased from 61% to 12% 
and incineration increased from 17,7% to 57,9% (EPA 2014a). Subsequently, the 
third national Waste Strategy 2005-2008 established the first national target of 
33% recycling of household waste by 2008 (Danish Government 2003).  
 
By 2013, Denmark recycled 44% of MSW, whereas 54% was recovered through 
waste incineration and only 1,5% was landfilled (EPA 2014a). Incineration 
continues to play a dominant role in the Danish waste management systems and 
opposite the English experiences this technology has been broadly accepted in 
Danish society as an efficient and less environmentally damaging way of 
managing waste, which produces cheap energy and heat for Danish households 
(DME 2013). In the 1980s to 1990s incineration plants were connected to local 
district heating systems, and the technology has gradually been improved over 
time in cooperation between the ministry, inter-municipal associations and the 
Danish incineration industry (Kleis and Dalager 2003). Also in recent years, 
Denmark has had a strong focus on technology development in waste. Waste 
became a specific focus area in the government action plan for promotion of eco-
efficient technologies from 2010 (Danish Government 2010a), which secured 
DKK 90 million in 2010-11 for environment technology development and testing 
in waste, water and air. Recently, funding has especially been directed at 
recycling, where the environment technology programme for example has 
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supported better sorting of waste batteries, new methods for organic waste 
treatment and recycling of phosphor from bio-waste (see http://ecoinnovation.dk/). 
 
In consequence of this development, Denmark has not had any problems reaching 
EU landfill diversion targets and has only recently come under pressure from 
recycling targets (EEA 2013c). The EU 2020 recycling target was not 
implemented before the most recent waste strategy ‘Denmark without waste’ from 
September 2013, which established a 50% recycling target for specific types of 
household waste by 2022 (Danish Government 2013). With this strategy, the 
Danish government outlines a ‘second wave’ of sustainability transformation in 
Denmark from incineration towards increasing recycling and reuse. The 
transformation towards increasing recycling may challenge the existing socio-
technical regime, where inter-municipal associations have already been under 
pressure from the government since the late 1990s.  
 
Also in Denmark, there has been a gradual movement towards privatization of 
waste management services. Inter-municipal associations has been criticised for 
non-transparency, lack of incentives for economic efficiency and for fostering 
unequal competition with private waste companies (DCA 1999, Grønnegaard 
Christensen 2001, Madsen 2002, EPA 2010), and by 2007, a coalition of political 
parties introduced benchmarking, new accounting systems and a ‘liberalization’ of 
private recyclables, which in practice meant a private ‘monopoly’ on this waste, 
which had formerly been a part of some municipal collection schemes (DME 
2007). The ministry of environment continue to consider a privatization of waste 
incineration activities (EPA 2014b), but a decision is continuously postponed and 
the question is fiercely disputed in the sector (see for example Dansk 
Affaldsforening 2013).  
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Contracting out was never compulsive in Denmark, but the government has been 
pushing municipalities towards this through voluntary agreements (DCA 2012). 
By 2001, at least 80% of household waste was contracted out to private companies 
increasing from 27% in 1990/91 (Grønnegaard Chistensen 2001, LGDK 1992). 
Whereas the inclusion of private actors in waste treatment is a continuous 
battlefield, liberalization of waste collection services has been less disputed. The 
choice seems to be rather pragmatic and independent of particular political 
leanings in municipalities (Grønnegaard Christensen 2001). However, the process 
has not been completely without controversy. Two of the biggest municipalities, 
Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, fought for years to be able to keep their long-term 
concession contract with the public company R98 (Federspiel 2011). In line with 
England, Danish waste management markets have been increasingly 
professionalised, internationalised and concentrated, but with fewer multi-
nationals entering, which might be linked to the comparably smaller market and 
the lack of possibilities in waste disposal. This context of ongoing organizational 
change provides a degree of insecurity in the waste sector, which may halt new 
developments as regime actors await a decision on their role in a future 
organization of waste management. 
 
Accordingly, in both countries legislative targets and economic incentives have 
been used to drive forward local sustainability change processes in a dialectic 
process between landscape and regime with local experiences, existing practices 
and discourses leading to protest and/or support to government initiatives from 
incumbent regime actors and populations. Whereas the main challenge in England 
has been to provide new infrastructure to build up sustainable waste management 
systems from practically zero, in Denmark the main challenge remains to redirect 
an existing well-functioning system based mainly on waste incineration to include 
more recycling. Recalling the challenges of change in socio-technical regimes, this 
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technological and organizational lock-in might explain why Denmark has only 
changed in baby-steps from the introduction of incineration.  
 
Simultaneous to demands for more sustainable waste management systems, local 
authorities in both countries have been met with government demands for 
inclusion of private actors. As Uyarra and Gee (2012) suggest, the effect of these 
changes may be seen as a more limited power of local authorities to manage 
waste. Public authorities are increasingly dependent on private businesses as waste 
collectors, construction and facility managers, technology producers and outlet 
markets for recyclables.  This increases the need for partnership working in the 
development and implementation of more sustainable waste management 
solutions. Increased private involvement may also be seen as a strengthening of 
public authorities, who may draw on private resources and knowledge without 
relinquishing political control (Grimsey and Lewis 2005). The following sections 
will look at how partnerships have provided new possibilities and challenges for 
sustainability transformation. 
 
Identified PPPs in England and Denmark 
Based on the empirical data from Denmark and England, three main PPP types in 
waste management have been identified across Denmark and England: 1) Policy 
Partnerships, 2) Service Delivery Partnerships and 3) Technology Partnerships. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the PPP types with examples from both countries. 
These PPPs have different purposes in relation to waste management (why), 
involve different organizations and actors (who) and tend to be organized 
differently (how). They also play different roles in the sustainability 
transformations of waste management in Denmark and England and provide 
different possibilities and challenges. 
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Policy Partnerships are typically more loosely coupled networks of actors, where 
the government or another strong organization gathers various public and private 
stakeholders to find specific solutions for the implementation of waste policies 
directed at sustainability change. Service Delivery Partnerships are contract-based 
or joint venture (company) partnerships between local authorities and private 
companies aimed to develop and deliver waste collection services and/or provide 
and operate new waste treatment facilities. Technology Partnerships are typically 
partnerships within a closed group of actors cooperating on the basis of a contract 
or collaborative agreement to develop and test innovative technologies for 
sustainable waste management. The following section will describe the role, 
potential and challenges of these partnerships illustrated by examples. 
 
Table 2: PPP types in municipal waste management with examples from 
England and Denmark 
 Purpose Participants Organization Examples, 
England 
Examples, 
Denmark 
Policy 
Partnership 
Develop
ment and 
or/ 
impleme
ntation 
of policy 
Government 
organization
s, local 
authorities, 
various 
private 
companies, 
knowledge 
institutions, 
facilitator 
organization
s 
Loosely 
coupled 
network of 
various actors 
committing 
to a joint 
purpose 
Partnerships 
initiated or 
supported by the 
Waste and 
Resources 
Action 
Programme 
(WRAP) , such 
as Metal Matters 
and Local Reuse 
Partnerships 
Partnerships 
initiated by the 
EPA , for 
instance on 
incineration 
residue, 
shredder waste 
and mechanical 
sorting plants, 
Resursium, 
Copenhagen 
Cleantech 
Cluster’s 
partnership on 
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plastic waste 
Service 
Delivery 
Partnership 
Develop
ment and 
delivery 
of waste 
infrastru
cture and 
services 
Local 
authorities, 
private 
waste 
managemen
t companies 
Contract-
based or joint 
venture 
organizations 
between one 
or more 
actors 
Waste 
collection:  
RBKC - SITA, 
Trafford 
Council - Veolia  
ES, Manchester 
City -Enterprise 
(JV) 
 
Waste 
infrastructure: 
GMWDA - 
VLGM (JV), 
NLWA (in 
procurement), 
ELWA-Shanks 
 
Waste 
infrastructure 
and collection: 
Shropshire 
Waste 
collection: 
Renosyd - 
Marius 
Pedersen, 
Faurskov 
Forsyning - 
Meldgaard, 
Vestforbrænding 
–  Danish 
private company 
 
Waste 
infrastructure: 
Vejle Waste and 
Recycling (in 
procurement)(J
V) 
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council-Veolia 
ES, Sheffield 
Council - Veolia 
ES, Somerset 
Waste 
Partnership - 
KIER/May 
Gurney/Marks 
and Spencer 
Technology 
Partnership 
Develop
ment and 
testing of 
new 
technolo
gy 
Private 
companies, 
local 
authorities, 
knowledge 
institutions 
Closed group 
of one or 
more actors 
based a 
collaborative 
agreement or 
contract 
Anaerobic 
Digestion 
(Shropshire 
District Council 
- (Biogen) 
Greenfinch), 
Mechanical 
Heat Treatment 
(Merseyside 
WDA - Orchid 
Environmental) 
 
Renescience 
Technology 
(DONG Energy 
- Amager 
Ressource 
Center, etc.), 
hybrid waste 
vehicle 
(Meldgaard – 
Banke -Esbjerg 
Municipality, 
etc.), electronic 
registration 
(Odense 
Renovation - 
Stena 
Recycling) 
JV: Joint venture 
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The role of PPPs in the Sustainability transformation of English waste 
systems 
The PFI approach was born in England and is today the dominant method of 
financing public infrastructure in England. PFIs are used in most areas of public 
service with waste management being among the most important sectors 
(Hellowell 2010). Whereas Labour continued the focus on private inclusion, the 
new government shifted the rhetoric from being one of down-scaling the state in 
favour of the private sector to being one of ‘joint working’ and ‘partnership’ with 
public, private and civil society sector organizations sharing responsibility for 
societal development (Falconer & McLaughling 2000). Partnerships were seen as 
a ‘third way’ of governing, distinct from the centralized, bureaucratic hierarchies 
of ‘Old Labour’ and the market governing by the Conservatives (Glendinning and 
Powell 2002). This partnership turn has also been evident in waste management, 
where partnerships have been used to implement new government policy, deliver 
new waste infrastructure and services and test new technologies. 
 
Policy partnerships  
In line with the central government approach, partnership working was a central 
strategy in the Waste and Resource Action programme (WRAP). WRAP was 
established as a not-for-profit company with funding from DEFRA, EU and the 
devolved administrations with the objective of promoting sustainable development 
by supporting local businesses and authorities in introducing recycling and reuse. 
For this purpose, WRAP has facilitated and supported a number of voluntary 
networks, campaigns and partnerships between private businesses, civil society 
organizations and local authorities (EEA 2013b).  
 
 An example is the ‘Home Improvement Sector Commitment’, a voluntary private 
sector commitment under which home improvement retailers promise to reduce 
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packaging, decrease waste to landfill and help consumers recycle more (WRAP 
2010). WRAP also supported the ‘Metal Matters’ campaign initiated by the 
private industry organizations Beverage Can Makers Europe (BCME), Novelis 
Recycling and Tata Steel. The implementation of the campaign was organized in 
partnerships with local borough councils. A pilot project was carried out in 2010 
in partnership with Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council, WRAP and the 
founders of Metal Matters. The partners succeeded in increasing metal recycling 
by 12,9% in the three weeks following the campaign. During 2012, 28 authorities 
joined the campaign (WRAP, no date a, Metal Matters 2014).  
 
WRAP has also facilitated a number of ‘local reuse partnerships’ in local areas to 
encourage organizations to work together in their local area to increase reuse. An 
example is Buckinghamshire, where WRAP in 2010 assisted Buckinghamshire 
Waste Partnership in reaching its targets for recycling and landfill diversion. This 
led to a new Reuse Forum being established between 5 local authorities, 7 local 
reuse organizations, 3 housing associations and 3 private contractors to share 
information and work together to raise awareness of reuse. WRAP also assisted in 
the design for a new Household Waste Recycling Centres (HWRCs) contract, 
which was designed to provide incentives to increase reuse and include 
cooperation with the community sector. Accordingly, two local reuse shops were 
established at HWRCs in partnership between authorities, the private contractor 
and South Bucks Hospice. According to Waste Prevention Officer Laura 
Silverstone ‘the re-use shops have been a major success, and developing 
relationships with other organizations has been really rewarding’ (cited in 
WRAP, no date b). Between July 2013 and June 2013 more than 45,000 items 
were sold, equating nearly 500 tonnes of material diverted from landfill (ibid.).  
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Whereas economic incentive structures and government targets provide the driver 
to act, WRAP’s partnerships facilitated the implementation of government policy 
by supporting local strategies and actions to increase recycling. WRAP has been 
innovative in mobilizing private production and design companies to engage in the 
prevention of waste, rather than focusing only on traditional end-of-pipe solutions. 
However, whereas the Labour government took an active role in driving forward 
sustainability change, the current conservative Liberal-Conservative coalition 
government has announced a withdrawal from intervening in the sector leaving 
action to the market and local authorities (DEFRA 2013b). The government has 
cut down WRAPs budget to less than half of its former size from £56 million in 
2009/10 to £15,5 million in 2015/16, which means the organization have had to 
reprioritize and close down some activities (RESOURCE 2013, DEFRA 2013c). 
WRAP now considers changing to a charitable organization, which might increase 
funding opportunities, but will also change its platform (WRAP 2014). 
Accordingly, in England policy partnerships have been used to mobilise and 
encourage local authorities, private companies and civil society organizations to 
take action together and develop new solutions. As such, these partnerships have 
the potential to act as translators between policy makers at the landscape level and 
industry, local authorities and civil society organizations at the regime level to 
improve waste collection systems within the existing socio-technical regime, 
although these efforts are currently challenged by reductions in funding and future 
organizational changes.  
 
Service delivery partnerships 
Whereas policy partnerships have been used by the government to mobilise and 
facilitate change processes, service delivery partnerships have the concrete 
purpose of providing waste infrastructure and/or deliver waste collection services 
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in cooperation between local authorities and private providers at the regime level. 
Sustainability targets may be more or less integrated in these contracts. 
 
Waste treatment infrastructure 
In waste infrastructure, the Public Finance Initiative (PFI) model of letting the 
private sector design, build, operate and own public infrastructure facilities in 
long-term 20-35 year contracts was used as the main option to provide new waste 
processing plants. The PFI model was introduced by the former Conservative 
government in 1992, but was reframed as a ‘public-private partnerships’ by ‘New’ 
Labour in 1997 (Hellowell 2010). According to several respondents, a PFI was the 
only affordable possibility for them to provide the required new waste 
infrastructure, as authorities did not have access to this level of funding without 
private co-financing. From the late 1990s DEFRA allocated in total £2 billion PFI 
credits to 32 waste PFI projects (DEFRA 2011a). The programme was closed as 
part of the Spending Review by the new Coalition government in 2010,where the 
government also retracted provisional WIDP funding from seven planned 
infrastructure projects, since it was calculated that the UK would be able to reach 
EU landfill diversion targets without this infrastructure (DEFRA 2010a; 2011d). 
Supported projects included East London Waste Authority (ELWA), Greater 
Manchester Waste Disposal Authority (GMWDA) and Shropshire Waste 
Partnership (now Shropshire Council UA).   
 
In Shropshire a PFI contract provided the possibility for a step change from 
landfilling towards recovery and recycling. The local county council and four 
district councils formed a formal unity, the Shropshire Waste Partnership (SWP), 
to jointly apply for PFI credits to procure a new waste solution10. The authorities 
had realized that ‘change was looming’ and did not have the resources to act 
                                                          
10 In this process, the Shopshire Waste Partnership was changed into Shropshire Unitary authority including to other councils as well. 
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independently. According to Shropshire Council, “the PFI route was at that time 
the only affordable route for the authority to achieve the targets, which we had to 
achieve, set by the Government” (Shropshire interview). The project received 
government funding and signed a 27-year combined disposal and collection 
contract with Veolia ES in September 2007. The contract also included a target to 
increase recycling above 50% in 2012 and reduce landfill from 65% in 2005/6 to 
5% in 2015 (Veolia 2008). In 2010, the recycling rate crossed 50% for the first 
time (Shropshire News 2013).  
 
The PFI in Shropshire is an output-based contract measured by a number of key 
performance indicators (KPIs) to provide incentives for the contractor to increase 
recycling. However, some of the early PFIs in the 1990s-early 2000s were less 
geared towards sustainability. The current situation for those contracts shows the 
potential hazard for local authorities of committing to long-term contracts. EU 
procurement rules do not permit authorities to substantially change a contract 
within the contract period. This became a challenge in for example East London.  
 
The East London Waste Authority (ELWA) had signed an innovative 25-year PFI 
contract in 2002/3 and was one of the first authorities in England to implement 
Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) technology. The contract also had a 
recycling target of 25%, which was ambitious at that time. Nonetheless, as 
political demands for recycling increased, it became clear that the contract was not 
designed to further increase recycling:  
“When we started looking at procurements in the 1990s, for us the driver was to 
keep waste out of landfill, because landfill tax was becoming more expensive. […] 
Recycling was just added in the backend, so the incentive payments in the contract 
do not encourage the contractor to increase recycling. We now want to recycle 
more, but we are not incentivizing the contractor to do so, and the infrastructure 
does not allow them to either” (ELWA  interview).  
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As such, as objectives changed over time, ELWA became locked in to a contract 
that no longer fulfilled their needs. 
  
According to respondents, PFIs facilitated the implementation and improvement 
of well-known technology in new contexts, but were more rarely used to 
implement or test new technologies. Whereas ELWAs contract imported 
innovative technology from Italy to England, most PFI contracts delivered what 
respondents referred to as ‘bankable’ technology, such as incineration, whereas 
more innovative technologies such as Anaerobic Digestion (AD), gasification and 
to some degree MBT was considered more high-risk and consequently was harder 
to secure funding for. As PFIs typically transfer technology responsibility to the 
contractor, a bank lending money to a PFI project will lean towards secure 
investments in tried and tested technology, since ‘if the contractor does not get 
paid, then the bank does not get its debt paid back’ (consultant interview).  
 
The PFI in Greater Manchester is generally perceived as one of the more 
innovative projects. The Disposal Authority strongly signalled to the market that 
they were looking for an innovative solution focusing on recycling. They chose a 
more expensive, but more sustainable and flexible solution integrating various 
technologies, which was all tested and proven, but considered innovative at this 
large scale. Nonetheless, the most innovative aspect of the Greater Manchester 
contract may not be the technology, but rather the organization of the partnership. 
In cooperation with its contractor, Greater Manchester solved one of the main 
challenges of MBT, namely to secure an outlet for the residual product, a Refuse 
Derived Fuel (RDF). The contractor engaged the private chemical production 
company Ineos Chlor as a third partner to use the RDF to provide energy for a 
chlorine producing plant in Runcorn. The contract reached 41% recycling in 
2013/14 (GMWDA 2014). However, the process had not been without challenges, 
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and the authority had to work hard first to convince the market to deliver 
something more innovative and second to convince the nine WCAs to align their 
various collection methods to feed into the new infrastructure system (GMWDA 
interview).  
 
As mentioned before, PFIs have been criticised for not being ‘genuine’ 
partnerships in the sense of having equal, long term relationships built on mutual 
trust and jointly developed objectives (Klijn and Teisman 2005, Wettenhall 2005). 
In the identified cases, most public and private managers described that PFIs were 
contracts and based on hard-nosed negotiations, but also that partnership working 
was needed to make cooperation work in practice after signing the contract. In 
Shropshire, the cooperation was backed by a 50-50 sharing mechanism to secure 
both partners a benefit from introducing efficiencies and public and private 
managers expressed trust towards each other. The private manager was described 
as ‘really good’ and ‘a numbers guy’, and as one of the public managers said, 
‘he’s an honest person by nature, and I think we benefit from that’ (Shropshire 
interview). The partnership was tested, when public resistance to a household 
recycling centre at Bridgnorth prolonged the planning process, but as the 
contractor described ‘it was a tough time, both partners were working together, so 
when things were close to actually being fulfilled, you don’t start saying ‘the 
timescale is not right’ – you find a way’ ( Veolia ES interview). 
 
In contrast, the NLWA expected to change from a 50-50 shared joint venture with 
a private contractor into a more strict contractual relationship in a new PFI-
contract directed at an MBT solution. A respondent from the authority did not 
necessarily expect a ‘warm and fuzzy’ relationship with a coming contractor, since 
there is a lot at stake in these contracts, although ‘the individuals in it, if it is going 
well, can make it feel like partnership, and you can have a willingness, with some 
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companies more than others, to explore improvements’ (NLWA Interview). This 
PPP project was however, ended by September 2013, when a change in planning 
policy provided a possibility for pursuing a new combined heat and power facility. 
The authority is currently pursuing this option and has prolonged the contract with 
the former joint venture company, which in the process has been fully procured by 
the authority. All in all, experiences from waste management show that a well-
designed contract combined with efforts of the people involved may allow PFIs to 
evolve into a partnership-like relationship, where challenges in sustainability 
transformation processes are solved jointly and the lack of flexibility can be 
resolved along the way as situations change or new ideas arrive. 
 
Whereas PFI contracts have played an important role in providing waste 
infrastructure, there appears to be a general tendency of moving away from these 
large scale integrated contracts and towards smaller, stand-alone procurements 
(Hogg 2014). Blackburn with Darwen UA decided not to join an integrated PFI 
contract with Lancashire Waste Partnership, because they felt too many factors 
would be outside of their control, whereas the signals from the market was that 
single procurement would save them money (Blackburn with Darwen interview). 
The PFI system may in general be criticized for neglecting smaller recycling 
initiatives in favour of large scale infrastructure facilities for recovery, which lock 
in local authorities in long term contracts (Slater et al 2007, Uyarra and Gee 
2012). On the other hand, PFIs not only secured private funding and expertise, but 
also delivered coordinated, comprehensive transformations of socio-technical 
regimes in local areas, and as such was a solution at a time when funding was low 
and action severely needed. 
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Waste collection services 
In contrast to PFIs, waste collection contracts tend to be more short term. The 
contracts are on average seven years, corresponding to the smaller investments 
involved, primarily in vehicles (OFT 2006). A main change in WCAs has been the 
introduction of separate or co-mingled collection systems to allow recycling. 
Whereas these solutions are more expensive than collecting single stream residual 
waste, increasing landfill taxes began to make the change worthwhile for local 
authorities. In some WCAs, ‘partnering contracts’ and joint ventures have 
replaced traditional contracts for waste collection, with the objective of increasing 
the flexibility to innovate and deliver improvements in a closer working 
relationship between public authorities and private companies (DCLG 2006).  
 
An often mentioned example of a ‘genuine’ partnership in waste collection, is the 
16-years partnering contract for waste collection and street cleansing between the 
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Sita UK Ltd. Prior to the 
contract, the RBKC was under considerable pressure from statutory demands to 
increase recycling to 22% by 2003/4 and 33% by 2005, whereas the borough had 
struggled to deliver an increase to 16,5% by 2003/4 (RBKC 2004). As such RBKC 
aimed to find a contractor willing to work continuously with the council to 
improve recycling, while keeping the service quality high (Letsrecycle.com 2005).  
The contract included a partnership charter committing the parties to work 
‘cooperatively in partnership’ with joint steering groups and innovation forums 
and ‘open book’ accounting with profit sharing (RBKC 2005/2011).  
 
According to the public and private managers involved, the close and trust-based 
relationship in this contract made it easier to implement changes. For example, 
when the council needed cost savings and considered cutting services, the private 
contractor managed to develop a cheaper and more efficient system that did not 
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jeopardize recycling. As the contractor said: “We were able to make that change, 
because there was trust. We understood what the borough wanted, and they were 
talking openly to us about it and made sure we had everything we needed to make 
the change” (SITA UK interview). By 2011, the partners had increased recycling 
to 30% (RBKC 2014). 
 
In another English Local Authority they were preparing a new contract, where 
they expected flexibility to be key: “One of the things that are crucial this time is 
flexibility. Flexibility, to be able to adapt to all those different things that are 
coming in our direction. We don’t know what customer expectations are going to 
be in the future, but I think they are going to be even higher. Recycling is likely to 
be more prominent in the future. Finances are likely to be less. How do you juggle 
all that?” The Borough had a good working relationship with their current 
contractor and was looking for the ‘same kind of thinking’ in a new contract, but 
as the respondent asked: “How do you write a good relationship into a contract? I 
don’t know if you can. If you have any good ideas let me know.” (English Local 
Authority interview). 
 
Accordingly, partnering contracts in waste collection seem to ease implementation 
of new solutions and efficiencies in the contrast period and thereby better enable 
the development towards more sustainable waste management systems. However, 
as for PFIs there is no guarantee for authorities that a partnering contract will 
actually deliver a partnership relationship. Despite general positive experiences, 
there seems to be relatively few of these close-knit partnerships in England.  
 
Technology partnerships  
Whereas new solutions may be more or less the objective of service delivery 
partnerships, a few identified public-private partnerships in England also directly 
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focused on development and testing of new technologies.  The New Technologies 
Demonstrator Programme (NTDP) was established in 2003 by DEFRA to 
“encourage the development of new technologies for the recovery of value and the 
diversion of BMW away from landfill, by supporting the construction and 
operation of new facilities to explore the viability of a particular technology or 
process” (Powrie, no date). In the program ten projects were granted support, 
whereof two were arranged as local partnerships: ‘Biocycle South Shropshire’ and 
‘Merceyside WDA/Orchid Environmental’. The programme was closed down by 
the end of 2009 (DEFRA 2010b). 
 
‘Biocycle South Shropshire’ was organised as a partnership between South 
Shropshire District Council (SSDC - now part of Shropshire UA) and Greenfinch 
Ltd (now Biogen Greenfinch Ltd) to demonstrate treatment of biodegradable 
waste by Anaerobic Digestion as the first plant in England. Greenfinch provided 
the technology, whereas the council provided a site and initiated the application 
for additional funding (LGA 2015). In total £3,55million was invested in the 
project through funding from DEFRA and Advantage West Midlands with 
additional funding from WRAP to establish a new food waste collection. The 
evaluation report pointed to learnings on feedstock composition and odour control 
and increased familiarity with the technology (DEFRA, no date a). The plant was 
in operation for six years until it was closed down in 2012 (Shropshire 2012). 
Likewise, Merseyside WDA and Orchid Environmental tested Mechanical Heat 
Treatment (MHT) and led to the establishment of two commercial large-scale 
plants (DEFRA, no date b, letsrecycle.com 2011) 
 
Technology partnerships provided ‘incubation rooms’ for development and testing 
new technologies for waste treatment, but in line with the arguments of urban 
scholars, rather than being external to the existing regime, incumbent regime 
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actors participated actively in experimenting with new technologies. These 
technologies were not seen as a threat to regimes, but rather as a possibility to 
improve existing local waste management systems.  
 
Summarizing the English case, policy partnerships have been used as a central 
strategic instrument by the government organization WRAP taking an active role 
in mobilising, engaging and supporting incumbent actors to deliver sustainability 
innovation in various local contexts. The Labour government also supported the 
use of service delivery partnerships to provide necessary new infrastructure and a 
more flexible approach to waste collection services to allow transformations and 
provided funding opportunities for two technology partnerships between private 
industry and local authorities developing and testing new sustainable waste 
treatment technology. As such, partnerships have played a prominent role in the 
English sustainability transformation of waste management, although especially 
PFIs are contested as policy instruments and the inclusion of private actors in 
waste collection remains politically disputed. However, in the future PPPs may 
play a smaller role with the new government retracting from waste initiatives. 
 
The role of PPPs in the sustainability transformation of Danish waste systems 
In Denmark, the PPP term has been linked closely to the British PFI contract 
model. In the state unit Udbudsportalen’s guide on public-private cooperation, a 
PPP is defined as a PFI-like infrastructure contract, compared to for instance a 
public-private company (joint venture) or service partnership 
(LGDK/Udbudsportalen 2010). PFI-type PPPs have never had a great 
breakthrough in Denmark, and as Petersen (2011) concludes: “Denmark’s strong 
public finances and well-built infrastructure made private finance through the 
PPP model largely redundant” (Petersen 2011, p.25). However, PPPs seem to 
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gain increasing interest in Denmark. A recent government report lists 14 Danish 
PPP projects with 15 in the pipeline and reported good results (DCCA 2012).  
 
Even though service delivery PPPs are new in a Danish context, partnerships with 
the private sector in a broader sense have deep roots in the Danish corporatist 
tradition and consensus-orientated society (Greve and Mörth 2010). A partnership 
approach to policy-making and sustainable development was emphasised by the 
Danish Social Democratic-led coalition government coming into power in 2011, 
which for example stated that “There is a need for new solutions. And they are to 
be developed through dialogue, partnerships and broad cooperation” (Danish 
Government 2011). This approach has also been evident in recent waste 
management policies (Danish Government 2013, EPA 2014b). 
 
Policy partnerships 
The government action plan for promotion of eco-efficient technologies from 
2010 launched a range of new partnerships to promote knowledge development 
and targeted action to solve environmental challenges. In the action plan, 
partnership is understood as ‘formalized cooperation to create synergies between 
knowledge institutions, private companies,  government authorities and users to 
develop efficient, cheap and fast solutions on environmental challenges’ and thus 
outlining a more networked structured partnership type (Danish Government 
2010a, p.30). In line with this, the Waste Strategy ’10 outlined the establishment 
of new partnerships within ‘specifically challenged areas’ (Danish Government 
2010b, p.25). The Danish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the 
first partnership on shredder waste in fall 2011 (a mixed waste type that is 
currently landfilled).  
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The shredder partnership was financed by the EPA, facilitated by external 
consultants and led by a steering group including representatives from the EPA, 
Danish Industry (DI), the Danish Technical University (DTU), the interest 
organization AffaldDanmark and the municipal company Reno Djurs I/S. The 
main objective was to provide a platform to gather relevant actors and inspire to 
further cooperation on the development of new solutions to extract resources from 
shredder waste. The partnership produced in the first year an overview of the 
legislative framework and current technological possibilities and provided a range 
of suggestions for next steps (EPA 2013b). However, in line with conclusions 
from a general evaluation of partnerships from 2013, the partnership did not lead 
to specific development of new technologies or technology clusters, as most actors 
already know each other well, but rather provided the ground for improved 
regulation or future directions of technology development (EPA 2013c).  
 
The most recent Waste Strategy from 2013 continued the partnership strategy and 
launched a partnership with Zealand and Mid Jutland Regions to investigate the 
possibilities for establishing a pilot plant to demonstrate mechanical sorting of dry 
waste as a means to take the next steps towards recycling (Danish Government 
2013, DAKOFA 2014). The project provided new knowledge on the legal and 
technical issues, where a main question was whether these plants should be 
publicly provided, privately provided or provided in public-private partnership 
(EPA 2014c). As such, the government has played an active role in driving 
forward mechanical sorting and partnerships for infrastructure, and interestingly, 
in this case took a more hands-on approach to the provision of waste 
infrastructure, rather than trusting the market or municipalities to provide this. 
However, the implementation of mechanical sorting plants remains dependent on 
procurement decisions in municipalities, municipal companies and/or private 
companies, and as such, the partnership approach can only take a solution so far.  
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Although policy partnerships might be new in their current form, the partnership 
approach to innovation is not new. From the beginning of the 1990s, 
Vestforbrænding I/S, the largest publicly owned company in Denmark, 
participated in a series of projects with the EPA to develop more sustainable 
solutions for incineration residual, which also tended to involve other large actors 
in the sector. According to Vestforbrænding, these collaborations were open and 
informal, but over time they became continuously more formalized with legal 
partnership agreements (Vestforbrænding interview). Through these partnerships, 
the resourceful publicly owned companies have played a central role in driving 
forward technology innovation in Denmark in cooperation with authorities, 
knowledge institutions and private companies.  
 
Today, multiple organizations in Denmark facilitate these kinds of partnerships 
often supported by public funding and with more or less obligation for the 
involved organizations to contribute to actual technology development (see for 
example inno-mt.dk). Recently, CLEAN, a Copenhagen-based cleantech cluster 
has joined the scene, facilitating for example a partnership on new solutions for 
plastic waste engaging multiple actors to develop a joint procurement for a 
mechanical sorting plant for plastic waste (Clean 2015). 
  
Accordingly, in Denmark more loosely organised policy partnerships has been 
used both by the government and other facilitating organisations and, especially in 
the past, more bottom-up from incumbent actors to mobilise and engage a range of 
actors to solve specific issues related to a transformation towards more sustainable 
waste and resources management. The government may use these types of 
partnerships to facilitate change processes and gather relevant actors to discuss 
problems and solutions, but experiences also show that the government is 
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dependent on local authorities, publicly owned companies, private actors and 
various knowledge institutions to identify and implement solutions in practice. It 
seems the Danish tradition for collaborative innovation continues and is enforced 
with the increased focus on resources. 
 
Service delivery partnerships 
Whereas policy partnerships tends to have a national development perspective, 
service delivery partnerships in local contexts have also begin to emerge, partly in 
relation to infrastructure provision, which the government has pushed for, and 
with several cases in waste collection.  
 
Waste treatment infrastructure 
Whereas the government project on mechanical sorting is presented as an 
innovative ‘pilot’ plant, a local authoritive, Vejle Municipality, has over the past 
years developed a project on mechanical sorting delivered in a PPP. In July 2013, 
Vejle Municipality issued a tender for a public-private joint venture to deliver a 
new ‘resource centre’ including the construction, part finance, and operation of a 
modern mechanical sorting plant to manage biodegradable waste, residual and pre-
sorted dry recyclables, a new household recycling station and adjacent buildings 
and services (such as administrative offices, a transfer station, etc.). The contract 
was to be procured through competitive dialogue (udbud.dk 2013), which in itself 
is innovative in a Danish context, where traditional procurement processes has 
been the norm. 
 
Before the procurement process, Vejle Municipality engaged in an  ‘innovation 
partnership’ with the private company Marius Pedersen A/S. Innovation 
partnerships is a Danish model for public-private cooperation, where an innovative 
solution with commercial potential is developed in cooperation between one or 
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more public and private organizations (Brogaard and Petersen 2014). In this case, 
the purpose was to discuss potential organizational forms, rather than a specific 
technical solution (Rønne & Lundgren 2013). A main objective in the Vejle 
contract was to move beyond the traditional adversarial form of contracting in 
waste management services and find a more collaborative approach. As a 
respondent from Vejle Municipality asked: “Why does a contract need to be an 
order to do this or that for the lowest price, and then people are in war with each 
other for the rest of the time? The best thing for both parties would be to find win-
win solutions” (Vejle Municipality interview).  
 
The identified win-win solution was that the new resource centre should be able to 
treat both household and commercial recyclable waste and thereby provide extra 
business opportunities for the private company. Unfortunately, Vejle’s legal 
advisor was countered by the state attorney, who in a declaration stated that 
including a private company in a joint venture did not justify treating recyclable 
waste from private industry, as this by law was only to be treated by private 
companies (Kammeradvokaten 2014). This statement, which came during the 
procurement process, has halted the procurement. In consequence, the future of 
Vejle’s joint venture resource centre and infrastructure partnerships in Danish 
waste management in general remains insecure. 
 
Waste collection services 
The conditions of an ‘almost war’ between public and private companies 
described by Vejle stems from experiences with waste collection contracts. In 
Denmark, waste collection contracts are relatively short term, typically 4 years, 
sometimes with the possibility of 1-2 years extension. In the interviews, both 
public authorities and private waste companies described a development towards 
increasingly adversarial relationships, where increasing competition had led some 
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private companies to bid very low and then attempt to gain extra money from the 
contract afterwards. In consequence, public authorities wrote continuously more 
specified contracts, thus in effect binding both parties to a stiff contract and 
preventing new ideas from the private sector to enter into these contracts.  
 
To break this pattern, a number of municipalities and publicly owned companies 
have experienced with ‘service partnerships’ as a new form of contracting out. For 
example Renosyd I/S decided to try a ‘service partnership’ based on disappointing 
experiences with a former contract:  
“We had a traditional contract with retribution and controlling systems, which did 
not go well.[…] We experienced a number of deficiencies, probably because 
they[the private company] had bid too low and could not live up to their own 
expectations. But when we were done criticising each other, […] we realised, that 
they only did what our contract asked them to. The contract did not focus on 
delivering good quality services for citizens, but only on moving waste from A to 
B. And that was not good enough” (Renosyd interview).  
 
The new contract was designed to incentivise gradual improvements and allow a 
change in collection services to introduce a new split-bin for packaging waste and 
a new electronic registration system. Both public and private partner expressed 
content with this new form of cooperation.  
 
However, it is not necessarily always easy to implement new forms of contracting. 
The publicly owned company Vestforbrænding pioneered this kind of contract in 
waste transportation, but whereas Vestforbrænding saw a good start with the 
partners building trust and the private company bringing in new ideas, they 
experienced conflicting interest in the operational phase. The partnership was 
completed, but without the expected positive results. As the cooperation ceased, 
both companies experienced reduced trust in the opposite part. As such, procuring 
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a partnership contract is no guarantee for ‘genuine’ partnership to develop 
between the partners.  
 
In Denmark, service delivery partnerships in waste collection have been used to 
improve the possibilities of implementing new solutions to increase recycling, 
service quality and efficiency within contracts. Service partnerships might be a 
step on the way towards closer public-private collaboration on waste management, 
but it is still a new procurement form. As one of the private businesses 
commented: “I believe that everyone starting on this is a bit fumbling, trying to 
figure out how to do this and what could be developed in these partnerships. And I 
don’t believe the limits for collaboration has been challenged yet” (Danish private 
contractor interview).  
 
In both waste infrastructure and services, these service delivery partnerships have 
shown potential for establishing collaborative relationships between incumbent 
regime actors and potentially implementing innovative technology and 
organizational forms in a Danish context. However, there continue to be 
legislative challenges for partnerships and perhaps also challenges in the mind sets 
of incumbent regime actors, who need to adjust to new ways of thinking and 
organizing waste. 
 
Technology partnerships 
Supplementing the policy partnerships gathering actors and knowledge to develop 
new solutions and service delivery partnerships implementing new technologies 
and forms of organizing, there are also a range of technology partnerships in 
Denmark, which from the outskirt of socio-technical regimes develop and test new 
technical solutions. These are typically organized in closed groups of actors, 
where private partners are included because of specific competences and know 
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how, and public partners because of their knowledge of and access to municipal 
waste. Typically, all partners invest in the project and share involved risks. 
Projects are often supported by government funding, for example through the 
before mentioned environment technology programme.  
 
The most high profile technology partnership is probably REnescience. 
REnescience is anchored in the majority state-owned energy company DONG 
Energy with a test facility placed at Amager Resource Centre. The REnescience 
technology treats unsorted residual waste with enzymes converting biodegradable 
waste into a bio-liquid and separating dry recyclables. Compared to incineration, 
the aim is to increase the use of various resources in waste. As such, this new 
technology may become a competitor to existing incineration technology and 
other forms of treating residual waste, and it may also make redundant household 
sorting of waste, which has been the tradition in Denmark. As a respondent from 
Dong Energy explains: “We have the tagline ‘value from waste’, […] and I can 
sincerely say that with this technology and the focus on it from DONG, we take 
that seriously. […] We believe that a lot of resources are lost, when it [waste] is 
simply lit on fire.” (DONG Energy interview) 
 
The technology was developed and tested in partnership with public and private 
actors and knowledge institutions and was partly funded by Energinet.dk and the 
Danish Energy Agency’s Development and Demonstration Programme (DONG 
Energy 2012). DONG would like the first full scale plant to be built in Denmark, 
but the technology is likely to have a global outreach, and DONG has also been in 
contact with potential customers in countries such as England, China and the USA 
and engaged with a partner in Abu Dhabi to spread the technology to the Middle 
East.  DONG expected the first full scale plant to be implemented in 2015 
cooperation with Fredericia, Kolding and Middelfart municipalities (FiB 2014), 
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but is experiencing some technical challenges. It may also be questioned, if 
REnescience is actually a partnership. Several respondents refer to it as a ‘DONG’ 
project, rather than a partnership. 
 
In waste collection, many traditional contracts in Denmark include the possibility 
for testing technologies such as hybrid/electrical or gas driven vehicles for waste 
collection. According to the respondents, hybrid vehicles with electric 
compressors are increasingly in demand in municipal procurements. One of these 
vehicle types was developed in a technology partnership. The project was initiated 
by the small start-up Banke Assessory Drives, who got the idea to the electric 
driven compactor that distinguishes the vehicle. The partnership was facilitated by 
the Lean Energy Cluster in Southern Denmark (now part of ‘CLEAN’) with 11 
partner organizations, including Esbjerg Municipality and their private waste 
collector and financially supported by Syddansk Vækstforum (Berlingske 
Business 2012, Meldgaard interview). In contrast, technology partnerships may 
also be smaller groups, such as the cooperation between Odense Municipality and 
Stena Recycling to develop a more efficient and safe electronic registration system 
for hazardous waste, which was, however, halted by a lack of finance (Stena 
Recycling interview).  
 
As such, although these partnerships develop and test new technologies in the 
outskirts of regimes in financed ‘incubation rooms’, incumbent regime actors tend 
to be included as partners. Technology partnerships, therefore, provide a link 
between idea development and technical skills in niches and incumbent regime 
actor’s knowhow on problems and possibilities in waste management. However, it 
may be questioned whether these co-innovation projects are ‘genuine’ 
partnerships. 
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Summarizing the Danish case, the government has emphasised partnerships as a 
policy instrument for tackling the sustainability challenge and given partnerships a 
prominent role in efforts of transforming Danish waste systems from incineration 
towards increasing recycling and prevention.  The government also suggested PFI-
style partnerships to combine public and private resources and skills in the 
provision of new mechanical sorting plants, but the future of these remains 
insecure, whereas also a local initiative in Vejle was stalled by legislative 
difficulties. In waste collection, service partnership seems to be spreading as a 
way of overcoming adversarial relationships, but the potential for co-production of 
innovation in these partnerships might not yet be fully exploited. More radical 
innovations seems to be developed in large or smaller technology partnerships, 
where incumbent regime actors play an active role in driving forward change and 
producing solutions that are fitted to the waste management sector. The role of 
partnerships in future waste management systems depends on choices in various 
actor groups. 
 
The potential of PPPs in sustainability transformation processes 
The analysis showed that PPPs clearly contribute to sustainability change and 
transformation of municipal waste management in England and Denmark, 
although there are also challenges connected to different PPP types. The three 
identified partnerships showed potential for supporting sustainability innovation 
and change by joining actors in policy development and implementation, securing 
implementation of new solutions in local waste infrastructure and providing 
flexibility for continuous search for improvements and efficiencies in contract 
periods, or act as incubation rooms for new technologies.  Table 3 summarizes the 
various roles and potentials of sustainability change with national variations.  
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Table 3: The role of PPPs in sustainability change of waste management in 
Denmark and England 
 Role of PPPs in sustainability change Scope and scale for sustainability 
change 
England Denmark England Denmark 
Policy 
partnerships 
Facilitate local 
partnership 
working to 
develop and 
implement local 
solutions 
Facilitate 
development of 
new solutions to 
specific national 
challenges 
System redesign 
or optimization 
(national/local) 
System redesign 
or transformation 
(national) 
Service 
delivery 
partnerships 
Deliver waste 
infrastructure with 
private finance, 
competences and 
knowhow, 
improve flexibility 
for incremental 
improvements and 
service changes in 
collection 
contracts and joint 
ventures 
 
Little role in waste 
infrastructure, but 
may facilitate 
public-private 
cooperation in the 
future, 
improve flexibility 
for incremental 
improvements and 
service changes in 
collection 
contracts 
System 
transformation, 
redesign or 
optimization 
(local) 
System 
transformation, 
redesign or 
optimization  
(local) 
Technology 
partnerships 
Further 
development and 
market maturity of 
new technologies 
Development and 
testing of new 
technologies 
System redesign 
or optimization 
(global/national) 
System 
transformation, 
redesign or 
optimization 
(global/ national) 
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Policy Partnerships are initiated by government organizations at the landscape 
level to facilitate the development of national or local solutions to implement 
government waste and resources policies in dialogue with incumbent local actors, 
niche technology developers and knowledge institutions.  Whereas in England 
these partnerships are used to encourage and facilitate transformation processes or 
improvements in specific local contexts, in Denmark the government focuses on 
developing new technological or organizational solutions to solve national 
challenges. 
 
Service Delivery Partnerships are initiated by local authorities to deliver new 
waste treatment facilities or waste collection services in cooperation with private 
waste management companies. These partnerships have the potential for creating 
local systems transformations or redesign existing systems or finding ways of 
optimizing current practices.  Although these contracts may bring new 
technologies from one local waste management systems to another or even test or 
implement new technology matured in niches and fitted to local needs, they are 
perhaps mostly innovative in developing new forms of organizing service 
delivery.  
 
Technology Partnerships are closed groups of organizations and actors, which 
provide a framework for interaction between regime actors and technology 
providers with different competencies and skills to develop and test new 
technologies and/or lead technologies closer to market maturity and sale at 
national or perhaps even global markets.  
 
Whereas the contributions from these various partnerships may be analytically 
separated, an even more interesting observation may be how they seem to 
supplement each other as they contribute to linking actors and solutions at various 
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levels in the multi-level framework. Whereas partnership may be based mainly on 
one of the three levels, all partnership types seems to include organizations across 
landscape, regime and niches, when innovating. Policy partnerships are based on 
the landscape level, but initiate interaction with and in between regime actors and 
niches. Service delivery partnerships are based at the regime level, but are clearly 
supported by governments at the landscape level and may reach out to technology 
niches when searching for improved solutions. Technology partnerships are based 
at the niche level, but usually include and may even be initiated by regime actors 
and often depend on government funding. As such, these partnerships may be 
interlinked in various ways to foster sustainability transformation. The next 
section will show this interlinkage in the two cases and discuss how the future of 
PPPs will be affected by strategic choices in different social groups.  
 
Strategies for governing sustainability transformations 
In England, the government chose a very hands-on strategy towards the 
sustainability challenge after a few years of softer policy measures and non-
binding targets, which was driven mainly by economic concerns of the 
consequences of not meeting EU targets. The government established statutory 
targets for local authorities supplemented by strong economic incentives for 
changing from landfilling to recovery and recycling and the possibility of 
achieving PFI finance for the necessary infrastructure. Whereas the PFI systems 
secured new waste treatment facilities (approved by the government), the 
development of markets for the recycled material from new collection systems 
was tackled by WRAP along with support for redesign of local authority systems 
to achieve the new targets.  
 
The changing targets and new demands for waste collection in separate streams 
have led some WCAs to search for new ways of contracting that improved the 
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flexibility for making changes and at the same time kept low costs. Despite 
positive experiences with partnering, many English authorities continue to have 
in-house waste collection and the question of private inclusion remains politically 
anchored in Labour versus Conservative dominated authorities. As such, local 
authorities may miss out on opportunities for private input and ideas. On the other 
hand, according to most respondent the majority of drive towards change comes 
from public authorities. The labour government also supported technology 
development in treatment methods alternative to incineration, which was used to 
improve local systems. Altogether, this led to the fastest sustainability 
transformation of waste management in Europe, which the government was able 
to control to a considerable degree through these measures and PPP support 
systems.  
 
Compared to the current challenge in Denmark, England had the advantage of 
being able to build up a new system from almost zero, rather than trying to alter an 
existing infrastructure system with sunk costs, vested interests, etc. It was logical 
to involve large private companies in this work to attract competencies in these 
new technologies and integrated waste systems. The focus on involving private 
actors in local service delivery had continued from the conservative government 
over to Labours’ modernizing agenda and has led to one of the most evolved 
support systems for PPPs in Europe (Connoly and Wall 2013, Verhoest et al 
2015).  Whereas some local authorities such as Greater Manchester was supported 
by the government in managing these complex, large scale projects, it has in the 
end been up to local authorities to make PPPs work in practice. The future will 
show, whether sufficient flexibility has been built into PFI arrangements or if 
England in a few years will face a lock-in situation comparable to the one in 
Denmark. 
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Furthermore, the focus on waste policies seemed to decrease with the UK Liberal-
Conservative coalition government that entered into power in 2010. With this 
development combined with deep economic cuts in the budgets of local 
authorities, the sustainability transformation of waste management systems in 
England may experience a halt or even a fall-back. Ironically, this retreat by 
government may lead to less partnership between public and private actors. It may 
also mean that a further development of waste management will be more 
decentralised and dependent on local regime actors’ willingness to move forward. 
 
In Denmark, regulation and economic incentives for sustainability change was 
established more than a decade before the English government began to take 
action. Municipalities have had great autonomy to design local systems, where 
inter-municipally provided incineration with some added recycling became the 
dominant solution. In the current change process, policy partnerships have been 
used not only to develop solutions, but also in attempts to bridge interest conflicts 
in regimes and find common ground for new solutions. The government has set an 
ambitious national recycling target, but not applied statutory targets on 
municipalities. It remains to be seen if this more hands-off approach will work or 
the government will need to apply harder measures after the review of the resource 
strategy in 2016 to prevent this former frontrunner to face not reaching EU targets. 
Although it clashes with the Danish consensus culture, it might be important to 
remember that there are genuine interest conflicts in play.  
The analysis showed that incumbent regime actors played an active role in the 
reconfiguration of the Danish waste management system including in partnerships 
for development and testing new technologies. However, whereas Geels and 
Kemp (2007) suggested that in sustainability transformation processes (in contrast 
to transition processes) ‘the survival of incumbent regime actors is not threatened, 
and they are the ones to enact the redirection of the development trajectory of the 
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existing system’ (p. 445), this article suggests a slightly more complex reality. In 
the Danish waste management sector it seems that main incumbent regime actors, 
municipalities and publicly owned companies, are actually threatened to some 
degree by the transformation from incineration towards recycling and prevention. 
When participating in transformation processes these actors might be preparing for 
their own ‘creative destruction’. Nonetheless, it might be a better strategy for 
incumbent regime actors to play along in for the time being inevitable 
transformation processes and reinvent themselves in new roles rather than 
contesting change. 
 
Municipalities and especially publicly owned companies have invested in and 
organized their systems around incineration, but may see a future potential in new 
mechanical recycling plants to answer political demands for recycling. Economies 
of scale from mixing municipal and commercial waste may tempt them to partner 
with private actors, but most likely if the current regulations are changed to allow 
joint venture companies, where municipalities may have the increased flexibility 
and influence from shared ownership. Otherwise, the safe model of municipal 
provision and full control may continue to be preferred locally. In contrast, private 
actors which currently have the monopoly on collecting and treating commercial 
waste might have less interest in changing this condition, but may realize that they 
risk missing out on market opportunities, if municipalities decides to side pass 
them in the provision of new sorting plants. The existence of these interest 
conflicts does not necessarily mean that incumbent actors may not support the 
objective of sustainability transformation. Rather it means that these 
transformations are difficult for them and may force them to rethink their position 
and roles, which is likely to bring some resistance. 
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There is an irony in the fact that Denmark now considers using PPPs in 
infrastructure, whereas England has quit their PFI programme in waste 
management. The lack of PPPs in Denmark compared to England so far may 
simply be a timing issue, as the system of intermunicipal provision was 
established long before PPPs came on the political agenda in Denmark. However, 
in the Danish waste sector, PPPs are still considered something new, and there is 
no clear argument to privatize waste treatment in Denmark. The choice remains in 
the Danish municipalities, which are less dependent on external funding compared 
to local authorities in England. If the Danish waste sector decides to engage in 
PPPs, it is central that experiences from England are adopted. 
 
Along with these developments, public and private actors continue to cooperate on 
waste collection with more or less success. The idea of more relational service 
partnerships has been spreading and may bring smoother implementation of new 
collection schemes along with continuous service improvements and efficiencies. 
Good experiences in waste collection services may support the courage to further 
partner up in waste treatment. However, this model might not be fully exploited 
yet, and it seems that local authorities are still holding on to hierarchical 
governing, rather than leaving more responsibility to private partners.   
 
Public and private actors also collaborate in technology partnerships, where local 
authorities and publicly owned companies as potential buyers and users of new 
technologies are relevant partners for private companies. As local authorities have 
the statutory responsibility and thereby a monopoly on handling municipal waste, 
some degree of cooperation with a public authority will even be necessary to 
access municipal waste for testing. Perhaps DONG Energy and their Renescience 
project points the way for a new waste system, where technology makes separate 
collection and incineration redundant. DONG has itself been through a process of 
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focusing the company’s activities, where waste incinerators were sold off in 
favour of a focus on ‘New Bio Solutions’ (such as Renescience), which they see as 
part of a future flexible energy system (see DONG Energy 2015, Fjernvarmen 
2012). It will be interesting to see, which road the publicly owned companies will 
follow in these developments.  
 
In contrast to the Danish tradition for large municipalities and publicly owned 
companies to actively participate in driving forward waste management 
innovation, the UK government and the public waste sector in general seems to 
focus less on radical technology innovation. It was remarkable that none of the 
large waste disposal authorities interviewed took part in technology development 
activities.  Besides the few identified partnerships for testing and maturing 
technology, it seems there is not the same tradition in England for public 
authorities taking on this role. Whereas technology partnership may be better 
forums for more radical innovation, these cases show that the first steps towards 
technology might be developed in broader policy partnerships providing the 
knowledge base for identifying needed solutions and creating direction, whereas 
service delivery partnerships are key to implementing developed solutions. As 
such, developments at the landscape and regime level are equally important to 
sustainability transformation than development in niches. 
 
In conclusion, the article shows that public-private partnerships are prominent, but 
contested governing instruments in transformations of waste management systems 
in England and Denmark. Behind the question of partnership lies the continuously 
political question of private sector inclusion in waste management services, which 
has traditionally been dominated by local authorities. Based on a number of 
empirical examples, this article suggests that PPPs may gather actors and 
resources to develop better policies or new solutions and may improve contractual 
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relationships, but the article does not provide evidence that PPPs should perform 
better than publicly owned waste infrastructure.  
 
Nonetheless, PPPs may be driven forward by the increasing interdependency 
between public and private actors in municipal waste management. New political 
demands for sustainability transformation have developed needs for more 
complex, green technologies from private developers, whereas economic restraints 
and the move towards privatization continue to place a strong focus on economic 
efficiencies. Choosing the right governing instruments to enable sustainability 
transformation is not only a question of national strategy. Change is taking place 
through interplay between government, knowledge institutions, local authorities 
and private companies across European, national and local contexts, where 
differences in political strategic, practical and market conditions may lead to a 
variety of trajectories of change.  
 
There may be advantages and disadvantages by the English governing approach 
compared to the Danish. The English hands-on approach provided the fastest 
transformation process in Europe, which also benefitted from technology 
developments in other countries. The next 20-30 years will show if the PFI route 
will provide enough flexibility for future changes, which with no doubt will come, 
and if sustainability objectives shave indeed been rooted in the English society 
beyond the economic rationale in reaching EU targets. In contrast, the more 
hands-off approach in Denmark may take longer and risks not leading to the most 
optimal results in a broader societal perspective, but may also secure local 
ownership of solutions with engaged actors at all levels bringing ideas and 
solutions to the table. 
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Conclusion 
This article has investigated PPPs as policy instruments for sustainability 
transformation of urban infrastructure networks in the case of waste management. 
Through a comparative, embedded case study of the role of PPPs in municipal 
waste management in England and Denmark, the article has identified three types 
of PPPs: policy partnerships, service delivery partnership and technology 
partnerships. The article shows how these partnerships contribute in various ways 
to sustainability transformation processes by facilitating interplay between actors 
at landscape, regime and niche levels. Policy partnerships gather actors with 
various resources and knowledge to develop more sustainable policies or facilitate 
policy implementation. Service delivery partnerships may be used to implement 
new waste infrastructure systems or provide flexibility for the introduction of new 
collection systems and gradual service improvements in cooperation between 
public authorities and private contractors sharing risks, resources and ideas. 
Technology partnerships may connect actors in regimes and niches with various 
competences and skills to develop and test new technologies. In conclusion, 
policy-makers may benefit from supporting a broad palette of partnerships in the 
governing of sustainability transformations. Nonetheless, the popularity of the 
partnership approach should not lead us to overlook that there might continue to 
be conflicting interests between various actors in these systems. 
 
This article has contributed to a growing literature on governing sustainability 
transformations of urban infrastructure networks by investigating the role of PPPs 
in such transformation processes. The results from the article support the argument 
of urban scholars that sustainability transformations of large infrastructure systems 
should also be investigated in place-specific local contexts, where they may follow 
diverse trajectories of change as actors initiate, facilitate or contest change 
processes and further that landscape-regime interaction should not be overlooked 
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in these processes. Adding to these points, the article shows how local systems 
change feed into national transformation processes through dialectic processes 
between actors at landscape, regime and niches levels interlinked through various 
forms of partnership arrangements. In line with Bulkeley et al (2014) description 
of the energy sector, the waste management sector also reveal a ‘patchwork’ of 
various experiments, from REnescience and hybrid vehicles to new forms and 
shapes of partnerships, which through improvement in different parts of the 
system may bring sustainability transformation over time.  
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Abstract 
PPPs have been used all over the world to deliver new infrastructure and public 
services. This paper investigates how innovation is developed and implemented in 
PPPs. Although innovation is often mentioned as a potential benefit of PPPs, 
empirical studies investigating this in practice has been scarce, scattered and show 
mixed results. Based on a case study of four innovative PPPs for infrastructure and 
service delivery in municipal waste management in England and Denmark, this 
paper aims to take the first steps towards an increased conceptual understanding of 
the possibilities and challenges for PPP innovation. 
 
The paper suggests that PPPs might deliver both governance and organizational 
innovation, in terms of innovation as the PPP itself or in the organizational design 
of PPPs, and service innovation, in terms of process and/or technology innovations 
in the PPP outcome. Three governing strategies for innovation in PPPs are 
identified: hierarchy, market and network. Although these three forms of social 
coordination might be separated analytically, they are in practice often closely 
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interwoven. In all four cases, the paper identifies a mix of these strategies over the 
whole PPP process from the pre-contract phase over the contract design to the 
post-contract phase leading to various forms and levels of innovations. On this 
background, the paper suggests that PPP innovation is related to the management 
of a mix of governing strategies.  
 
Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are used all over the world to deliver public 
infrastructure and services in cooperation between public and private sector 
organizations (Osborne 2000, Rosenau 2000, Hodge et al. 2010). In comparison to 
slow-moving, bureaucratic public organizations and the free, unregulated forces of 
the market, PPPs are said to deliver more efficient, effective and innovative 
solutions through competition for service delivery and synergies from 
collaborative structures between public and private actors with different resources, 
competences and knowledge (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998, McQuaid 2000, Greve 
and Hodge 2005). In a public sector pressured by increasing citizen demands, 
complex societal challenges and budget restraints, innovation is increasingly seen 
as essential to improve public services and deliver ‘more for less’ (Albury 2005, 
Osborne and Brown 2011, Sørensen and Torfing 2011). Hence, whereas efficiency 
arguments of ‘value for money’ have dominated the PPP debate so far (see for 
instance Hodge and Greve 2007), innovation is likely to become increasingly in 
demand in the future. 
 
However, investigations of innovation from PPPs are few, diverse and show 
mixed results. Whereas some studies document innovative outcomes (Akintoye et 
al 2003, Bovaird 2006, Esteve et al 2012), others describe PPPs leading to 
business as usual (Hurst and Reeves 2004, Leiringer 2006, Slater et al 2007). As 
Leiringer (2006) suggests, despite the broad practical acceptance of PPPs as 
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innovation instruments, ‘the theoretical basis to support them seems strangely 
underdeveloped’ (p. 302). This paper aims to remedy this research gap by taking a 
closer look at the theoretical ideas linking PPPs to innovative outcomes and 
investigate how these are managed in the ‘real world’. The intention is to provide 
the first stepping-stones towards a theoretical and empirical understanding that 
may reach across various sectors and organizational forms of PPPs. 
 
Whereas partnerships are often contrasted to bureaucratic hierarchies or 
competitive markets, the theoretical starting point of this article is a more complex 
reality, where partnerships as organizational forms may be separated from the 
modes of coordination actually applied. Thus PPPs can be governed through a 
variety of forms of social co-ordination – including hierarchy, market and network 
(Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). This variety of coordination forms may be 
associated with various strategies for innovation in the public sector (Sørensen 
2012). This paper investigates how these modes of co-ordination and associated 
innovation strategies are used in practice in a comparative case study of four waste 
management PPPs from England and Denmark. The case analyses are based on 
qualitative, in-depth interviews with public and private managers involved in the 
PPPs triangulated with document analysis of contracts, tender material, waste 
management strategies, websites, etc. As two of the cases are organized as joint 
ventures (also referred to as ‘mixed companies’), the paper also contributes to an 
increased understanding of ‘mixed companies’, which are less studied in literature 
(Cruz and Marques 2012).  
 
Based on the case analysis, the paper suggests that the development and 
implementation of innovation in a PPP is related to the management of a mix of 
governing strategies for innovation in the PPP process - from the pre-contract 
phase, to the creation of the contract design and the post-contract phase. The cases 
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reveal how public managers combine these strategies in efforts of developing 
innovative services in terms of both organizational and technological outcomes. 
Thus the paper supports the significance of ‘managerial efforts’ in PPPs (Steijn et 
al 2011), but emphasise that at least in these types of tightly organized PPPs, 
network-based managerial strategies should be supplemented by hierarchical and 
market management strategies in order to develop innovation. Also, not simply the 
overall organizational form, but the specific ways these strategies are implemented 
in the procurement process and contract provides various possibilities for 
innovation. Contrary to seeing hierarchy, market and networks as 
counterproductive opposites, this analysis points to that although there might be 
tensions between them, the right mix of coordination might be mutually 
supportive. As Rhodes concluded already in 1997: “It’s the mix that matters” 
(Rhodes 1997).  
 
In the following two sections, the paper will explore and define the concepts of 
PPPs and innovation in this context, before the conceptual framework of 
hierarchy, market and network strategies for innovation is rolled out. This leads to 
a presentation of the comparative case study followed by an analysis of the mix of 
governing strategies for innovation applied in the four cases. The paper concludes 
by discussing the implications for theory and practice of managing mixed 
governing strategies for innovation in PPPs. 
 
The organizational form and process of waste management PPPs 
PPPs may be defined broadly as ‘cooperative institutional arrangements between 
public and private sector actors’ (Greve and Hodge 2005). With a public 
organization as one partner, PPPs will always have a policy function in a broad 
sense of the word, in this case to provide waste management services or treatment 
facilities to citizens (Rosenau 2000).  These kinds of partnerships are based on a 
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contractual relationship, which regulate the cooperation between public and 
private organizations in the specified contract period and may be based purely on 
the contract or organized as a joint venture. The contract is signed following a 
procurement process, where the public organization(s) choose a partner among 
competitive bidders presenting diverse solutions to a public call for tender.  This 
process might be more or less open for cooperation in terms of dialogue and 
negotiation on the formation of tasks and division of responsibilities in the 
contract. Within the EU, these processes are obliged to follow competition 
principles of transparency and equal access and established procedures in the 
public procurement directive (EC 2004b).  
 
In 2004, a new procedure of ‘competitive dialogue’ was added to the ‘negotiated’ 
and ‘open or restricted’ procedures, which allows for a period of dialogue between 
authority and bidders before the final tenders in situations of particularly complex 
contracts, where the authority is not able to specify the contract in either 
technically or financially/legal terms. The aim was to provide increased flexibility 
in discussions with candidates on all aspects on the contract, and the directive 
further point to the benefits of describing outputs in functional or performance 
terms rather than detailed specification to open for innovative ideas arising in the 
procurement phase (EC 2004a). Obviously, these formulations are subject to 
interpretation. Whereas in England, similar procedures was followed even before 
this regulation within the framework of negotiated dialogue, in Denmark 
authorities has shown more caution and most PPP projects has been procured 
through traditional open or restricted procedures.   
 
The competitive dialogue procedure is especially mentioned in the directive as a 
possibility for the provision of long term infrastructure contracts, such as 
procurement of waste treatment facilities (EC 2004b). These specific contract 
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types originated in the UK with the PFI scheme in the early 1990s (Weihe 2008). 
Their contract design varies from traditional construction contracts in terms of 
especially finance, ownership and risk sharing.  Rather than the public authority 
paying a private contractor out front for the construction of a pre-designed facility, 
the authority contract out a bundle of tasks, such as design, construction, finance 
and operation of a facility in a period of 20-30 years. In this timeframe, the risk of 
for instance technology and maintenance of facilities are transferred to the project 
company, whereas the authority pays instalments for ‘usage’ and then potentially 
takes over ownership of the facility, when the contract expires (Yescombe 2007). 
PFIs have primarily been seen as a mechanism of getting access to private funding 
to get around restrictions on public sector investments and reduce pressure on 
public sector budgets, but the PPP model has also been linked to a promise of 
increased ‘value for money’ and innovative solutions through private sector 
involvement (Hodge and Greve 2013).  
 
Whereas long-term infrastructure PPPs has largely dominated the PPP debate 
(Weihe 2008), PPPs for service delivery has taken a less prominent role. 
Compared to the former, these tend to be more short-term contracts involving 
relatively minor private investments. Service PPPs often involve a complex bundle 
of tasks, which is managed through close interaction and dialogue between the 
partners in a ‘spirit of partnership’. Because of the complex and changeable nature 
of tasks, service PPPs tend to have more loosely defined specifications to allow 
for flexibility (Domberger and Fernandez 1999). Waste collection has often been 
used as the prime example of a standardized service with possibilities for 
economies of scale, which might easily be contracted out (Bennett and Johnson 
1980, Savas 2000). However, the political pressure for continuous improvements 
and the increased complexity of recycling services might challenge this perception 
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and point towards a potential benefit from a more ‘relational’ form of contracting 
(Walls 2005).  
 
Accordingly, PPPs are formed through a process from the pre-contract phase of 
contract preparation and procurement that leads to the final contract design, which 
frames a new post-contract phase. As we will return to, these phases might provide 
various possibilities for social coordination (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998, Ysa 
2010) and hence lead to various innovation strategies. For instance, the 
possibilities for innovation in the pre-contract phase might depend upon the choice 
of a more or less hierarchical procurement procedure. Before we continue down 
this line, we need to take a closer look on the concept of innovation. 
 
Defining innovation 
Innovation is a creative process of developing new ideas to change existing 
practices in a specific setting and also involves the implementation and diffusion 
of these ideas (Mulgan and Albury 2003, Walker 2006, Van de Ven et al 2008). 
Rather than ideas ‘grabbed out of thin air’, innovations are often described as 
piecemeal solutions, where old ideas are connected and re-used in new contexts 
(Rogers 2003). As Stark (2009) emphasizes, most innovative ideas are not just out 
there waiting to be found, but needs to be generated in a ‘curious cognitive 
function of recognizing what is not yet formulated as a category” (p.4). 
Innovations may occur from a number of sources, such as inspiration from good 
practice in other settings, top-down external pressures for change, or experienced 
challenges in the current setting bottom-up (Walker 2006). To provide a bottom-
up example, a group of Danish engineers in a private company came up with the 
idea to transfer and adapt the concept of electric passenger cars to the waste 
management sector, formed a new company and engaged in a dialogue with actors 
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in the field to develop a new product category, a hybrid collection vehicle, which 
was implemented in a number of Danish municipalities.  
According to Osborne and Brown (2011), innovation theory has originally focused 
private sector production processes, and thus innovation has been understood as 
new products or production processes. However, this does not necessarily capture 
the nature of service innovations. Service innovations often combine the 
implementation of new products and technologies with changes in the 
organization and processes of service delivery. It is also important to remember 
that service innovations take place in a political and institutional context (Osborne 
and Brown 2011). In the public sector, innovations are directed at producing 
‘public value’ (rather than surplus value) and are often framed by new political 
strategies, languages and concepts creating a demand for change (Hartley 2005).  
Even more encompassing, Moore and Hartley (2008) introduced the concept of 
‘governance innovation’ involving not only specific service changes, but changes 
in the “ways in which productive activity is financed (or more broadly, resourced), 
the processes that are used to decide what will be produced, and the normative 
standards used to evaluate the performance” (p.4). Accordingly, the PPP in itself 
might be considered a governance innovation, which frames the specific service 
delivery (Ysa et al 2013, Hodge and Greve 2007). Accordingly, although history 
reveals a long history of public-private cooperation (Wettenhall 2010), the 
implementation of a PPP in a specific local or national context or the specific 
design of the PPP can be considered innovative.  
 
PPPs can also be more or less ambitious considering the scale of innovation. 
Innovations might be more radical, such as the hybrid waste collection vehicles, 
but also smaller and more incremental innovations – such as a new electronic 
registration system for bin collections - might provide important contributions to 
improving the quality of waste management services (Albury 2005). Furthermore, 
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Hartley (2005) emphasizes the importance of diffusion of innovation. In a public 
sector context with less competitive edge between organizations, diffusion of 
already tested solutions might be equally important to produce public value as the 
continuous development of ‘new to the world’ innovations (Hartley 2005). A good 
example could be the diffusion of split-bodied bins for collection of recycled 
materials. Rather than developing their ‘own’ solution, many municipalities adopt 
this solution from other authorities, but it anyways affects services for local 
citizens – whether they see this as a positive or negative service change (Osborne 
and Brown 2011). In the next section, we will look into the mix of strategies for 
producing innovation in (or as) PPPs. 
 
Hierarchy, competition and network as innovation strategies 
The relationships between public and private sector actors in PPPs might be 
related to at least three forms of social coordination: hierarchy, market and 
network. Adding to the traditional dichotomy of markets and hierarchies (Coase 
1937, Williamsen 1975, 1985), the network term as a ‘third wheel’ of coordination 
was consolidated during the 1990s (Kooiman 1993, Rhodes 1996, Kickert et al 
1997, Jessop 1998). Whereas in theory these three archetypes might be separated, 
they are closely interrelated in most real-life cases (Bradach & Eccles 1991, 
Rhodes 1997). The mixing of governing strategies in PPPs might be connected to 
two public management reform movements, New Public Management (NPM) and 
Networked Governance (NG), which have challenged traditional hierarchical 
administration and – in different ways - emphasized the need involve private 
sector actors to innovate public organizations and services (Klijn 2010, Sørensen 
2012). Although these innovation strategies might be linked to different time 
periods, they might also be seen as competing or supplementary as they co-exist 
with traditional public administrative practices as ‘layered realities for politicians 
and public managers’ (Hartley 2005, p.29). 
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Hierarchical governing is often connected to the public bureaucracy and the idea 
of neutral, rule abiding public servants implementing ideas developed at the 
political level (Frances et al 1991). Bureaucracies has been criticized for being 
ineffective, slow moving and rigidly rule-bound and for being risk averse in fear 
of political failure. Conversely, although this critique might resonance to some 
degree, investigations of innovation in the public sector have shown numerous 
examples of innovative programs and concepts for service delivery (Borins 1998, 
Albury 2005, Sørensen and Torfing 2011). Accordingly, hierarchy might embody 
its own governing strategy for innovation. As Hartley (2005) describes: “The role 
of policy-makers in this approach to innovation is to act as commanders – 
creating legislation and then support for whole scale changes, while assuming 
that the detailed work of implementation will be carried out by officials” (p.30). 
As policy instruments, PPPs are subject to political command and control of 
hierarchical organizations. Hence the political level of ambition towards 
innovation might to a large degree be set by the public sector as legislators and 
purchasers of PPPs. Furthermore, PPPs might also establish rather bureaucratic 
structures between public and private actors in the contracts to regulate 
implementation of for instance innovation. 
 
In the critiques of the heavy administrative bureaucracy in the public sector, 
politicians and public managers in the beginning of the 1980s increasingly looked 
to the private sector competitive markets as an ideal alternative. New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms demanded implementation of market-like structures 
in the public sector through a separation of policy (steering) from implementation 
(rowing) (Osborne and Gabler 1992). Public organizations should leave most of 
the ‘rowing’ to private or voluntary organizations at competitive markets or in 
arms’ length organizations at safe distance from bureaucratic home organizations 
(Hood 1991). Thus the NPM strategy for innovation was to install competition and 
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market-based incentives in the public sector to motivate actors into developing 
innovative processes and services in order to gain ‘competitive advantage’ 
(Sørensen 2012). This demanded new managerial competencies from public 
administrators, who needed to ‘manage markets’ through demand and 
performance monitoring in order to achieve the most efficient solutions (Hartley 
2005, Domberger and Fernandez). As variants of contracting out often established 
in arm’s length of home organizations, PPPs are clearly linked to the NPM 
reforms and ideas of market competition (Klijn 2010). 
 
Networked governance has increasingly been seen as an alternative to hierarchy 
and markets. According to this stream of research, the fragmentation of the public 
sector by NPM reforms as well as the rise of new, complex policy problems have 
led to an increased need for coordination through the establishment of inter-
organizational networks between mutually dependent actors in society (Rhodes 
1996, Kickert el al 1997). Compared to hierarchical command and control and 
competitive markets, networks are coordinated through collaboration and trust 
(Frances et al 1991). Network theory emphasises the importance of institutional 
and managerial strategies to achieve good outcomes. The network manager leads 
and enables processes and outcomes by connecting actors, arranging structures for 
interaction, establishing process rules and searching for new solutions (Hartley 
2005, Steijn et al 2011). The idea is that the framing and facilitation of interaction 
between actors with various resources, competences and ideas should enhance the 
public sectors ability to develop innovative solutions to solve complex, societal 
problems (Sørensen 2012). This might be linked to the idea of ‘collaborative 
advantages’ (Huxham 1996) emerging from synergies developed through close 
interactions between actors. Thus PPPs might be seen as a special kind of highly 
institutionalized network that frames collaboration between public and private 
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actors in order to facilitate co-production of innovative solutions (Klijn 2010, 
Steijn et al 2011).  
 
Table 1 summarizes the various innovation strategies and associated public 
manager roles from hierarchy, competition and network.  
 
Table 1: The innovation strategies of hierarchy, market and network  
 Innovation strategy Public manager role 
Hierarchy New political objectives are 
implemented through administrative 
command and control 
 
 
Administrator (implementing) 
Market Competition between private providers 
incentivize them to deliver more efficient 
and effective public services  
 
Market manager (demanding, 
incentivizing, monitoring) 
Network Collaboration between mutual dependent 
public and private actors with various 
resources, competences and ideas lead to 
new and better solutions to complex 
societal problems  
Network manager (leading, 
enabling, searching) 
Source: see Hartley 2005, p.29 
 
Mixing market, network and hierarchy 
The mixed hierarchical, competitive and networked coordination in PPPs might be 
both beneficial and challenging. On the positive side, market competition might 
provide external pressure for the cooperation partners to agree and move forward, 
whereas collaboration might provide the resources for development of innovation 
fused by the competitive pressure (Sørensen 2012). On the other hand, experiences 
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from urban regeneration partnerships show that a competitive environment, where 
partners need to consider their own survival as organizations, may create tensions 
in co-operations (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). The idea of public and private 
organization collaborating closely towards a common goal might also lead public 
organisations to overlook private objectives of economic surplus and consequently 
become a source of conflicts and confusion.  
 
Hierarchical command and control might provide direction of the collaboration 
towards the creation of public value and secure clear divisions of roles and 
responsibilities. On the other hand, hierarchy might also challenge the effect of 
competition and collaboration.  According to Greve (2010), businesses have 
complained that public procurement processes restrain them from proposing 
innovative solutions, unless this is specifically outlined in the procurement 
material from the public authority. These mixes of mutually beneficial or 
restraining coordination and innovation strategies might change over the PPP 
process (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). The next sections will investigate how 
these dynamic mixes develop in practice in the four cases of waste management 
PPPs. First, the article will provide a presentation of the design of the comparative 
case study. 
 
The comparative case study 
The analytic design is an embedded, comparative case study of four waste 
management PPPs in England and Denmark (Peters 1998, Yin 2009). Within a 
common European legislative framework, both countries are pressured to change 
practices to deliver more environmental sustainable solutions by an EU target on 
50% recycling in 2020.  Furthermore, these countries share a relatively high 
inclusion of private sector organizations in waste management services compared 
to other EU countries (Dijkgraf and Gradus 2008). In England, around 50% of 
328 
 
waste collection services are contracted out to private companies, whereas almost 
all treatment services are privately provisioned (OFT 2006). In Denmark, at least 
80% of collection services are contracted out, whereas most treatment services are 
provided by municipally owned companies and private companies deliver pre-
treatment of recycling (Grønnegård Christensen 2001, EPA 2011).  
 
Whereas in England many of these contracts have been arranged as PPPs, 
Denmark has only recently seen a few PPPs in waste collection and one in a very 
early stage in waste treatment. From each country, a PPP in waste collection and 
in waste treatment has been selected. The cases are selected on a background of 43 
qualitative interviews with public and private waste managers and experts 
approximately equally spread between Denmark and England. The interviews 
were used to map the variety of waste management PPPs and achieve in-depth 
information on innovation processes in PPPs. There were two main case selection 
criteria: 1, The PPPs should have an element of ‘partnership’ rather than being 
purely adversarial, and 2, the partnerships should be seen as innovative in the 
broader waste management community. As such, these cases were chosen for an 
analytical purpose in a replication design investigating the theoretical framework 
in a variety of cases across countries and PPP types, rather than necessarily being 
samples of typical waste PPPs (Yin 2009). The selected cases are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
In England, the partnership contract on waste collection and street cleansing 
between the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) in the London 
Area and Sita UK was mentioned several times in interviews as an example of a 
partnership contract that did not just talk about partnership, but was really a 
partnership relationship. This case did not have the most sustainable system of 
waste collection, but displayed continuous innovation effort in the contract period. 
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In waste treatment, a pilot interview with Greater Manchester Waste Disposal 
Authority (GMWDA) in relation to a research seminar at Manchester University 
exposed their PFI joint venture contract with the private consortium Viridor Laing 
ltd. as an interesting case in at least two ways. First, the public manager described 
the management of their relationship in partnership terms, and second, the 
contractual arrangement was in itself innovative and they had implemented 
political goals and incentives in the contract to improve recycling.  
 
Table 2: Presentation of the four cases in the embedded, comparative case 
study 
 England Denmark 
Waste collection Waste 
treatment 
Waste collection Waste 
treatment 
Public 
organization 
Royal Borough of 
Kensington and 
Chelsea (RBKC) 
Greater 
Manchester 
Waste Authority 
(GMWDA) 
Renosyd i/s Vejle Waste 
and Recycling 
(VWR) 
- Population 159,000 2,3 million 80,000 110,000 
- 
Households 
85,000 1,000,000 32,000 47,000 
Private 
contractor 
Sita UK Limited Viridor Laing 
(Greater 
Manchester) 
Limited (VLGM 
Ltd.) 
Marius Pedersen A/S Marius 
Pedersen A/S/ 
? 
Contract 
type 
Partnership 
Contract 
Joint Venture 
Contract 
Service Partnership 
Contract 
Innovation 
Partnership/ 
Joint Venture 
Contract 
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Tasks 
included 
Collection 
(residual/recycling) 
and street 
cleansing 
DBFO (Design, 
Build, Finance, 
Operate) + 
communication 
and education 
services 
Collection  
(residual/(packaging)) 
DBFO 
(Design, build, 
finance, 
operate) + 
administrative 
and service 
tasks 
Waste 
amounts 
Approx. 90,000 
tons municipal 
waste/ year 
Approx. 1,1 
million tons 
municipal waste 
per year 
Approx. 1,300 tons 
packaging waste and 
17,600 tons residual 
waste   
Expected 
approx. 60-
80,000 tons 
municipal 
waste per year 
Contract 
period 
1st April 2005 – 
31st March 2021 
(16 years) 
1st April 2009 – 
31st March 2034  
(25 years) 
1st September 2008 – 
30th April 2013  
(5 years) 
Innovation 
Partnership: 
 January – 
March 2013 
Call for tender 
in July 2013 
(20 years) 
Contract 
price 
Approx. £12 
million in annual 
value 
Approx. £3,8 
billion (£631 
mill construction 
costs) 
Approx. 16 million 
DKK in annual value  
(≈ £1,7 million) 
Expected 
approx. 20-40 
mill DKK 
capital costs + 
180-250 mill 
DKK 
construction 
costs (≈ £2,1-
4,3 mill + 
£19,2-26,7 
mill) 
Sources: RBKC 2004, Census 2011, letsrecycle.com 2005, GMWDA 2014a, Renosyd 2012, 
p.31, VWR 2014, Rønne & Lundgren 2013B, udbud.dk 2013 
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In Denmark, the service partnership contract between the publicly owned 
company Renosyd and Marius Pedersen A/S was the first contract of this kind in 
waste collection.  The choice of this organizational form was directly related to the 
public organizations aim of achieving a more productive and less adversarial 
relationship with a private contractor. Compared to an almost parallel example of 
a similar service partnership contract, Renosyd chose to change their collection 
system within the contract period. In waste treatment, there is only one example of 
a PPP in Vejle Municipality, which for the first time in Denmark aims to create a 
closer collaboration with a private company in a joint venture PPP with the aim of 
providing both an innovative service delivery arrangement and new technology for 
mechanical sorting of recyclables. This PPP has not reached beyond the 
procurement process, which limits comparability, but on the other hand provides a 
unique, detailed inside to the pre-contract period that is fresh in mind of the 
interviewed managers. 
 
In all cases, qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with public and 
private managers involved in the PPP and additional material such as procurement 
documents, contracts and waste strategies were collected. The respondents were 
asked to describe the aim and organization of the PPP, the public-private 
relationship and the process of the PPP with an emphasis on their experience of 
possibilities and limitations for innovation, hereunder the contributions and 
capacities of public and private actors. They were also asked to provide specific 
examples of innovations, which made it possible to compare the degree of 
innovation towards general developments in the sector. The interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and analysed in an iterative process between theoretical 
concepts and empirical data.  For example, a third category of hierarchy was 
added to market competition and networked collaboration as the importance of 
hierarchical governing in innovation processes emerged from the data.  
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Case studies of waste management PPPs 
In both England and Denmark waste management is delegated to local authorities. 
In Denmark the 98 Danish municipalities are responsible for collection, treatment 
and disposal of municipal waste, whereas in England the responsibility is shared 
between Waste Collection Authorities (WCAs) and Waste Disposal Authorities 
(WDAs). Following critiques of the fragmentation of this system, a number of 
English authorities were joined in Unitary Authorities (UAs). There are 
approximately 273 WCAs, 40 WDAs and 81 UAs (OFT 2006). Instead of creating 
a single organization, many English authorities have solved the issue of 
coordination between layers by forming various partnership arrangements. 
Eventually, the Waste and Emissions Trading Act from 2003 made the 
development of ‘Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategies (JMWMS) 
between WCAs and WDAs mandatory (Slater et al. 2007). Also in Denmark, 
many local authorities have chosen to coordinate waste management services, 
especially regarding treatment facilities, and usually by establishing joint public 
companies (Grønnegård Christensen 2001). Compared to the English case, these 
are all voluntary activities.  
In the following sections, we will investigate the mix of coordination and 
innovation strategies applied in the four cases from the pre-contract phase, to the 
contract design and the post-contract phase to see how these might have affected 
the development of innovative outcomes.  
 
Case 1: The ‘Partnership Contract’ between the Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea and Sita UK Ltd., England 
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) is a waste collection 
authority in the London Area of England. The borough is one of the smallest and 
the most densely populated in England with more than 158,000 citizens and 
85,000 households (Census 2011). The RBKC is one of four constituent boroughs 
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to the Western Riverside Waste Authority (WRWA), which is also responsible for 
waste disposal from the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fullham, the 
London Borough of Lambeth and the London Borough of Wandsworth. The 
WRWA is governed by a council of two representatives from each borough. 
Together, these five authorities have joined in the Western Riverside Partnership 
(WRP) and have developed a JMWMS according to national regulations 
(JMWMS 2006). Accordingly, waste collection in the borough needs to be 
coordinated with the other boroughs and the WRWA to feed into the provided 
treatment facilities.   
 
Waste collection and street cleansing in the borough is contracted out to Sita UK 
Limited in a 16 years ‘partnership contract’ from 1st April 2005 – 31st March 2021. 
Within the contract, Sita has continued the collection of residual waste and mixed 
recycling (paper, card, glass, plastics) from bags and blue bins transported in split-
bodied compaction vehicles. The contract includes collection of around 90,000 
tons of municipal waste, consisting of approximately 53,000 tons of household 
waste, 6,000 tons of street litter and public institutions’ waste and around 30,000 
tons of commercial waste (RBKC 2004). The collected material is delivered at two 
transfer stations near the River Thames. From there, transport and treatment is 
organized through a 30 year recycling, treatment and disposal contract between 
the WRWA and Cory Environmental Limited in the period 5th October 2002 – 4th 
October 2032 (JMWMS 2006). Residual waste used to be shipped down the River 
Thames to a landfill site in Essex, but since February 2011 it has been delivered to 
a new Energy-from-Waste (EfW) incineration plant at Belvedere in the London 
Borough of Bexley constructed within the Cory contract. The contract also 
included the construction and operation of a new Mechanical Recycling Facility 
(MRF) receiving pre-sorted recyclables from the boroughs (WRWA 2008). 
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Pre-contract phase: Hierarchical coordination and a recycling challenge 
As well as the coordination with the other boroughs, the RBKC has to take into 
account a hierarchy of waste management strategies from the EU and national 
strategies, to the Mayor of London’s Municipal Waste Management Strategy 
(GLA 2003), the JMWMS (JMWMS 2006) and the borough’s own Strategy and 
Action Plan (RBKC 2004). The UK government has prepared a gradual 
transformation to reach the EU targets by setting statutory targets for individual 
WCAs. Thus, the RBKC was expected to deliver 22% recycling in 2003/4 and 
33% in 2005. Both the Mayors strategy and the JMWMS also underlined the need 
to focus on recycling rates (JMWMS 2006, GLA 2003). The government targets 
were seen as a huge challenge for the borough, who after a relatively intense effort 
in the previous contract (also with Sita), had increased recycling from 7,5% in 
2002/3 (letsrecycle.com 2004) to 16,5% in 2003/4, but continued to recycle 
considerably below the target (RBKC 2004). The borough implemented a 
recycling collection scheme in bags to be co-collected with residual waste in split-
bodied vehicles already in 1993, but has been challenged by a dense populated 
area with 83% of households living in flats, little storage space for waste and a 
high residence turnover (ibid., p.7, JMWMS 2006, p.25).  
 
The specifications in the new collection and street cleansing contract were 
developed concurrently with the RBKC’s Waste Plan and Strategy. The final 
results reflected the challenge of increasing recycling rates and results from 
consultations with citizens about aims and the waste industry about ‘what service 
improvements could be delivered at a realistic price’ (RBKC 2004, p.17). The plan 
stated that: ‘[t]he council seeks two types of improvement in the performance of its 
contractor’s recycling crews. The first is a higher rate of capture of recyclable 
material at the kerbside. The second is a lower rate of contamination of the 
collected recyclables” (RBKC 2004, p.14). In line with citizen’s wishes of an 
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‘unobtrusive’ service, the borough placed much focus on service quality, for 
instance by setting high standards for complaints management and short duration 
of waste bags piled on the streets (ibid.). They were also determined on having 
high standards of street cleanliness and planned to exceed national targets on this 
by far (RBKC 2004, p.5-7). As the contractor explains, in general, this borough is 
different from other boroughs, where focus is only on budget savings. In the 
RBKC, the ‘driver’ is quality rather than money (Sita interview, p.2).  
 
Thus the aim was to find a contractor who would work continuously with the 
council to solve the recycling challenge and keep a high quality level of service. 
This involved having flexibility to make changes over the contract period. Hence 
the contract was output-based and tendered through a ‘negotiated process’, where 
the contract could be developed in dialogue and negotiation between the authority 
and potential bidders. In the beginning of 2005, the existing contractor Sita UK 
won the contract in front of several other bidders (letsrecycle.com 2005). As the 
Sita suggests, their winning might have been linked to their strong local 
knowledge and existing relationship with the borough: “I think we probably had a 
slight advantage since we knew the borough inside out. I think there was a 
confidence that whatever the operational plan was it would be good. They knew 
they could trust that” (Sita interview, p.5). Accordingly, the cooperation between 
the RBKC and Sita continued in an altered framework.  
 
Contract design: Framing collaboration and innovation 
The contract has several characteristics distinguishing it from traditional contracts. 
First, the general contract and supplementary documents was accompanied by a 
‘partnership charter’, which established forums for joint working and co-
production of innovation. The charter prescribe the establishment of a joint 
partnership board with equal representation from the organizations, the 
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establishment of innovation forums to jointly manage specific innovation projects, 
outlined a number of partnership duties and principles of day-to-day working and 
a setup of an open book system of accounting (RBKC 2005/2011). The 
formulations in the charter also specifically express network coordination ideas. 
For instance, it is stated that: “The council and the contractor agree to work with 
each other cooperatively in partnership to discharge their responsibilities in 
relation to the services and to apply their respective special knowledge, skill and 
expertise, in accordance with the terms of the contract and this charter” (RBKC 
2005/2011: Partnership Charter, p.1). The partners commit to being innovative, 
proactive, ensure partnership, work in a ‘no blame’ culture and jointly evaluate the 
partnership (ibid, p.3). Second, although the contract includes a clause for 
arbitration, there are no punitive economic incentives for defaults. This signals a 
high level of trust to the contractor compared to most other contracts. Third, the 
contract secures the contractor an agreed profit, where after a profit sharing 
mechanism kicks in. The council may follow the contractors spending through the 
‘open book’s system (private contract manager, p.4). In this way, the interests of 
both partners are acknowledged – the ‘market’ interest in an economic profit and 
the council’s interest in transparency and securing against profit seeking on the 
expense of quality.  
 
Besides the charter, there is a relatively large body of contract materials specifying 
the general terms in the partnership contract and the service specifications in the 
supplementary documents. The partnership contract in itself amounts to 53 pages 
describing the legal and managerial framework with 233 pages of supplementary 
specifications. The descriptions of waste collection and street cleansing are output-
based, and much of the supplementary material is lists of equipment, streets, 
depots, etc., reflecting the complexity and practical nature of the contract (see 
Appendix 1). The formulation of collection services emphasize partnership 
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collaboration and expectations of a high degree of dialogue: “The Contractor is 
required to work in very close partnership with the council to develop and adapt 
waste presentation and collection schedules that meet the council’s policy 
requirements while also meeting the reasonable needs of householders and of 
commercial costumers” (RBKC 2005/2011: Waste Collection, p.3). However, in 
line with the aims of increasing recycling, the contract also establishes several 
specific demands towards this goal. For instance the contractor shall deliver five 
recycling wardens to communicate with citizens, employ a ‘Waste Reduction and 
Recycling Manager’, ensure proper training of collection crew and introduce 
separation of recyclables from street litter (RBKC 2004, p.14).   
 
Accordingly, although this contract has some bureaucratic features establishing 
legal and economic responsibilities and specific organizational features, it is 
designed to enable continuous service innovations within the contract period in 
collaboration between the partners.  
 
Contract period: Collaboration and incremental innovation in practice 
In the interviews, both authority and contractor expressed that the design of the 
contract framed the possibility for a more collaborative relationship between the 
partners. The contractor emphasized the uniqueness of the trust placed by the 
authority by not implementing the usual default mechanisms, and how this creates 
an open dialogue and aspiration for them to earn this trust:  
“It is definitely a partnership in the true sense of the word. There is not another 
contract in the in the UK industry like this one. You’ve got partnership contracts, 
but they will still have things like defaults mechanisms, so you will get fined for 
falling below standards. In this contract, there is nothing like that. (…) A lot of 
other contracts have not come across with this level of trust and partnership. We 
get things wrong, but we would never try to hide it. We would just say ‘yes, we 
should have done that, but we didn’t’. There are no financial penalties for that and 
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the council will understand. We might get it wrong once, but we won’t get it 
wrong twice. We will put it right and make sure that the right operational strategies 
are in place so that it does not happen again” (Sita interview, p. 2).  
 
The strategic issues are dealt with at the partnership board meetings, but generally 
issues are dealt with at a lower level, which is made easy by the co-location of 
officers at various levels. According to RBKC, the close collaboration and good 
attitude of the contractor staff means that it is almost like running a DSO (in-house 
“Direct Service Organization”):  
“We have generic officers in each smaller area in the borough, taking on all of the 
responsibilities of monitoring etc. in one area. This means they are close to the 
contractor’s teams out there, and they have a direct dialogue and often solve issues 
on the spot. You probably don’t have to be co-located, but it helps a lot (…). [The 
contract managers] both have brilliant attitudes. They immediately work to find a 
solution, when there is a problem. If they find a problem, they will come into my 
office and tell me about it, and usually say how they have solved it as well” 
 (RBKC interview, p.1-2).  
 
This trusting relationship builds on the shared understanding of the each 
organizations purpose in the contract. As the RBKC explains:  
“Some authorities tries to squeeze the contractor to get as much out of them as 
possible, but our former director understood that the contractor needs a profit – a 
reasonable profit, not an extensive one. Because they are secured a profit in the 
contract, we have a better and more trusting environment” (RBKC interview, p.2).  
From the other side, the contractor shows that the company understands the public 
authorities need for service improvements and cost savings. As the manager 
explains: “The partnership is all about adapting to the changing needs of the 
Borough.(…) The borough wanted this flexibility to make changes in the service 
for whatever they needed to do” (Sita interview, p.5-6). For example, when the 
council needed cost efficiencies and considered cutting down on collection rounds, 
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Sita UK developed a more efficient routine for twice a week collections with a 
two day gap that actually improved the service for citizens and secured the same 
profit margin for the contractor: “We were able to do that, because there were 
trust there. We understood what they wanted, and they were talking openly to us 
and made sure we had everything we needed to make the change.” (Sita interview, 
p.4)   
 
The Innovation Forums in the contract were to begin with established as four 
groups with regular meetings, but the general manager proposed to change this as 
it did not bring that many ideas and took much time. Instead, everyone would be 
able to hand a suggestion note to the general manager, who would put this forward 
to the board. Within this framework, they have implemented several smaller 
innovations such as providing English lessons to foreign speaking workers or 
changing to smaller electric vehicles at the dense Portobello Market. At the time 
of the data collection, they were in a process of discussing what the next steps to 
improve recycling rates should be (interview, p. 6-7). By 2011, they had managed 
to increase recycling to almost 30% (RBKC 2014). 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the case. The case shows how this partnership 
aimed at providing flexibility for continuous recycling according to hierarchical 
targets and did so through dialogues with citizens and the market followed by a 
competitive tender. The contract was designed to eliminate potential conflicts 
between public and private interests and provided some demands for specific 
initiatives towards recycling, but was basically based on the risk of trusting the 
other partner in a long-term relationship. The contract provided forums and 
principles for joint working and co-production of innovative solutions. These were 
used and adjusted during the contract phase through trust-based collaboration to 
develop and implement efficiency improvements and new ideas. In all phases, 
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managers mixed hierarchy, market and network in their strategies towards 
innovative solutions, although the pre-contract phase was mostly dominated by 
network management strategies.    
Table 3: Results of Case 1  
 Governing strategies for innovation in the RBKC – Sita UK Ltd. PPP   
Pre-contract 
phase 
 
- Adopting and coordinating political targets in a hierarchy of public 
authorities (hierarchy, network) 
- Competitive tendering for a ‘partnership contract’ for collection services 
through ‘negotiated dialogue ‘aimed to improve recycling and secure 
quality of services (market, hierarchy, network) 
Contract design 
 
- Mixing  demands to increase recycling with output-based service 
specifications to allow continuous changes and private input (market, 
network, hierarchy)  
- Securing a profit for the private company to avoid incentives for profit 
seeking in expense of quality (market, hierarchy) 
- Establishing forums and principles for collaboration and co-production of 
innovation in a ‘partnership charter’ (network) 
Post-contract 
phase 
Developing and implementing solutions to hierarchically determined 
problems as well as new ideas based on efficiency or social gains through a 
close, trust-based dialogue, based on a mutual understanding of the needs 
of each organization (network, hierarchy, market) 
 
Case 2: The PFI joint venture contract between Greater Manchester Waste 
Authority and Viridor Laing (GM) Ltd., England 
The Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority (GMWDA) was created in 
1986 as a WDA for nine district councils, Bolton, Bury, Manchester City, 
Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside and Trafford, situated in the 
North West of England. As the biggest WDA in England, they are responsible for 
the disposal of 1,1 million tonnes of waste produced by the more than 1 million 
households (GMWDA 2014b).  In April 2009, the authority signed a 25-year PFI 
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contract with the private consortium Viridor Laing (Greater Manchester) Limited 
(VLGM) for the design, build, (partly) finance and operation of a network of 
waste management facilities in the area. VLGM is a joint venture between Viridor 
Waste, a subsidiary of Pennon Group PLC, and the investment company John 
Laing PLC. The £3,8 billion contract involved a construction programme of £631 
million financed through a mix of private investment and loans from a range of 
financial institutions, £124,5 million of PFI credits from the government and a 
capital injection from the GMWDA itself (GMWDA 2012).  
 
The new facilities would include 5 Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) 
plants (4 with Anaerobic Digestion (AD)), 4 In Vessel Composting (IVC) plants, 1 
Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), 1 EfW incineration facility, 2 green waste 
shredding facilities, 1 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) station, 7 transfer 
stations, 21 household recycling centres and 4 education centres. The CHP station 
would be delivered through a separate Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with the 
chemical producer company Ineos Chlor, which effectively would solve the 
problem of off take for the residual Refused Derived Fuel (RDF) from the MBT 
plants (GMWDA 2014a).  
 
Pre-contract phase: Mobilizing support, negotiating with the market and 
setting political targets 
The PFI contract followed a long process, 7 years in total, of setting political 
targets, investigating and negotiating technological and market possibilities and 
mobilizing support and coordinating action with district councils and planning 
authorities. Prior to this contract, the authority managed a Local Authority Waste 
Disposal Company (LAWDC), which operated a number of waste sorting and 
transfer facilities and a thermal recovery facility. In 2002/3, almost 90% of 
municipal waste was sent to landfill, whereas only 7% was recycled (GMWDA 
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2004, p.10, GMWDA 2012). Hence from 2002-2004 the authorities went through 
a process of setting targets and exploring various options. They decided on a 
strategy of ‘maximising recycling and minimising landfill’, which were 
formulated in political targets of 50% recycling in 2015 and 75% diversion from 
landfilling. The authorities formed a joint strategy and consolidated their 
collaboration in a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) in 2004 to have a 
starting point for the invitation to tender in October 2005 (GMWDA 2004, MOU 
2004).  
 
In this process, the GMWDA arranged study tours and technology site visits 
around Europe for local politicians and planning authorities to investigate and 
familiarize people with potential technologies and started a dialogue with the 
waste market (GMWDA interview 2, p.3-4). They were not in doubt about the 
basic form of contracting, since a PFI contract was ‘the only game in town’ to 
achieve the necessary funding (GMWDA interview 1, p.2). To get something 
more than the standard solution, this meant that they needed to engage in a 
dialogue with the market. Most of the private companies they talked to in the 
beginning had suggested a large EfW incineration led approach. However, this 
was a politically unpopular solution, and although the tender was open regarding 
technologies, the authorities strongly signalled that they were mainly interested in 
more ‘innovative technologies’ such as Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) 
for residual waste (GMWDA 2004). According to GMWDA, this provided a 
tension to the private sector needing to secure funding: “Lenders do not like 
innovation. They want something proven. They want facilities that have dealt with 
similar waste at a similar scale for at least two years with proven track records so 
they have a degree of comfort in that their investment is safe” (interview 2, p. 1).  
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In 2005, four bidders were invited to provide final tenders in a ‘negotiated’ 
process structured very much alike the new ‘competitive dialogue’ process. They 
ended up with a compromise - an integrated solution with proven technology, but 
where the combination of technologies at that scale was new in a UK context. As 
GMWDA explained: “What the market said that they could do might have been 
half way up what we wanted, and we ended up with something in between. But we 
needed to push the market in order to get what we wanted” (Interview 1, p.2). 
Accordingly, rather than ‘cooperative’, this process was described as ‘hard-
nosed”, adversarial negotiation: 
“Those four years was a very tense process with a lot of debate, discussion and 
arguments. We wanted the contractor to take all of the risks. They wanted us to 
take some of it. It can become a quite adversarial process, where each side got 
their legal team. And lawyers do not understand partnership working or 
compromises” (GMWDA interview 2, p.14). 
 
As the final solution began to emerge, the Authority also spent much time trying 
to convince the WCAs to align collection methods to fit the new facilities: 
“I think one of the biggest challenges was that we have nine waste collection 
authorities to serve, and every one of them were collecting in a different way - 
different materials and streams - and they all had their own arrangements for off-
take of recyclable materials. So we needed to look at how they collected and try to 
uniform it across the place and convince them to make investments in different 
bins, new vehicles, new ways of collecting” (GMWDA interview 2, p.3).  
 
They agreed upon a four-string collection system (green waste with food, paper, 
card and Tetra Pak, co-mingled dry recyclables (glass, bottles, cans) and mixed 
residual waste), which was also relatively innovative in a UK context, where most 
authorities had a mixed recycling bin and a paper bin (GMWDA interview 1, p.2).  
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VLGM was selected as the preferred bidder in January 2007 and signed the 
contract in 2009 following financial challenges relating to the global financial and 
economic crisis (GMWDA 2012). The integrated and flexible solution suggested 
by VLGM suited the political targets of the authority, and VLGM had managed to 
solve the largest challenges with MBT by securing an RDF outlet. Accordingly, 
the innovative PPP organization and output was grounded in the pre-contract 
phase in a mixed process of coordination, mobilization and negotiation with 
constituent councils and market actors.  
 
Contract design: Economic incentives for innovation and a hierarchical 
framework for cooperation 
The negotiated, output-based contract was designed to create economic incentives 
for all actors involved to follow the GMWDAs sustainability objectives. Thus the 
targets of 50% recycling and 75% diversion of landfill were implemented as 
performance targets to guide the cooperation with an economic bonus to the 
contractor for exceeding these targets and a penalty for not meeting them.  The 
contractor was also provided a fixed profit margin to provide ‘cushion’ for 
investments and for taking on technology, construction and operational risks 
(interview 1, p.3). This design aimed to solve potential conflicting interests. As 
GMWDA explained:  
“From our perspective, we need to save money, and from the contractors’ 
perspective, they are looking to maximize revenues. (…) There is a tension. But 
the way that the contract works is that the cost of landfill is passed through to us, 
so when Viridor Laing successfully manages to increase diversion from landfill, 
we will make a saving. And if they increase it further they will get into bonus 
territory. So everybody would win from this” (GMWDA interview 2, p.15). 
 
The contract specified the organization of the joint venture, which was to be 
organized in a rather complex, hierarchical structure with several interfaces for 
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coordination across the involved organizations. Between the Authority and 
VLGM, a high/level strategic partnership board would meet quarterly to monitor 
the contract performance and decide on major strategic issues, communications 
strategies etc. A partnership management board, where WCAs are also 
represented, would manage the general contract, whereas a number of service 
delivery groups could be delegated specific responsibilities. Between the WDA 
and WCAs, an operational group and a strategic officer group should look into 
cross-organizational issues of collection services. At the contractor end, Viridor 
Waste was responsible for operational issues and delegated construction of the 
plants to various subcontractors, whereas sales of recyclables were to be managed 
by the Viridor sub-company Viridor Resources Management (GMWDA interview 
2, p.5). As mentioned, VLGM also had a separate contract with a joint venture 
between Ineos Chlor, Viridor and John Laing Investment plc for the construction 
and operation of a thermal power station producing energy to Ineos Chlor’s 
production processes from the RDF (VLGM interview, p.21).  
 
The complex, hierarchical organization might be said to form a rather bureaucratic 
framework for the continued cooperation. However, this was seen by the 
contractor and authority as necessary in order to provide interfaces for 
coordination and explained as important to implement all these large-scale 
changes across a number of organizations (interview 2). The contract itself was a 
comprehensive document with 529 pages of legal text supplemented by a number 
of schedules and specifications. The contract outlined the organization, procedures 
and the division of risks and responsibilities, such procedures of site supply and 
planning permission, procedures for the development of a revised project plan, and 
consequences and procedures for potential failings of implementation. Including 
all the specifications and background documents the material amounts to more 
than 9,506 pages (GMWDA 2009, see Annex 3). Although the 7,726 pages of this 
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material are environmental reports on facilities, this is a large amount of material 
to be considered. However, this was also a complex contract, involving large 
economic investments and technology risks and several organizations (see also 
Table 2).  
 
Post-contract phase: From negotiation to partnership working 
From the signing of the contract, the PFI entered into a new phase. From the hard-
nosed negotiation in the procurement process, the partners needed to re-build 
relationships and develop a new way of cooperating: 
“By the time we signed the contract, we were quite fed up with each other. Then 
we had to draw a line under that put all the argument, negotiation and discussion 
behind us, and figure out how to make things work in practice. During the next 6-9 
months we worked at re-building and re-establishing relationships and partnership 
working started again” (GMWDA interview 2, p.14)  
 
VLGM emphasized that this kind of partnership working was important to make 
the PFI work, but also that it was not always easy in practice and demanded hard 
work:  
“The most important element of how this work is partnership. The word really 
implies something pleasant, in working together, but partnerships do not always 
have that starting point. It is about working hard at being a partner. (…) I would 
say that if you entered into this hoping to ‘make a buck’ or ‘beat someone up’, 
then it would have fallen a long time ago. This was very complex, quite 
substantial, and there was a lot at stake – and still is in some ways. Its failure 
could have been very quick. But it did not fail - because we worked hard on it.” 
(VLGM interview, p.13)  
 
Supplementing this, the public director underlined that what made this a 
partnership was not a problem-free relationship, but the way that difficulties were 
handled between the partners:  
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“Relationship management is the biggest part of the contract. You have to accept 
that this is a huge contract, it is long term and nothing is going to run smoothly in 
the duration of that. For me, what defines a partnership, is accepting that yes, 
you’re going to have problems, but it is about the way you resolve them and get 
over them and make things work. If both parties are prepared to do that, then it is a 
partnership.” (GMWDA interview 2, p.13) 
 
An example of close partnership working in the contract period leading to 
innovative results is the work in the service delivery group on communication. 
The communication group consisted of employees from both organizations and 
was co-located at one of the education centres headed by a public officer. This 
organization was decided upon within the contract period, since the output-based 
contract did not specify this in detail. As the contractor explains: “What the 
contract says is fairly dry legal words that ‘you will have a prevention programme 
in place’, but it doesn’t prescribe how you are supposed to do that. That had to be 
developed over time.” (GMWDA interview 2, p.8) Guided by a jointly developed 
five years communication plan, the communication team developed and 
implemented various innovative campaigns towards prevention of waste, such as a 
‘recycling fashion show’ or a cooking event with leftover food waste.  
 
The contract seemed to be heading towards the targets. The preparatory work of 
including planning authorities early secured the partners a smooth planning 
process, which compared to challenges in other waste infrastructure projects, was 
a great achievement (GMWDA interview 2, p. 4). By February 2014, recycling 
had increased to 44% and landfill diversion to 56%. The two final plants should be 
in operation by 2014/15 to hopefully increase these numbers (GMWDA 2014c). 
During the planning and construction process, the contractor had discovered a 
possibility for increasing recycling and diversion from landfill beyond the targets, 
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and consequently the partners chose to upgrade targets towards 60% recycling and 
90 % diversion (interview 2, p.8-9).  
 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the case. The main ground for the innovative 
organizational form and output was formed in the pre-contract phase, where the 
GMWDA discussed and negotiated solutions with the WCAs and actors at the 
waste market on the basis of – and during – the coordination of political targets for 
the contract. In this period, especially their role as enabling network coordinator 
and market manager was needed, although the establishment of hierarchically 
decided political targets was a prerequisite for this process. Likewise, the contract 
design reflected various governing strategies. Targets were implemented through 
an output-based contract supported by economic incentives (market), which 
established detailed procedures for cooperation, risk sharing and responsibilities 
and outlined a hierarchical organization (hierarchy) with several interfaces for 
joint working (network). Within the contract period, the contract through joint 
working, where new ideas were developed and targets were improved with mutual 
gains.  
 
Table 4: Results of Case 2 
 Governing strategies for innovation in the GMWDA - VLGM PPP  
Pre-contract 
phase 
 
- Adopting, coordinating and determining political targets in cooperation 
with WCAs (hierarchy, network) 
- Competitive tendering for new waste facilities through ‘networked’ 
coordination and negotiation with WCAs and dialogue, negotiation and 
knowledge exchange with market actors pushing them towards innovative 
solutions (market, hierarchy, network) 
Contract design 
 
- Having an output-based contract based on political targets to allow market 
efficiencies and ideas and cooperation on the implementation process 
(market, network, hierarchy)  
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- Securing the contractor a profit for risk taking and providing economic 
incentives for exceeding targets and a penalty for not meeting them 
(market, hierarchy) 
- Establish a hierarchical ‘organization’ of forums for joint working 
(network, hierarchy) 
Post-contract 
phase 
Developing a partnership relationship by making things work in practice 
within the contract framework (network, hierarchy) 
Developing innovative ideas in joint working arrangements (network) 
Creating efficiencies to exceed the targets on the background of the 
economic incentive system creating mutual gains (market, hierarchy, 
network) 
 
Case 3: The ‘Service Partnership’ between Renosyd i/s and Marius Pedersen 
A/S, Denmark 
Renosyd i/s is a public interest company owned by Skanderborg Municipality and 
Odder Municipality in the Mid Jutland area. They have been delegated the 
operational responsibility for collection and treatment of household waste in the 
municipalities directed by a board with five members from Skanderborg and three 
members from the smaller Odder Municipality. As the first public organization in 
Denmark, they have contracted out the collection of residual waste in a ‘service 
partnership’ contract. They entered into a 5-year contract with a two-year 
extension option (5+2) with Marius Pedersen A/S from 1st September 2008 until 
30 April 2013. The contract amounted to around 16 million DKK per year for the 
provision of collection services for approx. 33,000 households. Within the contract 
period, the service was expanded with a new collection service of mixed 
packaging waste in a separate ‘resource bin’. This material has temporarily been 
delivered to a sorting plant in Vojens, but Renosyd has been in dialogue with other 
municipalities and public companies on having their own sorting plant constructed 
in the area. Renosyd also has an in-house collection of paper, garden waste and 
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bulky waste. The public company owns and operates a number of household 
recycling stations, a controlled deposit and a CHP incineration plant, which is 
connected to the local district heating system.  
 
Pre-contract: A former adverse relationship and expectations of service 
changes 
The idea to the service partnership was developed on the background of a 
problematic contract period with another contractor. As Renosyd explains, they 
realized through a scrutinizing process that perhaps the problem was not simply 
that the contractor did not perform well, but rather that the contract did not provide 
the right framework for the cooperation. They gathered inspiration to this new 
contract form from a consultant with experience from PPPs in the construction 
industry:   
“When we were done criticizing each other, we realized that they really only did 
what our contract asked them to. The contract did not focus on delivering good 
quality services to citizens, but only on transporting waste from A to B. That was 
not good enough. So we created a working group including an external consultant 
with experience from partnership working in the construction sector and tried to 
figure out what to do now” (Renosyd interview, p.3).  
 
Furthermore, Renosyd was in a process of changing their collection systems, 
which they would need to do within the next contract period. Like the English 
authorities, Renosyd was pressured by the EU recycling targets and demands to 
increase recycling, but in contrast diversion from landfill was already secured 
through incineration. Furthermore, national regulation demanded municipalities to 
establish collection systems for plastic and metal waste. Renosyd’s ‘Waste Plan 
2010-2012’ showed that the two municipalities were far from recycling targets on 
especially plastics (2%) and metal (11%), which at that time were collected 
through household recycle stations. Hence the plan, which was finalized within the 
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contract period, prescribed a change from residual waste collection once a week in 
traditional bags, to residual waste in a regular bin and packaging waste (metal, 
glass, plastics) in a split-bodied bin collected every fortnight. This idea was 
adopted and adjusted from Aabenraa Municipality, who had implemented a 
similar system (Renosyd 2010/11).  
 
Besides the possibility of changing service specification in the contract period, 
Renosyd also attempted to secure their right to implement these changes by noting 
them in procurement material. The contract was tendered through a process of 
restricted procurement with pre-qualification, which did not provide more 
dialogue than any traditional procurement process. Hence the organizational form 
and potential changes were in this case directed from public demand. However, 
the tender also involved the possibility for a traditional contract in case the market 
would not be ready for this new contract model (Renosyd 2008). Whereas the 
traditional procurement material involved a detailed specification of the collection 
procedure, the service partnership contract described this as guidelines, which 
could be altered in dialogue between the partners (Renosyd 2008). In that way, 
Renosyd opened for flexibility to innovate services in the contract period rather 
than in the procurement period. Three private companies applied for and were 
approved pre-qualification, where after Renosyd selected a service partnership 
with Marius Pedersen as the most economically advantageous tender.  
 
Contract design: Economic incentives and risk sharing 
Resembling the RBKC contract, this contract was framed by a ‘partnering 
agreement’ and a ‘partnership charter’ establishing the aims and values for the 
cooperation. This agreement stated that the partners would solve service tasks in 
an open, collaborative relationship, reaching qualitative an economic objectives 
through an efficient and instructive process, where both parties would contribute 
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to a positive, constructive and goal-oriented cooperation and ensure the 
development of a good ‘collaboration spirit’ based on openness, honesty and 
mutual respect (Renosyd 2008: Aftale om servicepartnerskab, p.1). The agreement 
also established two hierarchical organized forums for joint working to steer the 
partnership: a strategic oriented ‘steering group’ and an operational oriented 
‘project group’. The partnership was to start up with a workshop that would 
include members of collection staff to ‘ground’ the partnership idea in the 
organizations (ibid., p. 3-4).   
 
This framework were combined with a market-inspired ‘dynamic budget model’, 
which was created in the pre-procurement phase. The model provided a sharing of 
costs and benefits to incentivize continuous efficiencies, but also delegated 
penalties to the contractor if the work was not satisfactory. Thus if the contractor 
was to exceed the acceptable level of ‘mistakes’, he would pay retribution, 
whereas if the contractor did exceed this level, extra costs or savings would be 
shared between the partners (Renosyd 2008: Betingelser og målsætninger, 
servicepartnerskab).  The contractor experienced the contract model as 
‘refreshing’ in comparison to the traditional contracting out in waste services, 
which they felt tended to become less and less fair with cumulative demands and 
less gains to the private contractor: “We had experienced a period where demands 
continuously grew until we thought we were about to reach the limit of unfairness. 
And then, this whole new way of looking at this arrives. A new consultant, we had 
not seen before. It was very refreshing. The language, the approach, the 
formulation of the collaborative spirit, attitude and values – a whole new category 
of concepts was applied.” (MP interview, p.11) 
 
The contract material amounted to a little more than 100 pages including material 
for the two various contract models, which in comparison to the English contracts 
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was moderate. However, the service tasks and organisation were also simpler and 
thus easier to describe with smaller investments for both parties (see Appendix 2). 
Compared to the GMWDA contract, targets for recycling are not incorporated in 
this contract, although they might be steering the partnership indirectly.  
 
Post-contract phase: Service innovation and organizational integration 
According to both the contractor and Renosyd, the contract succeeded in framing a 
much more collaborative relationship. As the contractor described:  
“Obviously, it is also related to the culture and specific persons involved, but we 
experienced within this contract a completely different form of dialogue. Rather 
than sitting on each side of a table with a contract in the middle that you tear in 
from both sides, we experienced that we were sitting on the same side of the table,  
looking into the same contract and having the same goals of increasing quality and 
decreasing costs” (MP interview, p.11).  
 
The partners experienced a conflict in relation to a winter period with extreme 
weather, where the authority got many citizen complaints. According to Renosyd, 
they managed those issues by holding on to their principles of cooperation:  
“At that point, we were a little annoyed at each other, but then we sat down, 
looked each other in the eye, remembered our principles and decided to scrap the 
incentive system for a while and just make things work. (…) This form of 
collaboration does not mean that we do not ever have conflicts. But we do try to 
find methods to eliminate them and be open and honest towards each other” 
(Renosyd interview, p.3). 
 
Whereas the difficult winter period in the beginning led to increased contract 
costs, shared savings characterized the rest of the contract phase.  
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Whereas service changes were directed by Renosyd, the contractor participated 
actively in the further development and implementation of the authority’s ideas. 
As the contractor explained:  
“In relation to waste collection contracts with public authorities, we only innovate 
if there is a demand for improvement of environmental standards in the contract 
material. Within the contract period, Renosyd had to change its collection services 
to collect more waste types, so we have been in dialogue with them on for instance 
shifting from bags to bins or the possibility of collecting from a stand by the house 
versus at the roadside. That kind of development, when their needs changes, is 
something we have participated in.” (MP interview, p.13)  
 
In relation the service changes, Renosyd also desired a new electronic chip system 
to register bin collections, where the contractor actively participated in 
determining the design of the system and developing a good workflow to 
eliminate working procedures (Renosyd interview, p.3-4).  
 
The contract period also led to minor improvements initiated by the contractor’s 
staff, such as more efficient collection routes and adjustment to equipment at 
households. In the day-to-day working, the refuse collectors were functioning as 
an ‘extended arm’ of the public company. If they experienced something on the 
route that was not working well, they would report back to Renosyd (Renosyd 
interview, p.2). According to Renosyd, they almost perceived the private refuse 
collectors as being part of their own organization: “The staffs from Renosyd are 
almost part of our own staff. For instance they get Christmas presents and stop by 
for a coffee. Since their contract manager is situated in Esbjerg, we even 
sometimes get information before he does” (Renosyd interview 1, p. 4). As such, 
compared to the RBKC, only collection staffs were co-located and not contract 
managers. 
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The results from case 3 are summarized in Table 5. The service partnership was in 
itself an innovation and a huge step change from traditional contracting out of 
waste services in Denmark. This model, as well as the service changes in the 
contract, was initiated from the public company and thus based mainly on 
hierarchical coordination, although they were implemented in a competitive 
tendered contract. The procurement process did not open for private sector ideas, 
but instead there was an enhanced possibility for private influence in the contract 
period. The contract provided a market-based economic incentive for continuous 
efficiencies in the contract period, and hierarchical forums for joint working to 
steer the partnership and implement changes. The incentives in combination with a 
closer collaboration with the refuse collection staff brought efficiency savings to 
both partners. Both partners experienced a more open and collaborative working 
environment, where the contractor actively participated with their knowledge and 
ideas in the implementation of service innovations.  
 
Table 5: Results of Case 3  
 Governing strategies for innovation in the Renosyd - Marius Pedersen 
PPP  
Pre-contract 
phase 
 
- Preparing to adopt to political targets through a more flexible contract 
design (hierarchy) 
- Designing a new contract model with inspiration from the construction 
sector (hierarchy, network) 
- Competitive tendering through a traditional restricted procedure (market, 
hierarchy) 
Contract design 
 
- Using a traditional detailed task specification, but making this flexible to 
allow for changes in the contract period (network, market, hierarchy)  
- Developing a new dynamic budget model to align economic interests 
between the organizations (market, hierarchy) 
- Describing common aims and values of cooperation and continuous 
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development of service improvements (network) 
- Establishing collaborative hierarchical organized forums for joint working 
governing (network, hierarchy) 
Post-contract 
phase 
- Further developing and implementing the public organizations ideas for 
service innovation through exchange of ideas and knowledge (hierarchy, 
network, market) 
- Solving conflicts through open and honest dialogue (network, market) 
- Developing and implementing minor service changes in close 
collaboration with the contractor’s refuse collection staff (network, 
hierarchy) 
- Creating efficiencies to obtain shared savings through the dynamic budget 
model (market, network) 
 
Case 4: The innovation partnership and joint venture contract in Vejle 
Municipality, Denmark 
Vejle Waste and Recycling (VWR) is a unit in Vejle Municipality situated in the 
Mid-Jutland area. The division is placed at the same site as the main part of the 
municipalities waste management facilities and functions almost as a separate 
‘company’ with its own communication staff, legal advisor, a user based economy 
etc. VWR serves around 110,000 citizens in 46,586 households producing more 
than 90,000 tons waste each year. The municipality contract out collection 
services and owns or co-owns most of its waste treatment facilities. Residual 
waste and organic waste is collected in black and green bags from the kerbside to 
be sorted at the municipality’s optical sorting plant. From there, organic waste is 
pre-treated and sent to a bio-gas plant, whereas residual waste is sent for 
incineration with heat and energy production at two municipally co-owned plants 
in Esbjerg and Kolding.  Recycling (paper, card, plastics and metal), garden waste 
and ‘problem’ waste (fi. hazardous light bulbs) is collected once a month through 
a bulky waste collection scheme or at one of the four household recycling sites 
(VWR 2014). VWR also used to have their own sorting facility for paper, card and 
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plastic foil, but this was closed down as they calculated it would be cheaper to 
contract out along with the sale of recycled material (VWR interview, p.6).  
In July 2013, VWR issued a tender for a public-private joint venture to replace the 
optical sorting pant with a new ‘resource centre’ including the construction, 
finance and operation of a modern sorting plant able to manage organic, residual 
and pre-sorted dry recyclable waste, a new household recycle station and adjusting 
building (such as administrative offices, a transfer station etc.). The contract 
would also include the operation of existing household recycling sites as well as a 
number of administrative and service tasks, such as administration of collections, 
communications, sales etc. The resource centre might be dimensioned to include 
commercial waste and waste from other municipalities in line with the wishes of 
the private contractor (udbud.dk 2013).  
 
This solution was innovative in terms of both organizational form and technology 
– and perhaps too innovative; the procurement process was eventually stalled by 
legislative complications. Consequently, this analysis will focus on the pre-
contract phase – and as part of this – the ‘innovation partnership’ with Marius 
Pedersen A/S, which was used to develop an organizational model for the 
procurement. 
 
Pre-contract phase: A long planning process, an innovation partnership and 
the beginning of a competitive dialogue process 
The contract preparation phase in Vejle was even longer than in Greater 
Manchester. Vejle Municipality decided to focus on resources in waste already in 
the late 1980s, where they implemented the optical sorting system to co-collect 
organic waste as one of the first municipalities in Denmark. Around 2005, the 
plant began to be run down and they started to investigate new solutions.  
However, the process was halted by the Danish structural reform in 2007, where a 
358 
 
new Vejle Municipality was created from four smaller municipalities (Give, Vejle, 
Børkop and Egtved). In 2007 they decided to continue the focus on resources and 
innovation, but the following years were occupied with aligning their various 
waste management systems (VWR 2007, VWR 2009).  
 
Towards the end of 2011, a political decision was taken that outlined the idea of 
building a ‘resource centre’ on a new site in Vejle Nord. That allowed VWR to 
engage in various networking activities to investigate available technological an 
organizational solutions in Europe in the following years. Based on these 
experiences, they acknowledged that they might not have enough capacity by 
themselves to provide economies of scale for the sort of mechanical sorting plant, 
which they were looking at. They were especially inspired by the English PFI 
experience:  
“In this process, we could see that these sorting plants worked well, but might 
demand some volume. And then especially in England, we were inspired by the 
integrated PFI projects. We talked to an English local authority with a joint 
venture, who was very content with this solution. They did not only cooperate on 
construction and operation, but also on administrative tasks.” (VWR interview, 
p.7)  
 
As such, VWR was inspired to broaden the scope of the contract. They considered 
to coordinate with other municipalities, but judged joint procurement to be too 
difficult and time consuming to coordinate. Also, current public companies were 
already under pressure from the government towards potential privatization, so 
they did not see this as a future-proof solution (VWR interview, p.14). 
 
In Denmark, VWR looked at some of the Danish contractual PPPs in the 
construction sector, but found that these seemed rather traditional and simple 
compared to the complexity of their project:  
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“The complexity of this was larger and we wanted to secure a possibility for 
continuous development. It is hard to predict the development of waste 
management services 20 years ahead in time. In comparison it might be easier to 
plan a parking house - it is probably approximately the same type of cars, whereas 
the likelihood of shifting to ‘flying brooms’ is relatively small” (VWR interview, 
p.11).  
 
Instead, they looked into the more collaborative approach to contracting in the 
service partnership in Renosyd. VWR hoped that a more collaborative approach 
might contribute to a new way forward for the waste management sector: “Why 
does a contract need to be an order to do ’this and that’ for the lowest price? And 
then being in war against each other for the rest of the time? That is insane. The 
best thing for both parties is to find win-win solutions.” (VWR interview, p.11) 
Accordingly, the final tender material became a piecemeal solution inspired by 
various PPPs across Europe.  
 
To further develop and mature this idea, they began to discuss these possible 
solutions with actors at the Danish waste market, which led them into an 
‘innovation partnership’ with the private company Marius Pedersen A/S (MP). 
Innovation partnerships (OPI) is a Danish model for public-private cooperation 
where a new solution with commercial potential is developed in cooperation 
between a public organization and one or more private organizations (Brogaard 
and Petersen 2014). In this case, the idea was to develop an innovative 
organizational design (rather than a new technology), which might fit both VWR’s 
political objectives and MP’s judgment of what might be a viable private business 
model. The partners entered into a structured dialogue process supported by two 
private consultancies, where they discussed possibilities and challenges relating to 
joint venture PPPs or purely contractual PPPs versus pure public or pure private 
solutions. As VWR describes: “There was a lot of dialogue, and then we had the 
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lawyers and Deloitte to investigate and present various possibilities, which we 
could discuss and say ‘well, how may this model fit a private company? Would 
this be interesting for them?’ Or ‘no, as a municipality this would not work at 
all’” (VWR Interview, p.10). The dialogue and the end reports showed that a PPP 
model might be viable for both partners (Deloitte 2013, Rønne & Lundgren 
2013A, Rønne & Lundgren 2013B).  
 
VWR decided on the more collaborative and flexible joint venture model and 
continued an open approach towards the private sector by tendering the contract 
through a competitive dialogue process. The tender material presented the 
organizational framework and ideas of the project, but left many details to be 
decided in the procurement process (interview, p.11, udbud.dk 2013). The material 
further emphasizes the authority’s collaborative vision; ‘that the collaboration 
with the private partner will develop into a close partnership, where the various 
strengths and competences of the partners may contribute to develop a better and 
more efficient use of resources” (udbud.dk 2013, p.1).  In November 2011, they 
began a competitive dialogue process with four pre-qualified bidders.  
 
In relation to the general development and national policies in Denmark, the VWR 
PPP might be seen as an innovative front-runner project both in terms of 
organization and technology. The PPP project was developed while the 
government worked on a delayed resource strategy, which was published in 
October 2013 (Regeringen 2013). VWR’s aims of providing new facilities to 
extract more resources fitted very well with the aims of the government strategy, 
which also emphasised separate collection of organic waste and the need for 
public-private cooperation. Furthermore, the Resource Plan (which followed the 
strategy) projected that the Ministry would engage in a ‘state-of-art’ mechanical 
sorting plant for dry recyclables (EPA 2013, p 37). The National Board of 
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Environmental Protection had begun working towards this and considered various 
scenarios for public-private cooperation quite similar to the considerations in the 
OPI (DAKOFA 2014).  
 
Despite all this coherence, the project has been halted by challenges in the Danish 
procurement and waste regulations. Whereas recyclable industry waste had been 
liberalised with the L513 regulation from June 2009, VWR’s plan was to increase 
economies of scale by including recyclable industry waste based on a 51% private 
ownership of the joint venture, which their legal advisor had recommended as 
plausible. However, a declaration from the state attorney from February 2014 
stated that this would contravene the purpose of this regulation 
(Kammeradvokaten 2014).  
 
Whereas English PFIs are usually organised in joint venture arrangements, the 
L548 regulation on the participation of public authorities in joint companies 
restrict this collaboration to tasks, which has not been contracted out to private 
actors before with the purpose of preparing markets to take over these tasks. 
Furthermore, only 50% of the turnover from company sales over a three year 
period may stem from other customers than municipalities.  In combination with 
the liberalization of recyclable industry waste with the L531 regulation from 2009, 
this also means that treating recyclable industry waste cannot be a part of a new 
sorting plant established in a public-private company after L548 (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the purpose of L548 fundamentally goes against the thought in 
partnership working of some tasks being best taken care of in public-private 
collaboration. The Danish Environmental Agency, who originally supported 
VWR’s legal interpretation, currently considers changing the regulation, but 
otherwise, Vejle will have to fundamentally alter the project.  
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Table 6 summarizes the results of case 4. Vejle Waste and Recycling has 
employed a mixture of hierarchical, market and network governing strategies in 
the pursuit of an innovative PPP model and waste infrastructure. They went 
through a long political process of developing the main ideas and targets along 
with which they explored available organizational and technological solutions in a 
European and Danish context. VWR strived to secure market interest for the PPP 
by entering into a collaborative OPI with a private company and arrived at a 
‘piecemeal’ PPP solution emphasising market opportunities and a collaborative 
approach and seeking a technological solution that would be new in a Danish 
context.  
 
Table 6: Results of Case 4 
 Governing strategies for innovation in the Vejle Waste and Recycling 
PPP   
Pre-contract 
phase 
 
- Developing hierarchical targets on the forefront of top down government 
demands through various network and market management strategies to 
search for new solutions and gain knowledge from experiences from public 
and private actors in Europe and Denmark (hierarchy, network, market) 
- Developing a new organizational model for public-private cooperation in 
close collaboration and dialogue with a private company in an ‘innovation 
partnership’, thereby aligning hierarchical and market based needs 
(network, market, hierarchy) 
- Competitive tendering for new waste facilities and services through a 
collaborative ‘competitive dialogue’ process on the basis of hierarchically 
established targets (hierarchy, market, network)  
 
Comparing the cases: Mixing strategies for innovation  
The analysis of the four cases suggests that innovation processes in PPPs is not 
driven solely by hierarchy, competition or network strategies, but through a 
combination of all of these. Against similar analyses of social coordination in PPP 
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processes (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998, Ysa 2010), the investigation of these 
cases points towards a mix of strategies in all phases of the PPP, rather than a 
model of temporal shifts from one form of coordination to another.  Although a 
general pattern of moving from hierarchical decision processes, market demand, 
competition and looser network coordination towards closer collaboration in the 
contract period might be argued for, this would be a simplification of governing 
processes in these contract-based PPPs. Table 7 provides an overview of the cases. 
Each square shows the relative importance of the three strategies by highlighting 
potential dominant strategies. 
 
Table 7: Mixed governing strategies for innovation in all four cases  
 Case 1  
(RBKC-Sita 
UK) 
Case 2 
(GMWDA-
VLGM) 
Case 3 
(Renosyd/MP) 
Case 4 
(VWR-MP/?) 
Pre-contract Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Hierarchy, 
market, network  
Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Contract design Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Hierarchy, 
market, network 
- 
Post-contract Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Hierarchy, 
market, network 
Hierarchy, 
market, network 
- 
 
In all four cases, the process of establishing ambitious targets towards innovative 
solutions through political hierarchies was prominent to achieve service 
innovation. Whether taking place before or during contract periods, these 
processes were a pre-requisite to demand innovation in the PPPs. Especially the 
GMWDA case and the VWR case displayed that waste markets did not just 
‘supply’ innovative solutions by themselves, but needed to be ‘managed’ through 
dialogue, negotiation and demand from public organizations. In both these cases, 
organizational and technological innovations were discussed with market actors 
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before the procurement process even started. In this way, the authorities secured 
that there was a market for the contract and hence competition that might bring 
efficiencies. In Vejle, VWR even entered a closer collaboration with a private 
partner through an innovation partnership to have a forum to discuss these issues 
without the risk of disqualifying their private dialogue partner.  
 
Except for Renosyd, the authorities chose to tender an output-based contract 
through negotiated or competitive dialogue procedures thus providing a possibility 
for market input. This might be related to the character of the service tasks, as the 
collection service that Renosyd required was also – except for the potential of 
implementing changes within the contract period – rather standard at a competitive 
market. The main innovation in this contract was the organizational form, which 
was also kept relatively simple compared to the other PPPs and made voluntary. 
Seemingly, in the cases where the combination of tasks and organizational 
structure were more complex and innovative, authorities opted for more 
networked pre-contract processes.  
 
However, Renosyd did provide a possibility for altering specifications after 
signing the contract. This might also reflect a general difference between 
collection (service) PPPs and treatment (infrastructure) PPPs. Whereas the most 
radical innovation tend to be developed in the pre-contract phase for treatment 
PPPs, where facilities and technologies are decided upon, collection PPPs tend to 
focus more on innovation in the post-contract phase, where there is a need for 
flexibility to introduce service changes and adjustments to collection procedures. 
In the RBKC case, authorities did demand some specific organizational 
innovations in the contract, but they emphasised the wish for a contractor, who 
would continuously work with them towards increasing recycling in the contract 
period. However, Vejle also emphasised that they wanted the partnership to 
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develop into a collaborative relationship where “the various strengths and 
competences of the partners may contribute to develop a better and more efficient 
use of resources” (udbud.dk 2013, p.1).  This clearly showed their inspiration 
from service PPPs. The Vejle case is a prime example of how outreach to a 
number of various sectors and countries for ideas led to the development of new 
‘piecemeal’ organizational form and process. Perhaps it was rather these 
networked search processes, than the inclusion of market actors through 
procurement that were the main cause of larger scale service innovations, whereas 
tender and flexible contracts were tools for implementation.  
 
Especially in the more complex GMWDA-VLGM case, the contract established a 
hierarchical structure with procedures for interaction between the various 
interfaces for collaborative working.  In this way, network collaboration was 
integrated in hierarchical governance structures of the involved organizations. 
Likewise, market-like structures were implemented in the contracts to provide a 
continuous drive for efficiencies in the ‘monopoly’ period after contract award. In 
this way, mixed frameworks were established for a post-contract period, which 
was to some degree hierarchically structured, but also provided market structures 
to incentivize change and collaborative forums to enable co-production of 
solutions and ideas. Whereas service innovations towards mainly ‘social value’, 
for instance increasing recycling, were generally driven by the public sector, the 
GMWDA actually managed to design a contract were political targets combined 
with economic incentives aligned the partners interests to work towards and find 
new solutions to increase recycling.  
 
In all cases, ‘relationship management’ and partnership working were mentioned 
as important to make these structures function in practice. Trust did not just occur 
from the established structures, but needed to be developed over time, where 
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relationships were created and maintained. In comparison, the RBKC-Sita UK 
PPP seemed more cooperative and trust-based than the other cases. The partners 
expressed a high level of mutual respect and close collaboration down through the 
layers of the organizations, and as the only case, they expressed that they did not 
have any fall-outs between the organizations. This contract differed in that it did 
not build on economic incentives or involve penalties, but relied on a fixed profit 
alone. As Stelling (2014) emphasizes, trusting involves taking a ‘leap of faith’ 
rather than constructing control mechanisms to ensure certain actions from the 
other partner. Hence, there was a larger delegation of trust from the authority to 
the contractor in the RBKC case, which may explain this difference.  
 
The RBKC-Sita PPP reported that they efficiently solved problems and challenges 
in everyday working, and they also managed to improve collection rates under 
very challenging conditions in a densely populated area in inner London, which in 
itself is valuable. However, it might be questioned, whether the higher degree of 
collaboration and trust in itself led to more innovation compared to the other 
cases. In line with the above discussion, the analyses point to that the degree of 
innovation would also depend on hierarchical coordination of innovation targets, 
idea development through networked outreach and availability of mature 
technologies at waste markets.  
 
Relating this to the discussion of mixed company PPPs versus pure contract-based 
PPP (Bel and Fageda 2010, Cruz and Marques 2012, Cruz et al 2013), the most 
collaborative PPP in this case setup was actually purely contract-based, although 
the contract did set up an ‘almost’ joint organization. Thus, although Steijn et al 
(2011) have a good point in saying that organizational form matter less compared 
to management to develop good PPP outcomes, this case study points towards 
slightly greater complexity in the argument. Although the organizational form as a 
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‘label’ might not matter, the specific contractual design, for instance the 
organization of forums for joint working, co-location and a fixed profit, might 
matter a great deal in order to develop collaborative partnership relationships and 
better outcomes. In all cases, mixes of social coordination forms in the contract 
were used to incentivise and enable the development and especially 
implementation of innovative outcomes.  
 
There were also some differences between the countries in the comparative 
framework. In England, both cases were dominated by the need for coordination 
between authority levels with split responsibilities. Accordingly, although political 
target setting could be seen as a hierarchical process, the WDAs needed to act as 
network managers to enable these targets to be set and agree on the main lines for 
the procurements of treatment facilities with the WCAs delivering the waste 
‘input’. This aligns well with Bovaird’s (2006) suggestion that contracting in UK 
authorities not only develops toward increased collaborative working, but also 
towards more complex forms of coordination in procurement processes (Bovaird 
2006). Although waste facilities and collection in these cases were not jointly 
procured, it was not possible for WDAs to procure without the consent of WCAs, 
which in the other end were obliged by law to cooperate and pressured to align 
collection systems to permit local system innovation.  As PFI’s were practically 
the only solution for them to get access to adequate funding, they also needed to 
coordinate with market actors. This was especially important for the GMWDA, 
who opted for a more innovative solution than mainstream incineration. 
 
Waste system innovation might in principle be easier in Denmark, where 
municipalities as single authorities have the joint responsibility of collection and 
treatment. However, Danish municipalities also have a tradition for joint working 
to provide waste treatment facilities and sometimes collection services. As the 
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Renosyd case shows, various networks of waste treatment have developed over 
time on a voluntary basis, rather than top down organized as in England. Whereas 
Renosyd, in itself a municipal co-operation, takes part in network based idea 
development with other nearby public organizations about the provision of 
mechanical sorting facilities, the Vejle case differs by flying solo. According to 
VWR, a process of coordination between municipalities in the area would take too 
much time, and instead they rely on the other municipalities to more or less 
formally join the project at a later point in time (VWR interview). However, 
Vejle’s attempt to secure economies of scale by including private industry waste 
may fail in consequence of current Danish legislation. Perhaps Danish 
municipalities will have to go through the same hard processes of political (and 
procurement) coordination as the English authorities to be able to innovate their 
waste systems.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how the management of a mix of hierarchical, market and 
network strategies throughout the PPP process were employed in four waste 
management PPPs to develop innovative organizational forms and outcomes. The 
cases were all at different stages and had slightly different approaches to the 
innovation of waste management services. In England, the Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea were under political pressure to increase recycling in their 
collection service and engaged in a collaborative, trust-based and flexible contract 
with no economic penalties to align public and private objectives and allow for 
continuous improvements in the contract period. In Greater Manchester, the WDA 
undertook a networked coordination exercise, where they discussed and negotiated 
targets and solutions with WCAs and market actors in order to mobilize for a large 
scale system innovation of both organizational form and technology use. The 
partners in this PPP made a complex organizational PFI-contract work in practice 
369 
 
and developed ideas to exceed political targets through joint effort towards 
partnership working.  
 
In Denmark, Renosyd wanted to change former adversarial relationships to private 
contractors and gain flexibility to implement a new recycling system within the 
contract period. They developed a new contract model based on a ‘partnership 
charter’ to frame a more collaborative relationship and a market-based dynamic 
budget model to align economic interests. This led to efficiencies and shared 
economic gains, a more open relationship and private ideas and input to the 
implementation of the new system. In Vejle, the division of Waste and Recycling 
gathered organizational and technical inspiration from especially English PFIs and 
Renosyd to develop an innovative, ‘piecemeal’ organizational model to implement 
technology that was innovative in the Danish context. As such, the cases all 
combined networked outreach activities to form new ideas with hierarchical target 
setting to set direction, competitive market structures to incentivize efficiencies 
and institutionalized spaces for joint working to enable development and 
implementation of ideas.  
 
The article suggests some adjustments to existing PPP theory. First, the article 
suggest that the idea that PPPs evolve through phases of hierarchy, market and 
network coordination is somewhat simplified. Rather, PPPs involve a mix of these 
organisation forms over the whole PPP process from pre-contract, to contract 
design and post-contract phase. Second, the article show that organizational form 
does matter to the success of PPPs in relation to innovation. Not in terms of the 
‘label’ of contract or joint venture, but in terms of the specific contract design and 
organisation of the cooperation. Third, and in line with the second proposition, the 
article suggest that joint ventures are not necessarily more collaborative than 
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contract-based PPPs. This will depend on the specific design and management of 
the PPP. 
 
For practitioners, the article points toward the need to include a mix of governing 
strategies in the management of PPPs over the whole process from pre-contract, 
contract design and post-contract phase in order to deliver innovation. Innovation 
is not necessarily about developing a new idea from scratch, but often rather a 
result of an outreach process, where from ideas are collected to new ‘piecemeal’ 
solutions. Therefore it is important to plan time for this process in the pre-contract 
phase as well as ensuring adequate flexibility and collaboration forums in the post 
contract phase. The paper also showed that joint working to a various degree took 
place in bureaucratic organizations. This raises a number of questions. How 
different are these joint working organizations from public bureaucracies? Did 
contracting out just create a new bureaucratic monster, where mixed interests 
make it even more difficult to take decisions and move forward? Might public 
organisations be better of innovating waste management services by themselves 
without having to deal with all this complexity?  
 
In Denmark, municipalities have so far preferred the flexibility of in-house 
solutions for treatment to be able to continuously develop waste services along 
political flux, whereas the more simple collection services have been contracted 
out. In this context, Vejle and Renosyd provide small ‘revolutions’ by working 
towards collaboration rather than competition between public and private waste 
management actors. In England, local authorities have – perhaps more from need 
than want – included private actors in the provision of new waste infrastructure. 
However, as these cases show, English local authorities are continuously 
developing these relationships to cure some of the ‘child diseases’ of PPPs and 
incorporate needs for flexibility and innovation. As such, the English cases can 
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provide learning to other countries such as Denmark, which considers going down 
the PPP lane.    
 
The need for developing continuous efficiencies in public services might make 
PPPs worth the effort. The analysed cases point towards that a bridging of public 
and private interests can be possible through open and thorough preparation 
processes, intelligent contract design and an effort towards collaborative working 
on both sides of the table. This demands an acknowledgement of the various 
interests and raison d’être of public and private organisations and perhaps also 
increased confidence in the other organization and a daring to trust. Although 
mixing seem to be a valuable and perhaps unavoidable tactic of innovating in 
PPPs, it might be important to remember that while targets of economic gains and 
social value might be aligned to some degree, partnership is essentially about 
learning from and prospering on each other’s forces rather than trying to 
assimilate the other organization to your own.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Contract documents in the RBKC and Sita UK Ltd. partnership 
contract  
Contract documents 
Document Number of pages 
Partnership charter 6 
Partnership contract 53 
General specification 11 
Waste collection 16 
Recycling (incl. appendixes) 8 (+18) 
Waste disposal 2 
Street cleansing (incl. appendixes) 18 
(+22+5+2+3+4+1+17+1+1
+2) 
Waste collection, Recycling, and cleansing in the market streets 
(incl. appendixes) 
6 (+1+3) 
Public conveniences (incl. appendixes) 4 (+4+2) 
Winter emergences (incl. appendixes) 7 (+46+4+3) 
Stand-by 2 
Notting Hill carnival 7 
Special events (incl. appendix) 3 (+3) 
Building maintenance (including appendix) 6 (+1) 
In total: 34 documents, 292 pages 
Source: 
http://www.rbkc.gov.uk/councilanddemocracy/commentscomplaintsfeedback/freedomofinforma
tion/wastemanagementcontract.aspx [23/7 2014] 
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Appendix 2: Contract documents in the service partnership between Renosyd 
i/s and Marius Pedersen A/S  
Contract documents 
Document Number of pages 
Main contract 6 
Procurement material  
- Procurement specifications traditional contract 
- Procurement specifications service partnership 
- Service Partnership Agreement  
- Bidding list traditional contract 
- Bidding list service partnership  
- Special conditions 
 
- 27 
- 25 
- 7 
- 8 
- 8 
- 18 
Specified offer (bidding list filled out) min. 8  
Financial security document - 
In total: 9 documents, 107+ pages 
Source: Material received from Renosyd by request 
 
Appendix 3: Contract documents in the PFI joint venture contract between 
GMWDA and Viridor Laing Ltd.  
Contract documents 
Document Number of pages 
Main contract 529 
Project agreement schedules  
- Service delivery plans - 
- Work programmes - 
- Waste flow model - 
- CHP Roc regime 6 
- Joint insurance agreement, part 1+2 11+12 
- Independent certifiers appointment 42 
- Fire suppression 5 
- Form of annual report 6 
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- Payment mechanism and performance framework 218 
- Forms of lease 21 
- Form of professional team warranty 8 
- Form of authority’s direct agreements 
- Rail contractor agreement 
- Operating contractor 
- COSTAIN Ltd. 
- Keppel Seghers 
- Clarke Haase 
- Enpure Ltd 
- CP manufacturing (Europe) Ltd 
- TEG warranty 
- MCC to COSTAIN 
- TPSCo Engineer warranty 
96 
- 16 
- 7 
- 7 
- 15 
- 11 
- 8 
- 8 
- 8 
- 12 
- 4 
- Form of financiers direct agreements 
- Project CO subcontractor 
- Financiers direct agreement 
- Financiers TPS 
100 
- 28 
- 48 
- 24 
- Site details  
(main + 30 docs of illustrations) 
196 
(11+3+2+2+2+3+2+2+2+1
+2+2+4++3+2+4+2+3+2+
3+3+3+3+1+2+2+2+1+1+
1+3)  
- Form of monthly report 4 
- TPSCo Financial model - 
- Base case financial model - 
- Insurance section A – SPV insurances 50 
- Insurance section B – TPSCo insurances 55 
- Output specification 56 
- Authority share/contractor share - 
- Longley Lane MCC facility costs - 
- List of sites and facilities 7 
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- Principal sub-contracts - 
- Contractor and HoldCo  
- Initial financial agreements 10 
- Proposed planning schedule - 
- Royalty payments following expiry and early termination - 
- Environmental provisions 
(55 docs on the various facilities) 
7,724 
(116+128+150+216+361+
117+103+166+159+192+1
15+58+154+147+197+2+1
16+262+41+36+9+5+5+1
7+96+40+46+22+37+13+
447+94+214+45+302+138
+18+4+10+42+4+7+49+8
0+72+54+36+32+8+22+3
96+282+212+108+101) 
- New site minimum criteria 11 
- Code dispute resolution criteria 5 
- Waste law list 12 
- Pensions (admission agreement + bond) 17 + 12 
- Relevant discharge terms 2 
- First employee list - 
- Landfill sites contracts 
- Biffa 
- WRL 
- Veolia 
- Viridor landfill 
288 
-72 
- 72 
- 72 
- 72 
- Commercially sensitive information 27 
- Input specifications 28 
- Supplementary works payment - 
- Base case adjustment protocols 2 
- Escalation of disputes 1 
- Actuaries letter (letter +TR1) 7+7 
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- Public rights of ways - 
- Contingencies, title defects - 
- Authority DBFO noviation agreement - 
- Deeds of surrender (Deed of surrender + TR1) 5+7 
- Non-key services and dry recyclables - 
- Deeds and documents 5 
- Dilapidations - 
- BOI supported faculty - 
- GMWL composting contracts - 
- Landfill site deed of novation 
- Viridor 
- WRG 
- Veolia 
- Biffa 
17 
- 6 
-  
- 5 
- 6 
- Share disposal agreement 8 
- Rail waggons 4 
- RVC contract basis of tender obligation - 
- Budgeted schedule - 
- Online data room index - 
In total:  min. 163 documents  Min. 9,506 pages (1,780 + 
7,726 of environmental 
provisions) 
 
Source: http://meetings.gmwda.gov.uk/ecCatDisplay.aspx?sch=doc&cat=12881&path=0, 
[30/07/2014] Some of the documents or parts of documents are redacted from the public, 
because they are commercially sensitive to the contractor  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview guides 
England, private organization 
Thus is an example of an interview guide for interviewing a private company in a partnering 
contract (service partnership).  
 
 
  
Interview guide 
Nn, Nn, Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea, SITA uk, 24th June 2013 
 
Themes: Personal background and position, the company, the partnership with K&C, innovation, 
partnerships versus traditional contracting, context: market development, transition to sustainability, 
cooperation with other organizations 
 
Personal background and position in SITA 
Would you tell me your background and your current position and responsibilities in SITA? 
 
Sita UK organization 
Could you provide me with some information on the background of sita - the origin, organization 
and different services/products etc.? 
What are SITAs core competencies? 
Would you say that you have a social and environmental responsibility as a company, and how is 
that a part of company policy? 
 
The partnership with K&C 
What is a partnership to you? 
Would you tell me about the process? How did you/SITA first hear about this contract 
possibility/partnership? How did you feel about it being a ‘partnership’? 
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How were you involved in dialogue with K&C in the pre-procurement and procurement phase? 
How is this contract different from other traditional contracts? ‘Discharge responsibilities’ (see 
charter)? 
How is the partnership organized? (How often do you meet, what do you discuss, etc.) (Partnership 
board) 
How is the management process? Who decides what? Would you say that Sita has a say in the goals 
of the partnership or the means to reach goals or both? Would you consider Sita and K&C as equal 
partners? 
Have there been conflicts or disagreements along the way, and how do you handle these? 
Is there a penalty and incentives system in the contract and has it been used? 
What kind of knowledge or expertise do you bring with you that the public sector did not have? 
What kind of risks is involved in this contract? How do you share those risks between SITA and 
K&C? 
Does the contract form matter to the process of cooperation after the contract award? For instance 
the partnership charter – is that something you use in practice and how? 
 
Innovation and improvements 
Was innovation a purpose of the contract?  
How do the innovation forums work in practice? Which forums are established? Did you use the 
funding? 
How is the tasks described in the contract - Detailed or more functional? 
Did you make any changes to the original task specifications in the contract along the way? 
Did the competition for the contract push/inspire you to come up with any innovative solution? 
Do you develop or implement new ideas in collaboration with managers from K&C? Do you have a 
forum for this? Is it a prioritized part of your work process in the partnership? 
How do you work with innovation in general in Sita? 
 
Partnerships versus traditional contracts 
Would you say that the results of the partnerships are better than in other traditional contracts? 
Is the contract form important for having a partnership relation? 
Do you participate in other partnerships? 
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Context 
How did the market for waste collection develop over the last 10 years? 
Would you say that sustainability has a greater role, and what has driven that development? 
What would you say is necessary in order to get a more sustainable waste management? How far 
can we get with technology, and is there a specific technology that is needed right now? 
Which other organisations/actors do Sita cooperate with? Are you involved in interest 
organizations/network organisations? (national, European, international?) 
 
Other sources 
Do you know any other examples of partnerships contracts?  
Do you know an example of a partnership involving both collection and 
construction/managements of facilities? 
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England, public organization 
This is an example of an interview guide for an interview with a public authority having an 
integrated contract for collection and disposal services. As such, I was specifically trying to find 
out if that made a difference in the partnership relationship or possibilities for innovation and 
sustainability change. 
  Interview guide – Nn,Nn, Sheffield City Council 
 
Background and Organisation 
What is your background? How long did you work in this organisation and in general with waste? 
How is waste management organised in Sheffield? What was the background for your choice of 
contracting out waste services and combining collection and operation of facilities? Did you 
consider other solutions? 
The procurement process and the contract with Veolia 
Will you describe the process of procurement? How much dialogue did you have with private 
bidders in the different stages of the procurement process? How do you interact on a 
daily/weekly/yearly basis? 
Would you characterize your contract as a partnership? How would you characterize a partnership? 
How do you share risks, benefits and resources in the contract? And how did it work out in 
practice? 
Do you have an incentive/penalty system built into the contract?  
Are there any challenges working with private providers (in partnership), eg. conflicts of interest? 
Would you say that you have a trust-based relationship? What is important to make a 
partnership/contractual relationship work? 
 
Innovation 
Did you buy new solutions or something that had proved to work before and why? Please get 
examples 
Did/do innovation play a role in the procurement process, contract design and in the contract period 
after signing? Is innovation/continuous improvement a part of the daily management and how? 
Please give examples.  
In which way do you cooperate with your private contractor on innovation – developing 
ideas/solutions together or coordinating efforts and delegating who is to find the solutions? Who is 
taking initiative to innovating practices? 
Do you believe that private providers have other competences, knowledge or resources than the 
public sector? Do you think that competition gave you a better/more innovative solution? Did you 
do something active to encourage competition? 
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Denmark, private company 
This is an example of an interview guide for an interview with a private company participating 
in a service partnership on waste collection. The interview also focused on characterizing the 
type of company in general and regarding innovation. 
 
 
  
Context 
How did the organisation of waste develop in England? Does sustainability play a bigger/smaller 
role? 
Do you cooperate with other organisation and how? (public/private/networks/interest 
organisations/NGOs/national/international) 
Do you have any ideas to whom else I should talk to about this? 
Interviewguide Meldgaard 
Interview med Nn Nn, Meldgaard Dagrenovation, den 9. januar 2013  
 
Interviewpersonen 
Hvad er din titel og baggrund? Hvor mange år har du arbejdet i branchen? 
Hvilken funktion har du i virksomheden? 
 
Virksomheden generelt 
Vil du kort beskrive jeres virksomhed – ydelser, historie, kunder? Hvad henter i, og hvor afleverer i 
de forskellige fraktioner? Hvor ender affaldet? 
Hvad er jeres kernekompetencer? 
Mener i, at har et ansvar for at skabe en miljøvenlig og socialt ansvarlig affaldshåndtering? Hvordan 
arbejder i med det? 
 
Innovation generelt 
Hvordan arbejder i med innovation i virksomheden?  
Kan du give nogle konkrete eksempler på, at i har udviklet noget nyt? Hvordan var processen? 
Hvordan fik i idéen?  
Samarbejder i med offentlige eller andre private aktører om innovation? 
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  Innovation og kontrakter med offentlige organisationer 
Udvikler og implementerer i noget nyt i forbindelse med kontrakter med offentlige aktører? 
Hvis ja – kan du give eksempler? Hvis nej, hvorfor ikke? 
Er konkurrencen om de offentlige opgaver med til at få jer til at innovere jeres ydelser? 
Skaber i innovation i samarbejde med den offentlige part under en udbudsperiode? 
Hvordan er samarbejdet generelt med offentlige aktører før og under kontraktperioden? Har i en 
god dialog? Oplever du det som et ligeværdigt forhold? Er der tillid i samarbejdet med de 
offentlige? 
Hvad er vigtigt for at få et godt samarbejde med den offentlige aktør? Fra jeres side – og deres? 
Hvad er vigtigt for at få de bedste løsninger? 
 
Servicepartnerskabet med Favrskov – proces, innovation, ledelse 
Hvilke overvejelser gjorde i jer omkring at byde på et servicepartnerskab? 
Hvordan er servicepartnerskabet anderledes end en almindelig kontraktaftale? 
Hvordan var processen omkring servicepartnerskabet? Hvornår startede det, hvad gjorde i 
konkret, hvem er involveret? 
Har der været fokus på udvikling/innovation i partnerskabet? Har der været en øget mulighed for 
at udvikle opgaveløsningen? Hvem sætter – eller skulle sætte – innovation på dagsordenen i 
partnerskabet? 
Har i udviklet noget nyt i forbindelse med partnerskabet? Kan du give et eksempel? Hvad har 
været drivkraften? Er det sket overvejende hos jer, hos den offentlige eller i samarbejde?  
Har jeres samarbejdsrelation været anderledes? Har der været tillid mellem parterne – eller er der 
blevet opbygget tillid?  
Har der været klare rammer for samarbejdet? Hvem leder et servicepartnerskab? 
Hvilke regler har i og/eller kommunen opstillet for samarbejdet? Formelle/uformelle? Hvilken 
rolle spiller kontrakten i jeres daglige samarbejde? 
Har i udviklet normer og værdier for, hvordan samarbejdet skal fungere?  
Har i forskellig viden og kompetencer – og hvordan bruger i det? Bliver det udnyttet? 
Positivt/negativt? 
Har i fælles interesser i partnerskabet? Giver partnerskabet jer incitament til at følge kommunens 
interesser? 
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Denmark, public organisation 
This is an example of an interview guide for an interview with a public organization in a service 
partnership. It was the first interview with a service partnership that I conducted. As such, the 
theoretical framework was in the making and the interview focused on describing the 
organization, partnership contract and process, partnership relationship, innovation and 
regulation. 
  
Interview med RenoSyd  
Nn Nn and Nn Nn, Renosyd I/S 
Ramme: 
Jeg kunne rigtig godt tænke mig at høre mere om jeres erfaringer med jeres servicepartnerskab med 
Marius Pedersen – især i forhold til samarbejdsrelation, hvordan i har arbejdet med (grøn) 
udvikling/innovation og eventuelle udfordringer med de lovgivningsmæssige rammer. Min 
overordnede overvejelse er, om partnerskaber kan bidrage til at skabe grøn innovation og dermed en 
mere bæredygtig udvikling i affaldssektoren, så det vil jeg især meget gerne høre jeres mening om. 
 
Spørgsmål 
 
Baggrund 
- Hvad er jeres personlige baggrund? 
- Hvornår blev Renosyd dannet? 
- Hvordan er Renosyd organiseret? 
 
Har i oplevet konflikter? Hvordan håndterer i eventuelle konflikter? 
Hvilken rolle spiller ledelse i forhold til at få samarbejdet til at fungere? Hvad er god ledelse af et 
servicepartnerskab? Har ledelse en betydning i forhold til udvikling/innovation? 
Ville i byde på et service partnerskab en anden gang? Har det overordnet været en succes? 
 
Affaldssektorens udvikling 
Har markedet for affaldsindsamling og behandling ændret sig? 
Har den private sektors rolle ændret sig? 
Oplever i et øget fokus på affald-som–ressourcer, og har det ændret noget for jer? 
Hvad er vigtigt i forhold til at rykke sektoren i en mere bæredygtig retning? Er der en bestemt 
teknologi, der mangler? Eller er der noget andet, der er vigtigere? 
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Organisering 
- Hvilke indsamlingsordninger har Renosyd? 
- Hvilke serviceydelser udliciterer Renosyd gennem kontrakter? Har i kommunale 
indsamlingsordninger? 
- Hvilke private samarbejdsparter har Renosyd?  
- Hvor er Renosyd i planlægningsprocesserne lige nu? 
 
Servicepartnerskabet – baggrund, organisering, styring og relation 
- Hvad var baggrunden for, at I valgte et partnerskab? 
- Hvad var jeres forventninger? Forventede i innovation? Var miljømæssige forbedringer 
en del af jeres forventninger? 
- Hvordan startede i partnerskabet op? Hvordan var processen? 
- Hvordan er partnerskabet organiseret? Hvilke overordnede punkter indeholder jeres 
kontrakt? Har i en særlig partnerskabskontrakt? Udviklede i fælles politiske 
målsætninger? 
- Hvordan foregår samarbejdet i praksis? Fx hvor ofte mødes i, hvad diskuterer i etc. 
- Har i justeret samarbejdsformen undervejs? 
- Hvordan er relationen med jeres private samarbejdspart? Vil i sige, at I er ligeværdige? 
Hvem træffer beslutninger? 
- Hvilke udfordringer har i haft undervejs? 
- Har der været konflikter i forløbet? 
 
Innovation i partnerskaber/udbud 
- Har i fået indfriet jeres forventninger? Er der noget, der har overrasket jer? 
- Er der sket innovation i partnerskabet? Hvordan? 
- Er innovation sket hos den private part? Eller i et samspil mellem offentlig og privat? 
- Har partnerskabet givet jer noget, som i ikke kunne have fået i et almindeligt udbud? 
- Kan partnerskaber bidrage til at skabe en mere bæredygtig affaldshåndtering? 
 
Regulering 
- Hvordan har udbudsreguleringen spillet sammen med oprettelsen af et 
servicepartnerskab? 
- Er der nogle reguleringsmæssige tiltag i savner? 
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